concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with the majority that since plaintiffs seek no equitable relief in this case, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to plaintiffs on the defense of laches. I believe, however, that issues of fact remain regarding whether defendant breached the parties’ agreement and, therefore, respectfully dissent.
*449The parties’ agreement provided in its entirety:
CATHERINE BARKER as Seller of the lands being conveyed this date to DIANE CATER, LYNNE O’CONNOR and KATHLEEN C. O’CONNOR, Buyers, in consideration of Buyers’ agreeing to complete the closing subject to this agreement, rather than wait for certain repairs to be completed by Seller on the house being sold hereby agrees, covenants and promises Buyers as follows:
1. Seller at her expense shall cause the repairs listed on Exhibit A to be made to the house, some of which have already been started.
2. The foundation footing for that portion of the house that has been formed and poured onto the ground and over tree stumps shall be repaired and/or replaced at Seller’s expense so that the foundation for the entire house meets standards of the North Carolina Building Code and good residential construction standards.
3. The sum of $4,000.00 for the foundation work and $200.00 for the other repairs shall be escrowed by Philo, Spivey & Henning, P.A. at closing from Seller’s net sales proceeds to be applied to these expenses. If the expenses of the repairs exceeds the sum being escrowed, Seller shall pay for any and all additional cost.
The record on appeal does not include Exhibit A to the agreement and the parties have not specified what repairs other than the foundation were subject to the agreement.
In support of their motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs submitted their own affidavits with each stating only generally “[t]hat she has been damaged by the breach of the repair agreement by the Defendant” and seeking $14,500.00 in damages and. $2,900.00 in attorneys’ fees and costs. The affidavits supplied no facts whatsoever about the breach apart from the conclusory claim that the agreement was breached. Plaintiffs also submitted the affidavit of Don Bates, who stated (1) that he had worked in the residential Homebuilding and construction industry for 28 years, (2) that he had personal knowledge “of the repair work sought by the Plaintiffs in the above-captioned action,” and (3) that the cost of the repair would be $14,500.00 in labor and materials. Thus, Mr. Bates’ affidavit supplied no information about any breach of contract either. In short, *450plaintiffs sought summary judgment based on their bare assertion that defendant breached the agreement and based on evidence of their damages.
Defendant responded with her own affidavit, which stated in pertinent part:
6. That following closing, on or about December 9, 2000, a report from a qualified civil engineer had been obtained by my real estate broker, Larry Davis, regarding the necessary work to repair the foundation mentioned in the Escrow Agreement. Copy of this report is attached as Exhibit “2”.
7. Following the receipt of this report, Mr. Larry Davis obtained an estimate to perform the necessary work from Shayne Boatwright in the amount of $5,500.00. At the time of the estimate, in late 2000 or early or [sic] 2001, Mr. Boatwright was able to perform the work during the spring of 2001 and as far as I know, no action was undertaken by Plaintiffs or their attorney to authorized [sic] the work to be performed at any time during the year 2001. I did not refuse to pay for the work required to be done at any time and in fact, authorized Mr. Davis to have the work performed.
I have no further information regarding what has transpire[d] with regard to this escrow account except for copy of letter [sic] received on or about May 29, 2002 from my attorney. This letter is attached as Éxhibit “3” and includes a copy of a letter from Plaintiffs then-attorney, the holder of the escrow monies outlining the fact that some of the monies placed into escrow had been expended, namely $200.00 for other repairs which was proper under the Escrow Agreement and $475.00 for the engineering report attached hereinabove dated December 9, 2000.
The North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure provide that summary judgment shall be granted “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” N.C.R. Civ. P. 56(c). In deciding the motion, “ ‘all inferences of fact. . . must be drawn against the movant and in favor of the party opposing the motion.’ ” Caldwell v. Deese, 288 N.C. 375, 378, 218 S.E.2d 379, 381 (1975) (quoting 6 James W. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 56-15[3], at 2337 (2d ed. 1971)).
*451The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of establishing the lack of any triable issue. Collingwood v. General Elec. Real Estate Equities, Inc., 324 N.C. 63, 66, 376 S.E.2d 425, 427 (1989). Once the moving party meets its burden, then the non-moving party must “produce a forecast of evidence demonstrating that the plaintiff will be able to make out at least a prima facie case at trial.” Id. In opposing a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party “may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” N.C.R. Civ. P. 56(e).
On appeal, this Court’s task is to determine, on the basis of the materials presented to the trial court, whether there is a genuine issue as to any material fact and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Oliver v. Roberts, 49 N.C. App. 311, 314, 271 S.E.2d 399, 401 (1980), cert. denied, 276 S.E.2d 283 (1981). A trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment is reviewed de novo as the trial court rules only on questions of law. Va. Elec. & Power Co. v. Tillett, 80 N.C. App. 383, 384-85, 343 S.E.2d 188, 191, cert. denied, 317 N.C. 715, 347 S.E.2d 457 (1986).
In this case, the parties agree that a valid contract existed. The primary question before this Court is whether a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether defendant breached that contract. The agreement specified that “Seller at her expense shall cause the repairs listed on Exhibit A to be made to the house”; that “[t]he foundation footing . . . shall be repaired and/or replaced at Seller’s expense”; and that Seller would place $4,200.00 in escrow to be applied to the cost of the foundation work and other repairs, with Seller being responsible for any additional sums necessary to complete the repairs. In response to plaintiffs’ conclusory assertion that defendant breached that agreement, defendant submitted her own affidavit stating that she paid $4,200.00 into the escrow account; that she obtained (1) a report specifying the work necessary to repair the foundation and (2) an estimate from Shayne Boatwright of $5,500.00 for completion of that work; that Mr. Boatwright was available to perform the work; and that defendant authorized that the work be done. Defendant asserts that plaintiffs did not, however, authorize Mr. Boatwright to do the work.
When the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to defendant, as the non-moving party, I believe that it supports a find*452ing that defendant had located a contractor and authorized that the work be done. Since defendant was no longer in possession of the premises, it is difficult to see what more defendant could do to comply with the agreement.
The majority suggests that defendant has failed to offer evidence that plaintiffs interfered with defendant’s causing the repairs to be made. Defendant’s affidavit, however, states: “[N]o action was undertaken by Plaintiffs or their attorney to authorize [] the work to be performed at any time during the year 2001.” The majority does not explain how repairs could be performed on plaintiffs’ property without plaintiffs’ authorization. Given the brevity of plaintiffs’ eviden-tiary showing, defendant’s affidavit should be sufficient to defeat summary judgment.
I believe that the majority substitutes itself for the jury when it asserts that “ [defendant's one attempt at performance over the course of two years cannot discharge her obligation.” A reasonable jury could decide that defendant’s efforts in obtaining a report identifying the repairs necessary, locating a contractor to perform the work, authorizing the contractor to begin work, and notifying plaintiffs was sufficient to comply with her obligations under the agreement. It is not for this Court to make that determination especially given the almost non-existent nature of plaintiffs’ evidentiary showing.
While undoubtedly there is more to this story, plaintiffs chose not to present their version of the facts and their theory of their claim to the trial court. Neither plaintiffs’ summary judgment materials nor their brief on appeal demonstrate why defendant’s actions constituted as a matter of law a breach of the agreement. Simply asserting that a breach has occurred, without adding any factual details to support such a claim, should be insufficient to establish entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on a breach of contract claim when the defendant has offered evidence suggesting that no breach occurred.