dissenting opinion.
I disagree with the majority opinion holding that the stop of the vehicle cannot be justified under ORS 131.615(1) or 496.660(1) and, therefore, respectfully dissent.
The majority opinion discusses Delaware v. Prouse, _ US _, 99 S Ct 1391, 59 L Ed 2d 660, (1979), but does not reach a conclusion as to its applicability to this case. The majority correctly points out that the questioning of all oncoming traffic at a roadblock-type stop is one possible alternative that would not come under the Delaware decision. The majority opinion stops there. I believe the facts of this case demonstrate *557that this was, in fact, a roadblock-type situation contemplated by Delaware.1
The majority holds that the stop is prohibited by ORS 131.615(1). This statute is based on Terry v. Ohio, 392 US 1, 88 S Ct 1868, 20 L Ed 2d 889 (1968). Proposed Oregon Criminal Code 26, Commentary § 31 (1972).2 The Terry court held that a police officer may briefly detain a person on the street without probable cause to arrest in order to make "reasonable inquiries” where the officer can cite articulable facts leading to his belief that criminal activity is afoot. 392 US at 30. In State v. Cloman, 254 Or 1, 456 P2d 67 (1969), the Oregon Supreme Court extended the Terry stop to motor vehicles and noted reasonable suspicion "to be of less quantum than probable cause to arrest.” 245 Or at 6. Because our statute was based upon Terry, we should now be guided by the most recent language of the United States Supreme Court on this subject.
In Delaware the court said:
"* * * This holding does not preclude the State of Delaware or other States from developing methods for spot checks that involve less intrusion or that do not involve the unconstrained exercise of discretion. Questioning of all oncoming traffic at roadblock-type stops is one possible alternative. We hold only that persons in automobiles on public roadways may not for that reason alone have their travel and privacy *558interfered with at the unbridled discretion of police officers. * * *” 59 L Ed 2d at 674.
I believe the question presented in this case is whether this game officer acted with "unbridled discretion.” I think not.
I find the facts of this case to be much more than set forth in the majority opinion. The officer had gone to the area where defendant’s automobile was stopped because a reliable informant had told him about a week earlier that some illegal deer killing was going on "above the gate.” The vehicle was seen by the officer on a private road owned by Weyerhauser Timber Co. about three miles above a gate manned by a timber company fire watchman. The officer thought the truck had been stopped on a high spot on the wrong side of the road and that it had just started toward the officer’s vehicle. It was a Saturday afternoon when few loggers, if any, were working in the remote, lightly traveled area. This was the first vehicle the officer had seen since coming through the gate three miles earlier.
The area where the automobile was stopped was so remote that persons, if any, who would be encountered would likely be there only for logging operations or to hunt bear, which was permitted at that particular time. In view of the officer’s reliable information that illegal deer killing was occurring in the area and, as the majority opinion points out, that he intended "to stop every vehicle he encountered,” he acted in the only way possible under the circumstances to determine if there were game violations occurring in the area which, I would hold, does not amount to 'unbridled discretion' in this instance.
Admittedly, this was not a typical roadblock where officers wait for automobiles to arrive at the roadblock, but it would be ridiculous to expect a game officer to use that method. Obviously, in the area described, he might wait days for one automobile. The more effective law enforcement practice would be to seek out the vehicles and inspect each and every one. The *559fact that this was the first vehicle stopped is not important for it may have been the only one in the area. What is important is the game officer’s intent to stop every vehicle which I conclude Delaware permits.
For these reasons I dissent.
It should also be noted that the concurring opinion in Delaware states:
"* * * And I would not regard the present case as a precedent that throws any constitutional shadow upon the necessarily somewhat individualized and perhaps largely random examinations by game wardens in the performance of their duties. In a situation of this type, it seems to me, the Court’s balancing process, and the value factors under consideration, would be quite different.” 59 L Ed 2d at 674.
While the majority opinion in Delaware makes no comment on this observation it is not disavowed.
Recognizing the fact that "the statute adopts a different rule than the decision in Terry by deleting the words "or is about to commit, ” State v. Valdez, 277 Or 621, n 4 at 625, 561 P2d 1006 (1977), I do not believe that distinction is relevant here.