The appellant was charged by information with a violation of the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act, RCW 69.33, as follows:
He, the said Samuel Williams, in the County of King, State of Washington, on or about the 26th day of March, 1967, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously did have in his possession and did sell to one Robert Smith, a minor, a certain narcotic drug, to-wit: cannabis sativa, otherwise known as marihuana, as interdicted by the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act; . . .
The jury found the appellant guilty on evidence that he had sold a marijuana cigarette to Robert Smith in response to the latter’s request in a cafe in Seattle. Upon appeal, he has raised a number of questions, including the constitu*460tionality of the 40-year maximum sentence imposed upon him under RCW 69.33.410 (4).
While this case was pending, the legislature enacted Laws of 1969, Ex. Ses., ch. 256, § 11, p. 2392, providing that .the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act should not ever apply to marijuana. We held in State v. Zornes, 78 Wn.2d 9, 475 P.2d 109 (1970), that the legislature intended this act to apply to all pending cases', and that any prosecution involving marijuana brought under the authority of RCW 69.33 should be dismissed.
Since the appellant was charged under an act which does not apply to his alleged offense, the prosecution cannot be sustained. It has been suggested that the court should interpret the legislative intent so as to make only the penalty provisions of the 1969 dangerous drug act apply to pending cases. We can find no language restricting in such manner the broad statement contained in RCW 69.33.220 that “narcotic drugs shall not include cannabis and the provisions of this chapter shall not ever be applicable to any form of cannabis(Italics ours.) It is not the proper function of this court to revise the legislative intent, as that intent is expressed in the statutes.
Since none of the provisions of the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act apply to the appellant’s alleged act, a prosecution under the act cannot stand. State v. Zornes, supra. We know of no authority for the proposition that a defendant can be tried under an act which the legislature has decreed does not apply to his offense and be sentenced according to the penalties of a different act under which he was neither charged, tried nor convicted. It becomes unnecessary to discuss the issues raised by his assignments of error.
The judgment is reversed and the action is dismissed.
Hunter, C. J., Finley, Hamilton, Neill, and McGovern, JJ., concur.