concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in Divisions 2, 3 and 4, wherein the majority holds that *412the habeas corpus court erred in its findings that Stripling is mentally retarded beyond a reasonable doubt, that OCGA § 17-7-131 is unconstitutional and that our decision in State v. Patillo, 262 Ga. 259 (417 SE2d 139) (1992) should be given retroactive effect. However, I respectfully dissent to Division 1, which holds that Stripling is entitled to a new sentencing trial based upon the State’s alleged violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (83 SC 1194,10 LE2d 215) (1963).
In Stripling v. State, 261 Ga. 1 (401 SE2d 500) (1991), we affirmed Stripling’s conviction and death sentence. Today’s affirmance of the grant of habeas corpus relief notwithstanding our disposition of the direct appeal is completely dependent upon the majority’s conclusion that “the record clearly establishes that [he] did not claim Brady error on direct appeal; he only claimed error under Pope [u State, 256 Ga. 195, 212 (22) (345 SE2d 831) (1986)].” Majority opinion, p. 406. Because the majority thereby mischaracterizes the scope of the issue actually resolved in Stripling’s direct appeal, his Brady claim is procedurally barred and the habeas court erred in granting relief based thereon. “ ‘One who had an issue decided adversely to him on direct appeal is precluded from relitigating that issue on habeas corpus, (cit.). . . .’ [Cit.]” Roulain v. Martin, 266 Ga. 353-354 (1) (466 SE2d 837) (1996).
In Stripling v. State, supra at 6 (7), this Court addressed Stripling’s claim regarding the disclosure of his records in possession of the Board of Pardons and Paroles, and held that “the non-disclosure provisions of OCGA § 42-9-53 must give way to the defendant’s right of access to potentially mitigating evidence. [Cits.]” Contrary to the implication of today’s opinion, Pope is not the only authority cited for that holding. We also cited Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U. S. 39 (107 SC 989, 94 LE2d 40) (1987) as a decision which was in “accord” with Pope. Ritchie, as did Pope, dealt with records in the custody of a state agency which were protected from disclosure pursuant to statute. The only difference is that the records at issue in Ritchie were those of the Children and Youth Services, rather than the Board of Pardons and Paroles. In concluding that the constitutional rights of the defendant must take precedence over the Pennsylvania statute providing for confidentiality of the records, the Supreme Court of the United States held that “[it] is well settled that the government has the obligation to turn over evidence in its possession that is both favorable to the accused and material to guilt or punishment. . . . Brady v. Maryland, supra, at 87.” Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, supra at 57 (III) (B) (2). Thus, it is abundantly clear that Ritchie must be construed as a specific application of Brady in those circumstances involving allegedly exculpatory evidence which is possessed by a state agency and which is entitled to confidentiality under a state statute. Likewise, Pope is also a Brady case, holding that a criminal *413defendant in Georgia is entitled to exculpatory evidence held by the Board of Pardons and Paroles, notwithstanding OCGA § 42-9-53. Confidentiality in those records does “not outweigh a capital defendant’s need for access to potentially mitigating evidence. [Cit.]” Pope v. State, supra at 212 (22).
Accordingly, the majority incorrectly concludes that Stripling’s direct appeal dealt only with a Pope claim which did not implicate Brady. Indeed, Pope is itself a Brady case, even though that decision was not cited therein. According to the majority’s analysis, no constitutional issue, such as those raised pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (80 SC 1602, 16 LE2d 694) (1966) or Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (106 SC 1712, 9 LE2d 69) (1986), is ever conclusively resolved on direct appeal. Consequently such contentions can be relitigated by a habeas court, unless, in rejecting the defendant’s claim of error, the appellate court expressly cited the relevant seminal decision of the Supreme Court of the United States. The fallacy in such a narrow construction of appellate decisions is apparent. Substance, not the citation of authority, is the controlling factor in determining the legal scope and effect of a holding. Thus, the lack of an express citation to Brady in either Pope or Stripling is immaterial. In substance, both appeals address Brady issues. Moreover, the specific citation in Stripling v. State, supra at 6 (7), to Ritchie is additional proof that, in resolving the claim regarding records held by the Board of Pardons and Paroles, this Court was relying upon the rationale of Brady. Because Ritchie is clearly a Brady case, so too is Stripling by necessary implication.
