Luanne Johnston sued her landlord, Michael Ross, for injuries she allegedly sustained when she fell down a set of steps at the house *253she rented as her residence.1 Johnston appeals from the trial court’s order granting Ross summary judgment. For reasons that follow, we reverse.
Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence, construed favorably to the nonmovant, demonstrates that no genuine issues of material fact remain and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.2 So viewed, the record shows that Johnston fell when she lost her footing at the top of five steps leading down from the front porch of the house. Although she cannot identify why she initially lost her footing, Johnston asserts that she fell because the steps lacked handrails that she could have used to steady herself.3 According to Johnston, once she slipped, her “normal instinct was to grab for a handrail, which was not there, so [she] fell over into the right-hand side of the yard.” She alleges that the absence of handrails created a dangerous condition on the steps.
Johnston’s landlord, Ross, built the house and constructed the steps without handrails. Johnston presented evidence that the lack of handrails was a violation of the applicable building code. The evidence further shows that the absence of handrails was obvious, that Johnston knew the steps had no handrails when she rented the house, and that she did not discuss this condition with Ross before her fall. Johnston had lived in the house for almost three months prior to her fall and had negotiated the steps five or six times without any difficulty. Ordinarily, however, she accessed the house by another set of steps with a handrail that led up to the side door.
Ross moved for summary judgment, arguing that Johnston’s claim was barred because she knew before her fall that the front steps lacked handrails. The trial court granted the motion. Citing Johnston’s “equal knowledge” of the alleged defect, Ross argues on appeal that the trial court properly granted summary judgment. We disagree.
Generally, “a landowner is not liable for injuries to an invitee arising from a patent defect on the premises preexisting the arrival of the invitee and of which the invitee knew or had the means of knowing equal to the landowner.”4 As we have noted, however, a *254landlord “may not hide behind this general principle” to avoid duties imposed by statutes or housing codes.5
In Bastien v. Metro. Park Lake Assoc.,6 we addressed a factual situation similar to this case. The plaintiff in Bastien sued her landlord for injuries allegedly sustained when she fell on the steps to her apartment. The steps lacked a handrail, which constituted a building code violation. The trial court found that the plaintiff’s knowledge of the defect demanded summary judgment for the landlord. We reversed, holding that “although the defect was obvious when [the plaintiff] took possession of the apartment, that is not necessarily a bar to recovery when the defect is in violation of a duty created by applicable statute or administrative regulation.”7 We followed this ruling in Watts v. Jaffs,8 again noting that a residential landlord may be liable for a patent defect when the defective condition contravenes a statute or regulation.
The dissent argues that Bastien and Watts improperly rely on the plurality opinion in Thompson v. Crownover.9 In Thompson, three of our Supreme Court justices recognized the “important public policy in favor of preventing unsafe residential housing.”10 To further that policy, these justices determined that a landlord may be liable in tort “for a violation of the duties created by the housing codes and other legislation.”* 11 Their conclusion parallels the Restatement (Second) of Property, cited by Thompson and this Court with approval,12 which subjects a landlord to liability for injury arising from failure to repair a dangerous condition existing in violation of “a duty created by statute or administrative regulation.”13 Explaining the rationale behind this provision, the Restatement drafters noted that
the rule of this section is based on the assumption that the statute or regulation represents a legislative determination of the standard of conduct required of the landlord, so that the violation constitutes negligence per se. . . . The tort liability of the landlord in this situation tends to increase the likelihood that the will of the legislature as expressed in the statute or regulation will be effectuated.14
*255The dissent dismisses the Thompson policy discussion as unbinding language from a plurality opinion. But we cannot — and will not — ignore such an obvious and necessary public policy. Moreover, we agree with the Restatement drafters that “[t]he fact that the tenant ... is aware of the dangerous condition [created by the residential building code violation] does not in and of itself mean that [this rule of liability is] inapplicable.”15
Undoubtedly, a landlord’s liability is not absolute. Landlords enjoy the usual defenses available in a negligence action, including those based on contributory negligence and assumption of the risk.16 But such defenses present questions for a jury except in extraordinary cases, where the facts are plain and indisputable.17 And, in cases involving housing code violations, the facts supporting these defenses will not be plain or indisputable. For example, a tenant who is aware of a condition that violates a housing code does not necessarily appreciate the danger presented — a danger that has been studied and regulated by a governing body.18
The dissent cites several decisions in which a claimant’s equal knowledge of a dangerous condition barred recovery as a matter of law, despite a possible building code violation.19 Those cases, however, do not involve the relationship between a residential tenant and landlord.20 Furthermore, given the important public policy at issue, we find that a jury should assess the reasonableness of the tenant’s conduct and the extent to which the tenant appreciates the risk of that conduct. Such result does not impose absolute liability on a *256landlord. It simply allows a jury to decide questions regarding ordinary care and the assumption of any risk.
