Concurring and Dissenting.—I concur with the majority’s denial of the petition for habeas corpus. However, because I believe that the trial judge sufficiently expressed at the sentencing and bail hearings the basis for his decision to deny bail on appeal, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion otherwise.
As noted by the majority, the sentencing hearing immediately preceded the hearing on defendant’s request for bail. Because the trial court at the bail hearing did not give a sufficient statement of its reasons for denying bail pursuant to In re Podesto (1976) 15 Cal.3d 921, 937-938 [127 Cal.Rptr. 97, 544 P.2d 1297], we must review the record of sentencing to determine whether it illuminates the trial court’s actions on the bail motion. (Ante, pp. 203-204.)
The majority characterizes the trial court’s statements during sentencing as expressing “the opinion that defendant is a thief, perjurer and drug dealer who, though technically without a prior record, has been engaged in illegal conduct for some time.” (Ante, p. 204.) My colleagues interpret this description merely as the court’s justification for its conclusion that past offenses by defendant warranted greater punishment than probation. They give no effect to the statements as predictive of defendant’s future behavior sufficient to support a denial of bail on appeal. It is here that I disagree.
In Podesto, after alluding to the difficulty of predicting future behavior, we reaffirmed that “When the pattern of a particular defendant’s history indicates that additional criminal conduct will probably ensue if the defendant is released, ... a court unquestionably retains the authority to deny release on appeal. [Citations.]” (Id., at p. 936.) We stressed that no “mechanical policy” should be adopted, and that the trial court “should look to the circumstances of the particular defendant . . . .” (Id., at p. 936, fh. 10.)
As we have reiterated in the matter of fixing bail on appeal, “ ‘the primary discretion belongs to the trial judge . . . [and] [w]here the trial judge has passed upon the merits of the application his ruling will not be disturbed unless a manifest abuse of discretion appears [citations] . . . .’ ” (In re Podesto, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 937, quoting In re Brumback (1956) 46 Cal.2d 810, 813-814 [299 P.2d 217].) No such “manifest abuse of discretion” occurred here. Stressing defendant’s potential risk to society the trial court expressly referred to the pronouncement of judgment: “Secondly, I do think that he does represent some risk to sociey. [f] What I meant by that in my pronouncement of judgment, not quite the same risk a rapist or murderer does; but he represents some risk, and *208I’m not persuaded that there’s going to be this sudden metamorphosis that he seems to suggest that there might be, that his conviction, and now his sentence to prison is going to have that major effect, going to bring about that substantial a change in his character, [1] I think that what we’re dealing with here are the results of some basic character flaws in Mr. Pipinos, and I am not persuaded that there’s going to be any change in his character.” The court’s general conclusion that defendant poses a risk which would support a denial of bail on appeal thus must be considered in the context of its more specific statements during the sentencing proceedings.
During the sentencing proceedings the trial court extensively recited its reasons for finding defendant unsuitable for probation. After detailing several specific factors and its belief that defendant was not a first time offender but one who had avoided previous detection, the court indicated that while defendant did not present a threat of violence, “I certainly think he does represent a threat or danger to the community, [f] He’s engaged in an ongoing scheme for distributing dangerous substances, controlled substances that are—could be the source of great mischief and danger to members of the community, and he’s a thief, [f] He represents danger to society because he has no compunction at all about going around ripping people off.” These comments were aimed at both past and present behavior.
Subsequently, the court observed that defendant’s “attitude as I perceive it watching him as a witness here, watching him throughout the trial, based on the other information before me, also convinces me that he’s not a suitable and likely candidate for probation. He’s not credible, he’s not reliable.” Finally, the court concluded “It’s pretty obvious that he surrounds himself with persons who are deeply engaged in criminal activity and criminal conduct. And again, that seems to satisfy not only the monetary and material needs, but even more significantly some emotional and psychiatric needs of his that I’m not persuaded that, at this stage in his life, I’m not very optimistic there’s likely to be much change in that regard; ...” Also notable is the court’s reference to the reports by the psychiatrist and criminologist who evaluated defendant and its specific rejection of their conclusions on the ground that the evaluations did not sufficiently take into account defendant’s history of criminality or the attributes of his personality which had embroiled him in the crimes with which he was charged and convicted.
The trial court’s discourse on defendant’s conduct was more than merely a statement as to defendant’s past criminal conduct. It also contained a considered prediction that defendant’s future acts presented a risk because the psychological and other factors which had led defendant to become involved in criminal activities remained, and defendant’s attitude as revealed during trial indicated no present movement toward improvement or meaningful change. *209The court considered “the pattern of . . . defendant’s history” (In re Podesto, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 936) and concluded that it revealed a present propensity for criminality which might lead to criminal conduct if defendant was released on bail.
As a result, unlike the trial court in Podesto, the court here articulated sufficient reasons for finding that defendant posed a substantial risk if released. A reading of the transcripts of the sentencing and bail proceedings in conjunction provides, in my view, ample material on which to permit appellate review, and to identify several valid reasons for the trial court’s action. I conclude that no manifest abuse of discretion occurred and would deny the writ on this basis.