dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that the applicable property tax statutes are constitutional. The current statutory scheme for property taxation permits the assessor to ignore current adverse economic conditions, thereby permitting unjust and unequal taxation.
As noted by the majority, article X, section 3(l)(a) of the Colorado Constitution, provides that property tax levies shall be uniform, just and equal, and shall be based upon the actual value of the property.
*206The statutory property taxation scheme, codified at sections 39-1-101 to 39-1-119, 16B C.R.S. (1982 & 1985 Supp.), allows the assessor to assess property taxes in 1985 based upon 1977 property values. See § 39-1-104 (10)(a), 16B C.R.S. (1985 Supp.). The 1977 actual values, in turn, are based upon 1976 economic conditions, including 1976 office building vacancy rates. § 39-l-104(9)(c), 16B C.R.S. (1982). Therefore, it is well within the assessor’s discretion under the present statutory scheme to assess property taxes in 1985 based solely on 1976 economic conditions. As acknowledged by the majority, when this base year method is used, two buildings may have identical tax burdens, even though in 1985 one building is vacant and the other is fully leased.
In my view, a taxation scheme that permits such circumstances to exist, ignoring the severe increase in office building vacancy rates between 1976 and 1985, violates article X, section 3(l)(a) of the Colorado Constitution, and the equal protection clauses of the United States and Colorado Constitutions.1
In order to find that a property tax statute is unconstitutional on equal protection grounds, it must be clear that no rational relationship exists between the goals and effects of the statute. Colorado Dept. of Social Servs. v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 697 P.2d 1 (Colo.1985). Equal protection is guaranteed only if there is a rational basis for the tax classification scheme imposed. Friends of Chamber Music v. City & County of Denver, 696 P.2d 309 (Colo.1985) (citing Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 95 S.Ct. 2457, 45 L.Ed.2d 522 (1975)).
The “goal” of the property tax statutes is established by the equal protection clauses and article X, section 3(l)(a); namely, to provide for uniform taxation laws and to secure “just and equalized” valuations for tax assessments. Here, because current economic conditions can be ignored,2 and property values established on economic conditions that existed ten years ago, the goals of the statutory scheme have no rational relationship to the resulting effects. Moreover, assuming that the goal of the scheme is also to secure equalized and uniform taxation, there is no rational basis for a classification scheme that assesses identically a fully leased office building with one that is entirely or partially vacant.
Accordingly, I dissent.
. I recognize that a property’s base year valuation may be readjusted to a higher or lower level if a decrease in actual value is attributed to an "unusual condition." § 39 — 1—104(1 l)(b)(I), 16B C.R.S. (1985 Supp.). Further, the assessor may, if he so chooses, consider vacancy rates as a factor under the "income approach" to valuation. See § 39-l-103(5)(a), 16B C.R.S. (1985 Supp.). This does not alter my conclusion that the scheme is unconstitutional, however, because section 39 — 1—104(1 l)(b)(I) does not list economic obsolescence as an "unusual condition," and limits a finding of "unusual condition” to very specific occurrences, such as change in the use of the land, vandalism, or fire. Moreover, under the statutory scheme, the assessor is not required to use the income approach when valuing property.
. Prior to the enactment of the current statutory scheme, we held that economic obsolescence should have an important bearing on the determination of property value for tax purposes. See Colorado & Utah Coal Co. v. Rorex, 149 Colo. 502, 369 P.2d 796 (1962).