The majority seeks to justify its narrow construction of the holding in Stripling v. State, supra at 6 (7), by stating that Stripling could not have raised a Brady error in his direct appeal, “because [he] did not know what was contained in the parole file and thus could only have speculated about the withheld material.” Majority opinion, p. 406. However, this conclusion betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of Brady. Under that decision, Stripling’s “interest (as well as that of the [State]) in ensuring a fair trial can be protected fully by requiring that the . . . files be submitted only to the trial court for [an] in camera review.” Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, supra at 60 (III) (C). That is precisely the procedure which was followed in Stripling. “The trial court reviewed [his] parole file and determined there was no potentially mitigating evidence in the file not already known to and available to the defendant.” Stripling v. State, supra at 6 (7). Consistent with the applicable procedure for assessing the trial court’s ruling, this Court conducted its own review of the records on appeal, and found “no error in the non-disclosure of the defendant’s parole file. [Cit.]” Stripling v. State, supra at 6 (7).
Thus, Stripling did assert a Brady violation in his direct appeal, *414and this Court rejected it. The fact that, on habeas, Stripling has now identified material in the records which he contends is exculpatory does not show the existence of a viable claim of Brady error. Instead, his argument in that regard constitutes an unauthorized attempt to relitigate this Court’s previous holding that the records do not contain any beneficial material which was not otherwise known and available to the defense. “Claims that were previously litigated and decided on direct appeal are barred because it is well-settled that ‘(a)fter an appellate review the same issue() will not be reviewed on habeas corpus.’ [Cits.]” Turpin v. Mobley, 269 Ga. 635, 636 (1) (502 SE2d 458) (1998). The majority concludes that Stripling can readvance his previously rejected assertion because this Court’s holding in Stripling v. State, supra at 6 (7), that the mitigating evidence was merely cumulative “was based on an incorrect reading of the record” and is subject to our “inherent discretionary power to review and correct [our] own errors.” Majority opinion, p. 408. Whatever the permissible scope of this Court’s authority to correct its own errors, however, it certainly does not extend to relitigating in the context of habeas corpus issues which were previously decided on direct appeal.
The “law of the case” doctrine is not confined to civil cases, but applies also to rulings made by appellate courts in criminal cases. [Cit.] Thus, in this civil action, the habeas court, as well as this Court, would certainly be bound by the ruling in [Stripling v. State, supra at 6 (7)], regardless of whether that ruling may be erroneous. [Cits.]
Roulain v. Martin, supra at 354 (1). See also Turpin v. Mobley, supra at 636 (1); Gaither v. Gibby, 267 Ga. 96, 97 (2) (475 SE2d 603) (1996); Davis v. Thomas, 261 Ga. 687, 689 (2) (410 SE2d 110) (1991); Gunter v. Hickman, 256 Ga. 315, 316 (1) (348 SE2d 644) (1986); Elrod v. Ault, 231 Ga. 750 (204 SE2d 176) (1974). Compare Brown v. Francis, 254 Ga. 83, 86 (3) (326 SE2d 735) (1985) (jurisdiction to consider new grounds not previously asserted in original habeas petition). If, as the majority holds, this Court is entitled to correct perceived errors in Stripling v. State, supra, then the long-standing “law of the case” rule is no longer in effect in this state, and a habeas court is free to redetermine and reverse any of our previous rulings made in a petitioner’s direct appeal. In effect, the habeas court now becomes a forum for appellate review of this Court’s prior disposition of the very same case.
Division 1 of today’s opinion begins with a misconstruction of the holding in Stripling v. State, supra at 6 (7), as addressing something other than an alleged Brady error, and concludes with a wholesale rejection of the “law of the case” principle. Application of the correct *415analysis compels the conclusion that this Court disposed of the merits of Stripling’s Brady claim in the direct appeal, and neither the habeas court nor this Court is now authorized to second-guess that disposition. Accordingly, the grant of habeas relief on that ground was erroneous and should be reversed.
Decided October 14, 2003 — Reconsideration denied November 26,2003. David McDade, District Attorney, Karen A. Johnson, Assistant District Attorney, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, for appellant. Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw, Diane G. Kelly, Mitchell D. Raup, David M. Gossett, Carl J. Summers, for appellee. James C. Bonner, Jr., Sarah L. Gerwig, Michael M. Mears, Holly L. Geerdes, Gerald R. Weber, Jr., John R. Martin, Nicholas A. Lotito, amici curiae.