dissenting.
I believe the search of appellant’s automobile was violative of the Fourth Amendment. I therefore dissent from Division 2 of the majority opinion.
The majority appears to justify the search of appellant’s automobile on the ground that the police had probable cause to arrest appellant for certain traffic offenses. I do not argue with the contention that the police had probable cause to arrest. However, it does not follow that, merely because the arrest was legal, the search was also legal. Under the circumstances of this case, I believe the state has failed to carry its burden of proof as to the reasonableness of the search of appellant’s automobile. See State v. Thomas, 150 Ga. App. 170 (257 SE2d 28) (1979).
Two possible bases exist for the state’s contention that the search of appellant’s automobile was lawful: 1) that probable cause existed for the search and 2) that the search was a valid inventory search. I find neither rationale persuasive under the facts of this case.
Clearly, probable cause to search the automobile did not flow from the arrest. Appellant was arrested for various completed offenses and, at the time of arrest, was not suspected of participation in any other offense. See Rowland v. State, 117 Ga. App. 577 (161 SE2d 422) (1968). On the basis of the arrest alone, no valid reason existed for the search of the automobile.
During the search incident to arrest, the police discovered money and two cartridges. Under the holding of the Georgia Supreme Court in State v. Handspike, 240 Ga. 176 (240 SE2d 1) (1977), the *834search incident to arrest did not exceed its permissible scope. See also United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 218 (94 SC 467, 38 LE2d 427) (1973); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U. S. 260 (94 SC 488, 38 LE2d 456) (1973). While the items seized could therefore be taken into consideration by the police in determining whether they had probable cause to search appellant’s vehicle, I reject the notion that the discovery of these items, when viewed in conjunction with other evidence of illegal conduct (i.e. commission of various traffic offenses and possession of a void inspection sticker), provided the police with probable cause to search appellant’s vehicle for contraband or “fruits of crime.” See Anderson v. State, 123 Ga. App. 57, 59 (179 SE2d 286) (1970); Cunningham v. State, 133 Ga. App. 305, 307-308 (211 SE2d 150) (1974).
Since the search of appellant’s vehicle was not based upon probable cause, it may only be justified, under the facts of this case, as an inventory search of an impounded vehicle.1 See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U. S. 364 (96 SC 3092, 49 LE2d 1000) (1976). The majority concludes the search was proper. I cannot agree.
“It is well established that a police seizure and inventory is not dependent for its validity upon the absolute necessity for the police to take charge of property to preserve it. They are permitted to take charge of property under broader circumstances than that.” (Emphasis supplied.) Mooney v. State, 243 Ga. 373, 375 (254 SE2d 337) (1979). The question is one of reasonableness.2 State v. Thomason, 153 Ga. App. 345 (265 SE2d 312) (1980). “In determining whether an inventory search is reasonable, we must . .. look, as a threshold inquiry, to the propriety of the impoundment, since the act of impoundment gives rise to the need for and justification of the inventory. If impoundment is not necessary, then the concomitant search is unreasonable. Accord, State v. Boster, 217 Kan. 618, 539 P.2d 294 (1975); Altman v. State, 335 So.2d 626 (Fla. App. 1976); State v. Bales, 15 Wash. App. 834, 552 P.2d 688 (1976). The state’s interest in impounding must outweigh the individual’s *835Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures; although the expectation of privacy with respect to an automobile is significantly less than the traditional expectation of privacy associated with the home, this interest is still constitutionally protected, South Dakota v. Opperman, supra.” State of Minn. v. Goodrich, 256 NW2d 506, 510 (Minn. 1977). Where a vehicle has been impounded, the inventory search serves “three distinct needs: the protection of the owner’s property while it remains in police custody, United States v. Mitchell, 458 F.2d 960, 961 (CA9 1972); the protection of police against claims or disputes over lost or stolen property, United States v. Kelehar, 470 F.2d 176, 178 (CA5 1972); and the protection of the police from potential danger, Cooper v. California, [386 U. S. 58, 61-62 (87 SC 788, 17 LE2d 730) (1967)]. . .” South Dakota v. Opperman, supra at 369. However, as indicated above, “[t]he justification [for the inventory search] is necessarily premised on the validity of the impounding.” State v. McCranie, 137 Ga. App. 369, 370 (223 SE2d 765) (1976). Unless reasonably necessary, impoundment cannot be justified. State v. Goodrich, supra. “[W]hether a search and seizure is unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case ...” Cooper v. California, supra at 59.
