Appellant Geneva Smith received injuries to her back and neck of the kind known as “whiplash” when the taxicab in which she was a passenger was struck from the rear by an automobile owned and driven by appellee Morico. She brought an action against the driver of the cab, the owner of the cab company, and appellee Morico, alleging negligence on the part of the two drivers and vicarious negligence on the part of the owner.
At the close of plaintiffs evidence appellee moved for a directed verdict in his favor, on the ground that no evidence of actionable negligence on his part had been adduced. The court granted the motion, thereby dismissing appellee from the main case. The jury subsequently found for the plaintiff against the other two defendants, who are not parties to this appeal. Appellant assigns as error the trial court’s award of a directed verdict in favor of appellee Morico. Held:
The record sustains appellee’s contention that there was offered at trial no competent evidence of fault on his part. The only evidence presented on this issue was the testimony of appellant Smith herself, who admittedly did not see appellee’s oncoming car until after the collision had occurred and who therefore was not competent to testify as to appellee’s speed, position on the roadway, or manner of operating his vehicle. Smith did not call the cab driver to testify in this regard and did not object to the court’s refusal to allow him to testify because he had failed to file an answer and was therefore in default. Moreover, the cab driver’s default was tantamount to admission of the allegations of the complaint, including that, without exercising due care, he drove into the middle lane, where appellee was driving and where the collision occurred. This tacit admission had the effect of tending to exculpate Morico.
Smith thus failed to establish the elements of negligence and thereby to make out a prima facie case against appellee. Plaintiff’s evidence suggested only the elements of duty and injury with reference to appellee Morico; nothing was offered to indicate breach of duty or causation on his part. It is axiomatic that “[t]he mere fact that an accident happened and the plaintiff may have sustained injuries or damages affords no basis for recovery against [a particular] defendant unless the plaintiff carries the burden of proof and shows that such accident and... damages were caused by specific acts of negligence on the part of [that] defendant . . .” Brown v. Kirkland, 108 Ga. App. 651, 655 (134 SE2d 472) (1963). Moreover, *738“[n]egligence is not to be presumed... In the absence of affirmative proof of negligence, we must presume performance of duty and freedom from negligence.” Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Stevens, 130 Ga. App. 363, 368 (203 SE2d 587) (1973). While it is true that questions of negligence are ordinarily for the trier of fact, Thompson v. Walker, 162 Ga. App. 292 (290 SE2d 490) (1982), plaintiff here has failed to establish any relationship between the collision and the conduct of appellee beyond the fact that his car was involved. Where “ [p]laintiff simply fail[s] to prove his case... the direction of a verdict [is] proper... The mere existence of conflicts in the evidence does not render the direction of a verdict erroneous if it was demanded, either from proof or from lack of proof on the controlling issue or issues.” Carr v. Jacuzzi Bros., 133 Ga. App. 70, 74 (210 SE2d 16) (1974); Wagner v. Timms, 158 Ga. App. 538 (281 SE2d 295) (1981); OCGA § 9-11-50 (Code Ann. § 81A-150).
Decided May 25, 1983. R. Wade Gastin, Rowe Brogdon, Jack P. Friday, Jr., for appellant. R. Stephen Sims, A. Martin Kent, for appellees.The trial court did not err in directing a verdict for appellee.
Judgment affirmed.
Banke, Birdsong, Sognier and Pope, JJ., concur. Shulman, C. J., Quillian, P. J., McMurray, P. J., and Carley, J., dissent.