dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from denial of en banc consideration. The issue before this Court is whether Rhodes’a conviction for escape from prison in 1999 (the Smith County escape) should be used to enhance Rhodes’ conviction for escape from prison in 2002, which Rhodes now appeals. In my view, the panel’s opinion that the earlier escape sentence is void, and that the earlier escape conviction may not, therefore, be used to enhance appellant’s current sentence, is erroneous and creates disunity between this Court’s opinions and the current jurisprudence of this State, constituting an extraordinary circumstance that requires en banc consideration. See Tex.R.App. P. 41.2(c) (providing that en banc consideration should be ordered only in extraordinary circumstances).
The panel holds that the trial court’s 1999 order in the Smith County case that Rhodes’ Smith County escape run concurrently with the sentence Rhodes was then serving for aggravated assault was an unauthorized, and thus void, “sentence” and that' Rhodes’ conviction for that escape cannot be used to enhance the penalty for his latest escape. The result of the panel’s ruling is not only to void the enhancement paragraph for Rhodes’ latest escape, but also, in effect, to void the sentence entered in the prior Smith County escape case. I would hold, in accordance with current jurisprudence, that the order that Rhodes’ sentence for the Smith County escape run concurrently with the sentence he was then serving was not itself a “sentence,” or even part of a sentence, but a cumulation order. As such, it is a separate part of the judgment entered with regard to that escape. Accordingly, even if the cumulation order is void, Rhodes’ sentence for the Smith County escape is not void, and his conviction for that escape should be available to enhance his punishment for the instant escape. I would, therefore, affirm the judgment of the trial court.
In reaching the contrary conclusion— that Rhodes’ “sentence” for his Smith County escape is void and that, therefore, Rhodes’ prior conviction for escape may not be used to enhance his punishment in this case — the panel relies primarily on Fullbright v. State, 818 S.W.2d 808 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). In Fullbright, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that a prior probated sentence used for enhancement purposes was void because, as the panel here states, “the aggravated assault sentence of five years probation was not within the statutory punishment range.” Id. at 810. The panel acknowledges that the Court of Criminal Appeals “later abrogated its decision in Fullbright, and held that the sentence and the conditions for community supervision are different parts of the judgment, and thus an error in the conditions of community supervision does not render the conviction void.” See Speth v. State, 6 S.W.3d 530, 532-33 (Tex.Crim.App.1999); Ex Parte Williams, 65 S.W.3d 656, 657-58 (Tex.Crim.App.2001). Nevertheless, the panel fails to draw the distinction between a sentence and other parts of the judgment, a distinction that governed the disposition of Speth and Ex parte Williams and that applies here.
The problem arises from a gloss placed by the Court of Criminal Appeals on the “sentence” imposed in State v. Ross, 953 S.W.2d 748 (Tex.Crim.App.1997), a case decided after Fullbright and before Speth. In Ross, the Court of Criminal Appeals was called upon to construe article 42.02 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which defines a sentence as “that part of the judgment, or order revoking a suspension of the imposition of a sentence, that orders that the punishment be carried into execution in the manner prescribed by law.” *357Tex.Code ÜRiM. PROC. Ann. art. 42.02 (Vernon 2004). The court pointed out that “the sentence used to encompass the entire judgment in that the sentence was ‘the order of the court ... pronouncing the judgment and ordering the same to execute,’ ” but that the term “sentence” had been “significantly narrowed” over the years so that it had become “nothing more than the portion of the judgment setting out the terms of punishment.” Ross, 953 S.W.2d at 750 (quoting Thornton v. State, 576 S.W.2d 407, 408 (Tex.Crim.App.1979)).
Comparing the definition of a sentence in article 42.02 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the definition of a judgment in article 42.01, which includes affirmative findings and the terms of the sentence as separate parts of the information contained in a judgment, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that a finding that an assault was committed with a deadly weapon was part of the judgment, but not part of the sentence. Id.; see also Tex.Code CRIM. Proc. Ann. art. 42.01 § 1(21) (Vernon Supp.2004-2005) (listing “[ajffirmative findings” as separate part of judgment); § 1(15) (listing “term of sentence” as separate part of judgment). The court then added, “For example, the sentence in this case would include the facts that appellant is to serve sixteen years in the penitentiary beginning July 28,1995, that his term is concurrent, and that he must pay a $500 fine.” Ross, 953 S.W.2d at 750 (emphasis in original). The court thus included the “fact” that a sentence was “concurrent” in its illustration of the terms of the sentence. However, the court then immediately reiterated that the intent of the Legislature in defining the term “sentence” in article 42.02 was clearly to restrict the definition of that term and to exclude “those aspects of the judgment merely affecting those facts,” such as affirmative findings. Id. (emphasis in original).
The panel in this case invokes the example given by the Court of Criminal Appeals in Ross as authority for its own argument that a sentence includes the terms for cumulation of sentences set out in the judgment; and, because the cumulation of sentences statute at issue here, article 48.02(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, does not authorize a court to order that a sentence for escape run concurrently with a sentence the defendant is already serving, the panel holds that Rhodes’ sentence for the Smith County escape is void, and, therefore, Rhodes’ prior escape conviction may not be used to enhance his current punishment.
