concurring in the result.
I agree with the majority that there was no error in the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion for a mistrial or the admission of the 27 December 1995 armed robbery charge. I write separately, however, to address the admissibility of the 27 December 1995 armed robbery1 in light of its relevancy under Rule 404(b) and potential for unfair prejudice.
I
A
Relevancy
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible if it is relevant for purposes other than to show the defendant “ ‘has the propensity or disposition to commit an offense [of] the nature of the crime charged,’ ” State v. Chavis, 141 N.C. App. 553, 563, 540 S.E.2d 404, 412 (2000) (citation omitted); N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 404(b) (1999), and if it proves “a material fact in issue in the crime charged,” State v. Johnson, 317 N.C. 417, 425, 347 S.E.2d 7, 12 (1986). In determining the relevancy of the evidence, there must be a connection between the extraneous criminal transaction and the crime charged. Chavis, 141 N.C. App. at 563, 540 S.E.2d at 412.
In this case, the trial court admitted evidence of the 27 December 1995 armed robbery for the purpose of “establishing] a modus operandi and . . . shed[ding] light on the identity of the [perpetrator] in the present case[].” Evidence of other crimes may be offered to establish a “defendant’s identity as the perpetrator when the modus operandi is similar enough to make it likely that the same person committed both crimes.” State v. Sokolowski, 351 N.C. 137, 150, 522 *654S.E.2d 65, 73 (1999). “This theory of admissibility requires ‘some unusual facts present in both crimes or particularly similar acts which would indicate that the same person committed both crimes.’ ” State v. Carter, 338 N.C. 569, 588, 451 S.E.2d 157, 167 (1994) (quoting State v. Moore, 309 N.C. 102, 106, 305 S.E.2d 542, 545 (1983)), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1107, 132 L. Ed. 2d 263 (1995).
In this case, there are similarities between the 22 December 1995 armed robbery and murder and the 27 December 1995 armed robbery. In both instances, the perpetrator of the offense used a long butcher knife to commit the offense, which occurred in the same general area at nighttime. Furthermore, in both instances, there is evidence defendant was driven to the crime scene by an accomplice who did not enter the premises but later picked up defendant from the crime scene. Moreover, there was testimony that after the commission of both crimes, defendant gave the knife to another person for disposal. Accordingly, the trial court properly concluded evidence of the 27 December 1995 armed robbery was admissible under Rule 404(b) to establish the identity of the perpetrator of the 22 December 1995 armed robbery and murder.
B
Unfair prejudice
Although I believe the 27 December 1995 armed robbery is relevant under Rule 404(b), “it may nevertheless be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Chavis, 141 N.C. App. at 564, 540 S;E.2d at 413. “The question of whether evidence is unfairly prejudicial ‘is a matter left to the sound discretion of the trial court.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Haskins, 104 N.C. App. 675, 680, 411 S.E.2d 376, 381 (1991), disc. review denied, 331 N.C. 287, 417 S.E.2d 256 (1992)).
In this case, the trial court admitted the evidence for the limited purpose of establishing identity and found the two offenses “sufficiently similar” and “not so remote in time as to dilute the commonality.” The trial court then determined “the probative value substantially outweigh[ed] the danger of unfair prejudice.” In light of the limited purpose of the evidence and the trial court’s findings, I do not believe the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of the 27 December 1995 armed robbery.
. Evidence of the 27 December 1996 armed robbery was excluded during the State’s examination of Detective Nicholson but was later admitted during the State’s cross-examination of defendant.