concurring specially.
I concur fully in Divisions 1, 2 and 4 of the opinion, and while agreeing with the result reached in Division 3,1 am compelled to offer the following comments. The broad rule that an indigent probationer has no right to the assistance of counsel at a revocation hearing has been modified by the United States Supreme Court in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U. S 778 (93 SC 1756, 36 LE2d 656) (1973), holding that counsel at a probation revocation hearing should be determined on a case-by-case basis applying certain general guidelines as to whether the assistance of counsel is constitutionally necessary. Parrish v. State, 164 Ga. App. 575 (2) (298 SE2d 558) (1982); see Hunter v. State, 139 Ga. App. 676 (1) (229 SE2d 505) (1976). Further, “[i]n every case in which a request for counsel at a preliminary or final hearing is refused, the grounds for refusal should be stated succinctly in the record.” Gagnon v. Scarpelli, supra at 791. However, as noted in the opinion, the issue here involves a request for counsel on appeal from a probation revocation hearing; counsel had been appointed for appellant at the hearing.
In deciding whether Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353 (83 SC 814, 9 LE2d 811) (1963), which requires the appointment of counsel for indigent state defendants on their first appeal as of right from a conviction, should be extended to require counsel for discretionary state appeals (such as certiorari to the state supreme court) and for applications for review in the United States Supreme Court, that court held that neither the Due Process Clause nor the ¡Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the appointment of counsel for an indigent beyond his first appeal as of right from his conviction. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U. S. 600 (94 SC 2437, 41 LE2d 341) (1974). “The duty of the State under our cases is not to duplicate the legal arsenal that may be privately retained by a criminal defendant in a continuing effort to reverse his conviction, but only to assure the indigent defendant an adequate opportunity to present his claims fairly in the context of the State’s appellate process.” Id. at 616.
“ ‘[T]he quantum of evidence sufficient to justify revocation of probation is less than that necessary to sustain a conviction in the first instance, and where there is even slight evidence of misconduct *699the appellate court will not interfere with revocation unless there has been manifest abuse of discretion.’ ” Johnson v. State, 142 Ga. App. 124, 126 (235 SE2d 550), affd. 240 Ga. 526 (242 SE2d 53) (1978), cert. den., Johnson v. Georgia, 439 U. S. 881 (1978). The trial court must set forth in the record the basis for any revocation of probation in order to facilitate appellate review. State v. Brinson, 248 Ga. 380 (1) (283 SE2d 463) (1981). Under these circumstances, I am of the opinion that an indigent has an adequate opportunity on appeal from the revocation of his probation for a fair presentation of his claims and that the appointment of counsel is not necessary in order to assure such opportunity. Cf. Ross v. Moffitt, supra.