dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
The final garnishment judgment at issue recites that the judgment-debtor in the underlying garnishment proceeding, Appellant Lease Finance Group, LLC (LFG) was given proper notice of the garnishment proceeding by the judgment creditors, Appellees Randy Childers and Arlington Motor Cars USA (collectively referred to herein as AMC). The judgment specifically states that “[t]he Court found that Judgment-Defendant Lease Finance Group, LLC has been properly served with a copy of the Writ of Garnishment in accordance with Rule 663a.” LFG filed a motion for new trial. LFG’s motion for new trial does not allege that it failed to receive notice-at best, LFG’s motion for new trial claims that the notice it received was defective in some unspecified way.1
The trial court conducted a hearing on LFG’s motion for new trial. At that hearing, LFG bore the burden to establish that it was entitled to a new trial — that is, to offer evidence supporting its global allegation made in LFG’s motion for new trial that its attorney did not believe that the notice given to LFG was valid.2 LFG *129failed to do so. Although provided -with the opportunity, LFG did not call any LFG employee to testify at the motion for new trial hearing that LFG did not receive notice. Nor did LFG present to the trial court an affidavit from any LFG officer or employee affirmatively stating that LFG had not received notice. LFG offered no evidence in support of its motion for new trial.
LFG instead relied exclusively on an affidavit of its current attorney, Mark Snyder,3 that was attached to LFG’s motion for new trial. Snyder’s affidavit does not allege that LFG did not receive notice. Snyder’s affidavit indicates the opposite— that copies of the required documents were faxed directly to LFG at some time prior to the signing of the judgment of garnishment.4 See Tex.R. Civ. P. 663a (authorizing service of the writ of garnishment on the judgment debtor as provided in rule 21a); Tex.R. Civ. P. 21a (authorizing service by “telephonic document transfer to the recipient’s current telecopier number”).
Although Snyder’s affidavit does aver that the notice given to LFG was — in some unidentified way — not in compliance with rule 663a of the rules of civil procedure, at the motion for new trial hearing LFG offered no explanation of exactly how the notice was purportedly not in compliance with rule 663a and offered no evidence in support of this contention. Assuming this broad, global allegation that notice did not comply with rule 663a preserved a complaint that notice to LFG was not provided as soon as practicable, LFG nonetheless failed to introduce any evidence of this alleged fact. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 663a (requiring notice be given to judgment debtor “as soon as practicable following the service of the writ”). Because LFG did not prove or swear on what date it received the faxed notice (nor did LFG deny receiving the faxed notice), no evidence exists in the record of the date on which LFG received the faxed notice. In the absence of evidence of the date on which LFG received the faxed notice, no evidence exists that LFG did not receive it as soon as practicable.5
*130Because LFG failed to meet its burden of offering evidence, or at least a sworn allegation, that it either did not receive the notice faxed to it or that the notice was faxed to it on a date certain — that was not as soon as practicable, no evidence exists in the record before us that is contrary to the judgment’s recitation of proper notice. In the absence of evidence in the record contrary to the judgment’s recitation of proper notice, we are required to presume that proper notice was given.6
The majority refuses to apply this presumption, claiming the garnishment judgment is akin to a default judgment. I cannot agree; under the rules of civil procedure, a garnishment judgment entered in the absence of an answer from a judgment debtor is not a default judgment. Under the rules of civil procedure, LFG, the judgment debtor, is not a party to the garnishment suit. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 659 (providing that garnishment suit is docketed with plaintiff as plaintiff and garnishee as defendant). Under the rules of civil procedure, LFG as the judgment debtor does not file an answer in the garnishment suit. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 665 (providing that the answer filed by the garnishee shall be under oath); Tex.R. Civ. P. 667 (providing default judgment may be entered if garnishee, not judgment debtor, fails to file answer). And finally, the majority’s holding that every garnishment proceeding in which a judgment debtor chooses not to participate is a “default judgment” thwarts the very purpose underlying garnishment proceedings — to permit judgment creditors to collect monies owed to them pursuant to a final, already-litigated judgment.
