(dissenting in part, concurring in part) — While I agree with the majority's conclusion regarding the adoption of Benton/Franklin County Local Juvenile Court Rule 7.14(b), I dissent from its reasoning on the separation of powers issue and from its conclusion that these cases should be remanded for findings of prejudice regarding each defendant's ability to defend against the charges. The majority rewrites this rule on appeal. That is unnecessary and unjust, because it compounds the harm these juveniles have already suffered.
*564The Delays in These Cases Were Clearly Unreasonable Under the Rule
There are four juvenile defendants involved here. In each case the State engaged in unreasonable delay in filing charges.
Timothy Blackman was alleged to have committed second degree burglary on January 1, 1986. The police report was completed and forwarded to the prosecutor within a week, on January 6, 1986. The State, however, did not charge Blackman for over a year, until February 25, 1987.
The police report on Manuel Ruelas Chavez was completed and forwarded to the prosecuting attorney on February 19, 1986. He was not charged with second degree burglary until 4 months later, on June 11, 1986. The State also delayed charging Richard Rotter for 4 months. Rotter was investigated for burglary, and the police completed their report and forwarded it to the prosecutor on February 12, 1986. Charges were not filed until June 9, 1986, however.
Shameeka Avery was charged with third degree assault on January 22, 1987. The alleged assault, however, took place 8 months before and the police report had been forwarded to the prosecution 6 months before, on July 15, 1986.
In each of these cases, especially Blackman's, it seems to me that the juvenile has suffered per se prejudice by the State's delay. Even if I agreed with the majority that prejudice was required under the local rule, I would affirm the trial court's dismissal of these cases. It seems absolutely clear that the delay in each of these cases was at least unreasonable, and I would affirm the trial court in the four cases because unreasonable delay is all that LJuCR 7.14(b) requires to justify dismissal.
*565The Dismissals Were Proper Under the Local Rule
The majority writes:
Dismissal without specific determinations that prosecu-torial delay resulted in actual harm to the four defendants' defense was improper under the standards set forth in LJuCR 7.14(b).
Majority, at 563. The problem with this conclusion is that the local rule does not require a finding of prejudice in the ability to defend as a prerequisite to dismissal. The rule provides in part:
Upon a prima facie showing of unreasonable delay, the Court shall then determine whether or not dismissal or other appropriate sanction will be imposed. Among those factors otherwise considered, the Court shall consider the following: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the impact of the delay on ability to defend against the charge; and (4) the seriousness of the alleged offense.
Brief of Appellant, at 32. As the majority recognizes, the trial judge relies on his discretion in determining the appropriate sanction. The rule lists four factors which ought to be considered in arriving at a decision. While consideration of all four is mandatory, none of the four is either necessary or sufficient to require dismissal. Prejudice to the ability to defend may indicate that dismissal is appropriate, but it also may, within the terms of the rule, constitute grounds for "other appropriate sanction." Similarly, the trial court may consider whether there is prejudice to the ability to defend and determine that such prejudice is slight or nonexistent. The court may nevertheless, within the terms of the rule, determine that one or more of the other three factors necessitates dismissal. In short, the rule requires consideration of the four factors, not a positive finding as to each and every one.
*566In a sense, the majority turns the rule upside down. As the majority reads the rule, dismissal is justified by prejudice to the defendant and unreasonable delay is an indicator of prejudice. The rule, however, does not read that way. Instead, the rule provides for dismissal or other sanction when there has been unreasonable delay. Whether a delay is unreasonable depends, in part, on the four factors, including prejudice to the ability to defend.