I believe that, under the facts and circumstances of the instant case, the state has failed to demonstrate that the impoundment of appellant’s vehicle was reasonably necessary. It is uncontroverted that three able-bodied adults were with appellant at the time of arrest. None of them was arrested. Appellant’s vehicle was not otherwise subject to impoundment. Compare Garner v. State, 154 Ga. App. 839 (1980). Under these circumstances, there was a substantial possibility that the impoundment of appellant’s vehicle could have been avoided by simply asking appellant whether he would prefer to have one of his companions take custody of it. It is not certain that such an arrangement would have been possible. For instance, none of those present may have been licensed to operate a motor vehicle. However, because the police made no effort whatever to permit appellant to make alternative arrangements for the removal and safekeeping of his automobile, in spite of the presence of appellant’s companions, the “inventory” search was, in my view, illegal. See State v. Rome, 354 S2d 504, 505 (La. 1978); State v. Ludvicek, 147 Ga. App. 784 (250 SE2d 503) (1978); South Dakota v. Opperman, supra.
“In situations such as are here present, against the interest of the state must be weighed the citizen’s interest in the privacy of the contents of his automobile . . .” State v. Thomason, supra at 350. Thus, in Thomason, this court upheld the trial court’s grant of the *836motion to suppress where the police made no “reasonable effort” to comply with the defendant’s request that her husband be located and given the opportunity to take custody of her automobile.
In the instant case, it does not appear that appellant made any request that one of his companions be permitted to take custody of his automobile while he was under arrest. However, in my view, the fact that no such request was made does not ipso facto validate the impoundment and inventory search of appellant’s vehicle. Our constitution places a requirement of reasonableness upon searches and seizures. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U. S. 433, 439 (93 SC 2523, 37 LE2d 706) (1973). A determination as to the reasonableness of a search cannot be based upon simplistic and rigid formulas, but must depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case.3 In the instant case, I believe appellant should have been informed that one of his companions could take custody of his vehicle if appellant so desired. In my view, the failure of the arresting officer to make this minimal effort invalidated the search even though it cannot be said with certainty that such action would have rendered impoundment (and inventory search) “unnecessary.” See State v. Thomason, supra at 350.
‘In my view, this justification is questionable from the outset. The arresting officer testified that, upon finding the money and cartridges, he “suspected [appellant] as a robber.” “The search of defendant’s automobile was clearly pursuant to an investigatory motive and was not a constitutionally reasonable routine inventory search within the meaning of South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U. S. 364, supra.” Rohrig v. State, 148 Ga. App. 869, 871 (253 SE2d 253) (1979).
“The fact that the [purposes of the impoundment]... might, in the abstract, have been accomplished by ‘less intrusive’ means does not, by itself,- render the search unreasonable...” Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U. S. 433,447 (93 SC 2523,37 LE2d 706) (1973); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42, 51 (90 SC 1975, 26 LE2d 419) (1970).
See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218 (93 SC 2041, 36 LE2d 854) (1973), wherein the Court applied a “totality of the circumstances” test in determining whether a non-custodial consent search was “voluntary.” The Court held: “ ... that when the subject of a search is not in custody and the State attempts to justify a search on the basis of his consent, the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments require that it demonstrate that the consent was in fact voluntarily given, and not the result of duress or coercion, express or implied. Voluntariness is a question of fact to be determined from all the circumstances, and while the subject’s knowledge of a right to refuse is a factor to be taken into account, the prosecution is not required to demonstrate such knowledge as a prerequisite to establishing a voluntary consent.” Id at 248, 249. In the case at bar, appellant was under arrest when the police decided to impound his vehicle.