dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion because the statute of limitations does not bar the civil rights claims presented when there is a strong case of continuing sexual harassment as there is here.
The General Assembly of Kentucky has authorized the Commonwealth to be sued for a violation of the Kentucky Civil Rights Act codified in KRS 344.010 et seq. My reading of the record in this ease indicates that the Board of Education has candidly conceded that Chapter 344 amounts to a waiver of sovereign immunity, both in its original brief and its response to the peti*801tion for rehearing. This Court has recently decided in Department of Corrections v. Dorsey Furr, Ky ., 23 S.W.3d 615 (2000), that the Commonwealth of Kentucky, as an employer under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act, does not enjoy the privilege of sovereign immunity. The majority decision does briefly acknowledge the application of both the federal and state civil rights acts. Cf. Kerns v. Bucklew, 178 W.Va. 68, 357 S.E.2d 750 (1987), which provides a detailed analysis of state sovereign immunity and the supremacy of the Federal Civil Rights Act. The Federal Act is reflected in KRS 344.010.
The failure of the majority opinion to accept the devastating consequences of a hostile work environment is serious error. It is beyond question that the behavior of the dismissed teacher was demeaning, crude and generally intolerable and unacceptable. It is further beyond belief that this created a totally hostile work environment. A civil rights violation can be of a continuing nature over a considerable span of time. Leonard v. Corrections Cabinet, Ky.App., 828 S.W.2d 668 (1992). KRS 413.120(2) provides for a five-year statute of limitations, with the period of limitations beginning to run on the date on which the act occurred. If a plaintiff can demonstrate that the violation is continuing, then the time limitation begins to run with each new violation. Here, the five-year period began to run on May 3, 1993, when Spick-ler was terminated by the school system.
Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993), is the leading case on a hostile work environment following the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Mentor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986).
Here, there were numerous complaints of incidents about the inappropriate conduct which had interfered with the work performance of the teachers who were harassed. The work environment was pervasively severe and hostile so as to constitute a continuing sexually hazardous work environment. Such questions are matters of fact and not questions of law and are not suitable for summary judgment. Approximately 17 teachers were subjected to the abuse between 1983 and 1993. Whether all of these acts were severe and continuing enough to constitute a hostile work environment is certainly a question for a jury. Cf. Meyers v. Chapman Printing Co., Ky., 840 S.W.2d 814 (1992). The hostile work environment was established not only by the behavior of Spickler and his actions against the individuals but also by his acts against other female teachers which were acknowledged through the years. As originally noted by this Court in its initial opinion “We have no doubt of the appellants’ contention that a hostile work environment existed.... ” There was testimony before the Inquiry Board of the Kentucky Board of Education that “Spick-ler’s conduct was common knowledge among the teachers and that all teachers tried to avoid him.”
Here, the work environment is a small elementary school and it is reasonable to conclude that the conduct of the accused had an impact on almost every female teacher in the system. The instances of abuse were ongoing and chronic. Generally, a claimant must show a series of related acts “one or more of which falls within the limitations period or the maintenance of a discriminatory system both before and during the period.” Gutowsky v. County of Placer, 108 F.3d 256 (9th Cir.1997).
It is well settled that unlawful sexual harassment can only be determined by examining “all the relevant circumstances, no single factor being required.” Harris, supra; Meyers, supra. Here, the underlying case was dismissed on summary judgment, consequently, no jury has ever been able to determine the facts. The misbehavior recited in this case is clearly a continuing violation of the civil rights of the individuals involved and can be the basis of an appropriate civil rights complaint. The clear purpose of the Kentucky *802Civil Rights Act was to provide relief for peaceful people thus offended.
KRS 344.450 provides as follows:
Any person injured by any act in violation of the provisions of this chapter shall have a civil cause of action in Circuit Court to enjoin further violations, and to recover the actual damages sustained, together with the costs of the lawsuit. The court’s order or judgment shall include a reasonable fee for the plaintiffs attorney of record and any other remedies contained in this chapter.
It is clear that the provisions of KRS 344.450 specifically permit a suit for compensatory damage as well as other relief covered by the Act.
KRS 344.010(1) defines the term “person” for purposes of any cause of action under the statutes as follows:
“Person” includes one or more individuals, labor organizations, joint apprenticeship committees, partnerships, associations, corporations, legal representative, mutual companies, joint stock companies, trusts, unincorporated organizations, trustees, trustees in bankruptcy, fiduciaries, receivers or other legal or commercial entities; the state, any of its political or civil subdivisions or agencies.
KRS 344.030(2) defines employer as a person who has eight or more employees within the state. Clearly, the state and its political subdivisions constitute a person and employer. This section of the statute was amended in 1972 specifically to exclude the United States government and a qualified private membership club exempt from federal taxation in disability discrimination cases only. In 1972, the General Assembly had the opportunity to exclude specifically the Commonwealth and did not choose to do so.
KRS 344.020 states the general purposes of the Kentucky Civil Rights Act as follows:
To safeguard all individuals within the state from discrimination because of familial status, race, color, religion, national origin, sex, age 40 and over, or because of the person’s status as a qualified individual with a disability as defined in KRS 344.010, and KRS 344.030; thereby to protect their interest in person dignity and freedom from humiliation, to make available to the state their full productive capacities, to secure the state against domestic strife and unrest which would menace its democratic institutions, to preserve the public safety, health and general welfare, and to further the interests, rights, and privileges of individuals within the state; ....
The record in this case supports a compelling case of continuing sexual harassment that did not end until the harasser was terminated in May of 1993. I do not believe the five-year statute of limitation bars the claim presented here. It is not necessary for this Court to reexamine its holdings in Withers v. University of Kentucky, Ky., 939 S.W.2d 340 (1997) or Franklin County v. Malone, Ky., 957 S.W.2d 195 (1997), in order to provide relief for the teachers in this case.
I would reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.
GRAVES and STUMBO, JJ., join in this dissent.