The rule focuses on unreasonable delay, rather than prejudice per se, because it is a juvenile court rule. Prompt disposition is a paramount value in juvenile prosecutions, as a number of features of the system indicate. For example, the speedy trial period for juveniles is 30 to 60 days, JuCR 7.8(b), compared with 60 to 90 days for adults. CrR 3.3(c). The sentencing period for adults is 40 days. RCW 9.94A.110. For juveniles, that period is 14 days. JuCR 7.12(a). The concern for promptness arises from the special nature of juvenile prosecutions. Unlike adult criminal proceedings, a primary purpose of juvenile proceedings is rehabilitation, not punishment alone. State v. Rice, 98 Wn.2d 384, 393, 655 P.2d 1145 (1982). Unless charges are resolved promptly, the process of rehabilitation is delayed, with a resulting threat to the juvenile's opportunities for rehabilitation and the likelihood of success. The local rule's stress on unreasonable delay is a reflection of those concerns. Its plain terms require dismissal for delay, not prejudice.
Therefore, while it is true that the trial courts did not make findings regarding prejudice in the ability to defend these cases, it is not necessary to remand for such findings. It is enough that, in each trial judge's considered opinion, dismissal was called for on the ground of unreasonable delay.
The Separation op Powers Problem
As I read LJuCR 7.14(b), it does not require a showing of prejudice to the ability to defend. Its plain terms require no more than a finding of unreasonable delay. The majority *567arrives at a different conclusion primarily because it fears this "plain meaning" construction of the rule may violate the separation of powers.
There are, of course, substantial separation of powers considerations in a dismissal for preinformation misconduct. Such a dismissal, whether pursuant to a court rule or not, risks encroachment on the Legislature's power to set limitations periods and on the executive's discretion in initiating criminal proceedings. Therefore, aside from statutes of limitations, a court can dismiss only on independent constitutional grounds; that is, for a violation of due process. United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 52 L. Ed. 2d 752, 97 S. Ct. 2044 (1977); United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 30 L. Ed. 2d 468, 92 S. Ct. 455 (1971).
The majority concludes that a dismissal for unreasonable delay is not a dismissal for a violation of due process. Consequently, in order to avoid a separation of powers problem, the majority reads into LJuCR 7.14(b) the requirement that the defendant show prejudice to the ability to defend. This seems to make sense, since our cases require a showing of prejudice before a due process violation will be found. In State v. Calderon, 102 Wn.2d 348, 352-53, 684 P.2d 1293 (1984) we held:
The defendant must show that he was prejudiced by the delay and, in making its due process inquiry, the court must consider the reasons for the delay as well as the prejudice to the accused.
Simply establishing prejudice is not enough, however. To find a due process violation, the court must also consider the State's reasons for the delay. If the State is able to justify the delay, the court must undertake a further balancing of the State's interest and the prejudice to the accused.
(Citations omitted. Italics mine.) Calderon, at 352-53. The majority reasons that, since the trial court can dismiss only for a due process violation and since Calderon requires a showing of prejudice, dismissal under LJuCR 7.14(b) requires a showing of prejudice to the ability to defend.
*568However, "prejudice" within the meaning of Calderon is not limited to prejudice in the ability to defend. We recognized in that case that prejudice sufficient to violate due process may consist solely of the loss of the special benefits of the juvenile justice system. Calderon, at 352-53. Because one of the prime values of the juvenile justice system is the prompt disposition of charges, unreasonable delay standing alone may constitute a due process violation, including the prejudice required by Calderon. A "plain meaning" reading of LJuCR 7.14(b) does not violate the separation of powers because the rule merely guides the trial court in determining whether due process has been violated by a delay in charging.
Conclusion
The local rule required the trial judges only to determine whether the State had committed "unreasonable delay" in charging these juveniles. We will ordinarily reverse for an abuse of discretion only where no reasonable person would arrive at the same conclusion as the trial court. Purser v. Rahm, 104 Wn.2d 159, 174, 702 P.2d 1196 (1985); Griggs v. Averbeck Realty, Inc., 92 Wn.2d 576, 584, 599 P.2d 1289 (1979). The trial courts did conclude that the State's actions in each of these cases resulted in unreasonable delay. In my opinion, on this record any reasonable person would reach the same conclusion.
I would affirm the trial court's decision in each case.
Pearson, C.J., and Utter, J., concur with Dore, J.