Because LFG failed to meet its initial motion for new trial burden of presenting evidence or a sworn allegation that LFG did not receive notice or the date on which LFG did receive notice so that the trial court could determine whether that notice was provided as soon as practicable, I would hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying LFG’s motion for new trial. I would affirm the trial court’s judgment of garnishment. Because I am in the minority, I respectfully dissent.
. LFG’s motion for new trial states that “Lwjhere a judgment debtor has not been give [sic] proper notice of a garnishment pursuant to Rule 663a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, the judgment in garnishment is subject to being set aside.” And the motion alleges that LFG’s attorney Mark Snyder “did not believe that a valid notice of the Garnishment Action had been made upon [LFGJ in that the notice as represented to him by Plaintiffs’ counsel did not comply with Rule 663a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.” Nowhere in LFG’s motion for new trial does it allege that it received no notice.
. The majority inexplicably places the initial burden of proof at LFG’s motion for new trial hearing on the judgment creditor, AMC. It is true that once the party claiming lack of notice or service (here LFG) makes a sworn allegation of lack of notice or comes forward with evidence or testimony supporting an allegation of lack of notice, then the burden shifts to the opposing party (here AMC) to prove proper service or notice. See, e.g., Mathis v. Lockwood, 166 S.W.3d 743, 745 (Tex.2005) (explaining that "testimony by Lockwood's counsel that notice was sent did not contradict Mathis’s testimony that notice was never received ") (emphasis added). But the initial burden of proof is upon the party claiming lack of notice; in Mathis, the party claiming lack of notice met his initial burden by providing testimony that notice was never received. Id. Likewise, contrary to the majority's position, notice is not automatically defective for the failure to include a rule 21a certificate of service; in this situation the party claiming lack of notice must still meet his initial burden of proof by coming forward with a sworn allegation or evidence that no*129tice was not received before the burden shifts to the opposing party to prove proper notice was given. Id.; see also Campsey v. Campsey, 111 S.W.3d 767, 771-72 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2003, no pet.) (explaining it is the appellant’s initial burden to overcome the presumption of proper notice and that the presumption “may not be discharged by mere allegations, unsupported by affidavits or other competent evidence”); Hanners v. State Bar of Tex., 860 S.W.2d 903, 908 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1993, no writ) (same). LFG did not meet this initial burden.
.Snyder refused to accept rule 663a service on LFG, claiming he was not LFG's attorney in the garnishment proceeding at that time. Apparently, Snyder subsequently became LFG’s attorney in the garnishment proceeding as he swore in his affidavit that he had miscalculated LFG’s response date in the garnishment proceeding and filed a motion for new trial along with his affidavit for LFG in the garnishment proceeding.
. Specifically, Snyder swore that
Plaintiffs' attorney transmitted a fax to me on October 9, 2008, which he advised was the fax transmittal of notice to the Garnishment to [LFG]....
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The alleged transmittal [sic] the judgment debtor, as contained in the fax did not comply with the requirements of Rule 663a, but was instead merely a copy of an undated fax transmittal dated [sic] the Writ of Garnishment and the Application for Writ of Garnishment.
. In the only case cited by the majority, the judgment debtor established a date on which he received the required notice; then the trial court held that the notice was not provided as soon as practicable. See Requena v. Salomon Smith Barney, No. 01-00-00783-CV, 2002 WL 356696, at *4 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 7, 2002, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (explaining that the judgment debtor "was not served with a copy of the *130writ until June 27, 2000, a day after the trial court began its hearing”). Here, no date of receipt was proved by LFG; the majority’s holding that the notice faxed to LFG was not provided as soon as practicable is pure speculation.
. See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Capital Assurance Co. v. Jackson, 135 S.W.3d 849, 853 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. denied) (explaining that court order, which recited that all persons entitled to citation were properly cited, was entitled to presumption of correctness in absence of evidence to the contrary); In re B.D., 16 S.W.3d 77, 80 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.l 2000, pet. denied) (applying presumption of regularity when the judgment indicated that notice had been given and there was no evidence to the contrary in the record); Osborn v. Osborn, 961 S.W.2d 408, 411-13 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, writ denied) (explaining that recitation of proper notice in judgment constitutes some, but not conclusive, evidence that proper notice was given).