dissenting.
I.
On the question of whether the initiative makes an appropriation, I respectfully dissent.
In Thomas v. Rosen, 569 P.2d 793, 796 (Alaska 1977), we quoted favorably from State ex rel. Finnegan v. Dammann, 220 Wis. 143, 264 N.W. 622, 624 (1936), which in turn states:
“An appropriation is the setting aside from the public revenue of a certain sum of money for a specified object, in such manner as the executive officers of the government are authorized to use that money, and no more, for that object, and no other.”
Courts in other jurisdictions have also defined “appropriation” for state constitutional purposes as applying to the use of money.1 But even more persuasive is the record of the proceedings of the Alaska Constitutional Convention. As originally proposed, the provision restricting the use of the initiative and referendum prohibited their use in “making or defeating appropriations of public funds.” 2 The floor discussion shows that the main concern of the delegates was that the expenditure of public money should not be subject to direct legislation by the electorate.3
It appears that the committee on style and drafting eliminated the words “of public funds” from the constitutional provisions because the state can only appropriate public funds. The committee chairman, Dele*20gate Sundborg, stated that those words were eliminated because the committee regarded them as redundant and unnecessary.4
In light of this history, I can find no sound reason for stretching the constitutional language to cover the distribution of land, a subject plainly not considered within the meaning of “appropriations” by our constitutional framers.
I would hold that the superior court erred in concluding that the initiative at bar amounted to a prohibited appropriation.
II.
My colleagues do not reach the question of whether the initiative violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of laws or the prohibition against special legislation. Because I would hold that the initiative does not amount to an appropriation, I must also express my views on these subjects.5
The Alaska Constitution, Art. XI, Sec. 7, provides that, “The initiative shall not be used to enact local or special legislation.” The homestead initiative is attacked as violating this provision. It is argued that the durational residency requirements of the initiative should be subjected to strict scrutiny as penalizing the right to travel. Alternatively, it is urged that the durational residency requirements do not bear a fair and substantial relationship to the purposes of the act.
I think the first argument is misplaced. It is true that laws which impinge upon the fundamental right of interstate migration, by denying the necessities of life or by penalizing the right to migrate, are invalid unless a compelling state interest justifies those laws.6
However, the initiative does not pose any obstacle to interstate migration. It does not deny to anyone the necessities of life or penalize a person for having migrated to Alaska. There is no fundamental right to receive land from the state to which one migrates. Certainly there are no cases which even intimate that such a right exists. The granting of state lands is a benefit conferred upon recipients of land grants, but it is not a penalty inflicted upon those to whom the grants are not made.
In this sphere of activity the state enjoys a large measure of autonomy. As the United States Supreme Court has observed:
“The governments of the States are sovereign within their territories save only as they are subject to the prohibitions of the Constitution as their action in some measure conflicts with powers delegated to the National Government, or with Congressional legislation enacted in the exercise of those powers.” Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 359-60, 63 S.Ct. 307, 317-318, 87 L.Ed. 315 (1943).
The Alaska Constitution expressly permits the state to dispose of its lands. Art. VIII, Sec. 9, provides:
“Subject to the provisions of this section, the legislature may provide for the sale or grant of state lands, or interests therein, and establish sales procedures. All sales or grants shall contain such reservations to the State of all resources as may be required by Congress or the State and shall provide for access to these resources. Reservation of access shall not necessarily impair the owners’ use, prevent the control of trespass, or preclude compensation for damages.”
*21Thus the object of the initiative, a grant of land, is quite plainly within the lawful powers of the state.7
As noted above, this legislation does not require strict scrutiny. Therefore, the compelling state interest test does not apply. We have stated in our previous cases that where fundamental rights or suspect classifications are not in issue, we will employ a more deferential test.
“Examining both the legislative goals and the means used to advance them, we must determine whether the legislation bears a ‘fair and substantial relationship’ to legitimate purposes.” State v. Lewis, 559 P.2d 630, 643 (Alaska 1977).8
We have also noted that the test to be employed in determining whether a statute amounts to special legislation, prohibited by the constitution, is substantially the same as that applicable to non-suspect classifications which are challenged as violating the guarantee of the equal protéction of the laws. State v. Lewis, supra at 643.
I know of no principle of law which prohibits a state from distributing land to its residents upon the basis of how long they have resided in the state. The initiative before us parcels out state lands as an incentive to settle and develop the state, as well as to encourage citizen awareness of and involvement in the affairs of the state. Those who have spent more time in the state and who have made, it is presumed, a greater contribution to the state’s economy and well-being are given greater amounts of land. To insure permanent settlement of the land and to enhance economic growth, I think it is permissible for the state to base its land grants upon length of residence. This is a practical method of assuring that the land will go to those who have a more permanent attachment to Alaska than casual visitors or newcomers. In my view, the initiative does not violate the prohibition against special legislation nor does it deny to anyone the equal protection of the laws.
Because our test requiring a fair and substantial relationship between the legislative ends and the means used to achieve them is more exacting than the federal rational basis test, it follows that the federal requirements of equal protection of the laws are also satisfied.
It is my opinion that the initiative is constitutionally valid.
. Dorsey v. Petrott, 178 Md. 230, 13 A.2d 630 (1940); Michigan Good Roads Federation v. Alger, 333 Mich. 352, 53 N.W .2d 481 (1952).
. Part 6, Appendices, December 9, 1955, at 1820, 23-24.
. Part 2, Proceedings, December 16, 1955, at 931-33, 941 — 42.
. Part 4, Proceedings, January 24, 1956, at 269-70.
. I am not dealing with these questions as exhaustively as I might were I not in dissent. I am merely setting forth my general views on these subjects.
. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972); Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 94 S.Ct. 1076, 39 L.Ed.2d 306 (1974); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1968); Hicklin v. Orbeck, 565 P.2d 159, 162 (Alaska 1977), reversed on other grounds, 437 U.S. 518, 98 S.Ct. 2482, 57 L.Ed.2d 397 (1978). See also L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 1003-1005 (1978).
. While Art. VIII, Sec. 9, refers to the legislature, the people through the initiative enjoy the same power as the legislature, so long as the initiative is not used for a purpose prohibited by Art. XI, Sec. 7, Alaska Constitution.
. See also, Isakson v. Rickey, 550 P.2d 359, 361-63 (Alaska 1976).