dissenting.
Jack C. Price was indicted for conspiring with Dr. Herbert I. Garfield under Code Ann. § 79A-812 (Supp. 1980),1 to commit the substantive offense of prescribing a controlled substance for other *63than legitimate medical purposes, under Code Ann. § 79A-820 (Supp. 1980).2 Since Price is a mechanic and not a practitioner under this Code Section, the State chose to proceed under the conspiracy statute.3 Compare Garrett v. State, 243 Ga. 322 (253 SE2d 741) (1979) (State may also sentence as a party one who is not a government employee, but who conspires with an employee to breach his public trust), and Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U. S. 613 (69 SC 766, 93 LE 919) (1949).
The majority holds under Braverman v. United States, 317 U. S. 49 (63 SC 99, 87 LE 23) (1942), that “if there is only one agreement there can be only one conspiracy.” Majority opinion at p. 60. In Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U. S. 640 (66 SC 1180, 90 LE 1489) (1946), the Supreme Court explained that in the Braverman, supra at pp. 642-3, case, “the indictment charged no substantive offense. Each of the several counts charged a conspiracy to violate a different statute. But only one conspiracy was proved. We held that a single conspiracy . . . violates but a single statute and no penalty greater than the maximum provided for one conspiracy may be imposed. That case is not apposite here. For the offenses charged and proved were not only a conspiracy but substantive offenses as well.” (Emphasis supplied.) In Price’s case, as in Pinkerton’s, the overt acts proved at trial amounted to substantive offenses themselves.4 “The *64question was submitted to the jury on the theory that each petitioner could be found guilty of the substantive offenses, if it was found at the time those offenses were committed petitioners were parties to an unlawful conspiracy and the substantive offenses charged were in fact committed in furtherance of it. ” (Emphasis supplied.) A review of the record in Price’s case reveals clearly that evidence of the actual commission of the substantive offenses was presented to the jury.
Under the authority of Pinkerton, supra, I would hold that Price may be separately convicted for all of the 150 counts which the State proves that he conspired to commit and that were in fact committed.
Code Ann. § 79A-820 (Supp. 1980) states: “Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense defined in this Chapter shall be punished by imprisonment not exceeding the maximum punishment prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy.”
Code Ann. § 79A-820 (e), (f)and (h) (Supp. 1980), provides: “(e) A controlled substance included in Schedule V shall not be distributed or dispensed other than for a legitimate medical purpose.
(f). No person shall prescribe or order the dispensing of a controlled substance except a registered practitioner who is:
(1) licensed or otherwise authorized by the State of Georgia to prescribe controlled substances; and
(2) acting in the usual course of his professional practice; and
(3) prescribing or ordering such controlled substances for a legitimate medical purpose. . .
(h) It shall be unlawful for any practitioner to issue any prescription document signed in blank. The issuance of such document signed in blank shall be prima facie evidence of a conspiracy to violate this Chapter. The possession of a prescription document signed in blank by a person other than the person whose signature appears thereon shall be prima facie evidence of a conspiracy between the possessor and the signer to violate the provisions of this Chapter.”
The punishment set out in Code Ann. § 79A-821 (b) for violating Code Ann. § 79A-820, and thus for violation of Code Ann. § 79A-812, is imprisonment for not more than 5 years and a fine of not more than $25,000, or both. The trial court here sentenced Price to serve 10 years with the rest suspended conditional on good behavior. Under the majority opinion, the maximum penalty would be 5 years.
We also note that like Price, Daniel Pinkerton had not himself directly committed the substantive offenses for which he was charged.