I believe that, to the extent Ross holds — instead of merely observing in dictum — that the imposition of a concurrent sentence is itself part of the sentence, rather than a separate part of the judgment, that holding has been implicitly abrogated by later authority. The Court of Criminal Appeals revisited the distinction between a sentence and a judgment in Speth, 6 S.W.3d 530. This time, the court explicitly juxtaposed a sentence, as defined in article 42.02 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to a judgment, as defined in article 42.01, noting that article 42.01, section one, of “[t]he Code defines ‘judgment’ as the written declaration of the court signed by the trial judge and entered of record showing the conviction or acquittal of the defendant” and that section one further provides that “[t]he sentence served shall be based on the information contained in the judgment.” Speth, 6 S.W.3d at 535 n. 4 (citing Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.01 § 1). The court pointed out that, in setting out the information contained in the judgment, article 42.01 distinguishes between “the length of community supervision, and the conditions of supervision,” provided for in subsection 1(10), and “[t]he term of the sentence,” provided for in subsection 1(15). Id. at *358532; see also Tex.Code CRIM. Proc. Ann. art. 42.01, §§ 1(10), (15). The court concluded that, therefore, the conditions of community supervision specified in article 42.12, section 11(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and included in the judgment pursuant to article 42.01, subsection 10, were separate from the sentence included in the judgment under article 42.01, subsection 15.1
Just as the Court of Criminal Appeals held in Speth that placement of a defendant on community supervision under article 42.12, section 3(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure was part of the judgment, but not part of the sentence, so I would hold in this case that a trial court’s cumu-lation order under article 42.08(b) likewise is part of the judgment, but not part of the sentence. Like article 42.12, section 11(a), at issue in Speth, article 48.02(b), at issue here, provides information regarding the terms under which sentences shall be served in conformity with article 42.01’s mandate that “[t]he sentence shall be served based on the information contained in the judgment.” See Tex.Code CRIM. Proc. Ann. art. 42.01, § 1; see also Speth, 6 S.W.3d at 535 n. 4 (distinguishing additional information in the judgment from the sentence). Just as article 42.01, defining the parts of a judgment, expressly distinguishes the conditions of community supervision from “[t]he term of the sentence” set out in a judgment, so article 42.01 expressly distinguishes “[t]he term of any order entered pursuant to article 42.08 of this code that the defendant’s sentence is to run cumulatively or concurrently with another sentence or sentences,” from the “[t]he term of the sentence.” Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.01, §§ 1(10), (15), (19).2 By its terms, article 42.08 cannot and does not assess punishment for any crime; rather, it comprehensively prescribes the terms under which two or more sentences are cumulated in any given case. Thus, logically, article 42.08 does not set out a sentencing scheme, instead, it sets out terms for the cumulation of sentences; and an order under article 42.08 is not itself a sentence, but rather a cumulation order. Nor can an order cumulating sentences any longer be construed as a portion of a “sentence” under the plain language of articles 42.01 and 42.02 of the current Code of Criminal Procedure; instead, a cumulation order must be con*359strued as a separate portion of the judgment.
I believe the current jurisprudence of this State requires us to conclude that a cumulation order under article 42.08(b) is not part of a sentence, but a separate part of the judgment. If that conclusion is correct, then, although a cumulation order may be void as not authorized by law, the sentence improperly cumulated, which is a separate part of the judgment, is not thereby made void, and the prior conviction may be used to enhance the punishment for a subsequent crime. I would hold that Rhodes’ sentence for the Smith County escape is not void, even if the cumulation order that was part of his judgment of conviction for that escape is void, and that the prior conviction was properly used to enhance his sentence in the current case; and I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Because I believe the panel’s opinion commits this Court to an erroneous interpretation of the Code of Criminal Procedure applicable to this and future cases, I respectfully dissent from denial of en banc consideration.
. Article 42.12 ("Community supervision”) provides in relevant part:
The judge may impose any reasonable condition that is designed to protect or restore the community, protect or restore the victim, or punish, rehabilitate, or reform the defendant.
TexGode Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, § 11(a). Article 42.01, "Judgment,” sets out the "information contained in the judgment” in 27 discrete subparts, including § 1(10) (conditions of community supervision) and § 1(15) ("term of the sentence”).
. In LaPorte v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals held, "An improper cumulation order is, in essence, a void sentence and such error cannot be waived” and that "[a] defect which renders a sentence void may be raised at any time.” 840 S.W.2d 412, 415 (Tex.Crim.App.1992). Given the subsequent abrogation of cases in this line that conflate the terms of a sentence and the terms of a judgment — including Heath, 817 S.W.2d 335 (holding that a portion of a "sentence” not authorized by law, namely probation, is void), abrogated by Ex parte Williams, 65 S.W.3d 656 (Tex.Crim.App.2001), and Ex parte Sims, 868 S.W.2d 803 (Tex.Crim.App.1994) (holding that defendant could not waive right to have sentences run concurrently, even by consent), overruled by Ex parte McJunkins, 954 S.W.2d 39 (Tex.Crim.App.1997), as well as Speth — LaPorte appears to have been implicitly, although not explicitly, abrogated to the extent it equates a sentence with a conviction. To be consistent with Speth, LaPorte must be read as holding that a cumulation order not authorized by statute is void, not that either a sentence or a judgment in which sentences are improperly cumulated is void.