Our decisions in Bastien and Watts control this case. Although Johnston knew that the steps lacked handrails, she presented evidence that this condition violated an applicable building code. Under these circumstances, summary adjudication was not appropriate.21 Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting Ross’ motion for summary judgment.
Judgment reversed.
Smith, C. J, Johnson, P. J., Eldridge, Barnes, Miller, Ellington, Phipps, Mikell and Adams, JJ, concur. Andrews, P. J., and Blackburn, P. J., dissent.Johnston based her claim on OCGA §§ 51-3-1, 44-7-13, and 44-7-14 and the common law theory of negligent construction.
See Prillaman v. Sark, 255 Ga. App. 781 (567 SE2d 76) (2002).
See Spencer v. Little Brownie Properties, 203 Ga. App. 324 (416 SE2d 851) (1992) (immaterial that appellant did not know what caused loss of footing on steps; allegation of negligence was that lack of handrail was proximate cause of failure to regain footing after slip). Cf. Culberson v. Lanier, 216 Ga. App. 686, 687 (1) (455 SE2d 385) (1995) (physical precedent only) (summary judgment proper where plaintiff failed to present evidence establishing a causal connection between her fall down stairwell and the absence of railings).
(Punctuation omitted.) Roth v. Wu, 199 Ga. App. 665, 666 (1) (405 SE2d 741) (1991).
Id.
209 Ga. App. 881 (434 SE2d 736) (1993).
Id. at 882.
216 Ga. App. 565-566 (455 SE2d 328) (1995).
259 Ga. 126 (381 SE2d 283) (1989).
Id. at 128 (2).
Id. at 129 (3).
See id.; Bastien, supra at 882; Spence v. C & S Nat. Bank, 195 Ga. App. 294, 295-296 (1) (393 SE2d 1) (1990).
Restatement (Second) of Property, § 17.6.
Id., comment a.
Id., comment b. See also Spence, supra.
See Restatement (Second) of Property, § 17.6, comment b; Thompson, supra at 129-130 (5) (recognizing that assumption of risk defense is available to landlord).
See Prillaman, supra at 782; Bossard v. Atlanta Neighborhood Dev. Partnership, 254 Ga. App. 799, 800 (2) (564 SE2d 31) (2002).
See Prillaman, supra (“For the defense of assumption of the risk of danger to apply, [the defendant] must show that [the claimant] had a full appreciation of the danger involved and without restriction of her freedom of choice either by the circumstances or by coercion, deliberately chose an obviously perilous course of conduct.”) (punctuation omitted); Spence, supra (genuine issues of fact remained as to the claimant’s appreciation of risk associated with walking on allegedly defective flooring, even though he knew the floor was “ ‘flimsy’ ”).
See Parks-Nietzold v. J. C. Penney, Inc., 227 Ga. App. 724, 726 (2) (490 SE2d 133) (1997); Sullivan v. Quisc, Inc., 207 Ga. App. 114, 116 (427 SE2d 86) (1993); Motes v. 6 ‘S’ Co., 186 Ga. App. 67, 68 (366 SE2d 358) (1988) (physical precedent only).
The dissent also cites Yon v. Shimeall, 257 Ga. App. 845, 846-847 (1) (572 SE2d 694) (2002), for the proposition that a residential tenant’s equal knowledge of a defect bars recovery against a landlord, despite evidence of a building code violation. We have reviewed that case and found no clear statement in the opinion that the condition at issue violated a building code. Cf. Culberson, supra (indicating in dicta unnecessary to holding that plaintiff’s failure to exercise ordinary care proximately caused injuries resulting when she allegedly fell down rental home’s stairwell, which was constructed without surrounding railings, in violation of building code).
See Watts, supra at 566; Bastien, supra.