(dissenting).
I do not join the court in remanding for a new sentence.
I find it unthinkable that the trial court was not aware of defendant’s age or that it was overlooked at the time of sentencing. Right from the beginning, defendant’s age played a key role in the proceedings against him. Except for the fact that the juvenile court declined to recall jurisdiction, the district court would have been without jurisdiction to hear the case.1
Defendant was charged with murder in the first degree, a capital offense, kidnapping, and aggravated sexual assault. Pursuant to a plea bargain, he entered pleas of guilty to all three offenses in exchange for the prosecution’s agreement not to seek the death penalty and defendant’s agreement not to further challenge his prosecution as an adult. Hence, all parties, including the judge, were well aware of defendant’s minority, and no consideration was given to imposition of the death penalty because of his age.2
Furthermore, at the time of sentencing, the trial court had the benefit of a ninety-day evaluation report prepared by the Department of Corrections that provided extensive background information and input for the sentencing.3 Also, defense counsel specifically advanced defendant’s youth as a mitigating factor at the sentencing proceeding.
The fact that the trial court did not specifically list defendant's youth as a mitigating circumstance is not of any particular consequence. The statute conferring adult jurisdiction provides, “The charge shall be made, and the proceedings regarding the charge shall be conducted in every respect as if the juvenile were an adult.”4 In any event, it is clear from the context of the sentencing determination that the' extreme cruelty and depravity that accompanied the *1303three offenses outweighed any of the factors in mitigation, including defendant’s youth.
In State v. Russell,5 a case also involving minimum mandatory sentences, we upheld two fifteen-year sentences imposed upon a juvenile. In so doing, we said:
We have stated that trial courts “have the discretion to weigh the circumstances in aggravation or mitigation of the presumptive term of middle severity in order to arrive at a just sentence.” State v. Lovell, 758 P.2d 909, 912 (Utah 1988). This discretion is not to be surrendered to a mathematical formula by which numbers of circumstances rather than weight of circumstances are determinative.
The overriding consideration is that the sentence be just. One factor in mitigation or aggravation may weigh more than several factors on the opposite scale.6
In Russell, we also rejected a claim that the trial court had failed to consider all legally relevant factors because it did not specifically list all mitigating circumstances.7
As to the imposition of consecutive sentences, such lies within the discretionary authority of the court.8 In determining whether to impose consecutive sentences, it is incumbent upon the court to consider “the gravity and circumstances of the offenses and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant....”9 Also, consecutive sentences are specifically authorized for offenses arising out of a single criminal episode such as this.10 Moreover, in State v. Jolivet,11 the defendant entered pleas of guilty to several offenses, including aggravated kidnapping and aggravated sexual assault, for which he was sentenced to serve mandatory consecutive sentences. We affirmed the consecutive sentences as being within the trial court’s discretion.
As was reiterated in Russell,
“This Court does not disturb a sentence unless it exceeds that prescribed by law or unless the trial court has abused its discretion.” State v. Shelby, 728 P.2d 987, 988 (Utah 1986); State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887-88 (Utah 1978). An abuse of discretion may be manifest if the actions of the judge in sentencing were “inherently unfair” or if the judge imposed a “clearly excessive” sentence. State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 887. The trial judge followed the procedural guidelines of the minimum mandatory sentencing statute, section 76-3-201, and his sentence did not exceed that prescribed by law. We find neither inherent unfairness in the trial court’s exercise of discretion nor a clearly excessive sentence imposed.12
In the instant case, since defendant could have been constitutionally subjected to the death penalty,13 the sentence he did receive was clearly not excessive. Rather, it was wholly consistent with the magnitude of the offenses committed and the accompanying cruelty and depravity.
Finally, the sentence does not “rob[ ] the Board of Pardons of any [more] flexibility to parole Strunk” than it is otherwise entitled to.
. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-25.
. Sixteen years old at the time of the offenses.
. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(5)(c).
.Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-25(6)(b).
. 791 P.2d 188 (Utah 1990).
. Id. at 192.
. Id.
. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401.
. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(2).
. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(3).
. 712 P.2d 843 (Utah 1986).
. 791 P.2d at 192.
. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 109 S.Ct. 2969, 106 L.Ed.2d 306 (1989).