concurring in the result of Part I of the opinion and dissenting on Part 2 of the opinion:
I concur in the result of Part 1 of this opinion and would order the election held because it is my view that the Boulder Charter and the Constitution of the State of Colorado, with respect to the issues raised on this point, in no way conflict with each other.
*90As the majority notes, the recall power reserved in Article XXI of the Colorado Constitution is political in nature and the Constitution provides that “. . . the electors shall be the sole and exclusive judges of the legality, reasonableness and sufficiency of such ground or grounds assigned for such recall . . . .” In my view, the Boulder Charter provision that the recall petition contain a “substantial statement of the grounds” also permits recall for purely political reasons. It requires only that those reasons be substantially set forth in the petition. The courts are therefore precluded from reviewing the grounds. Since, in my view, there is no conflict between the Colorado Constitution and the Boulder Charter, there is no need to make the constitutional determinations which the majority opinion does.
Insofar as the majority opinion forbids the present incumbents from having their names placed on the ballot to succeed themselves in the event they are recalled, I respectfully dissent. It is clear that the framers of the Boulder Charter followed the provisions of the Colorado Constitution dealing with recall word for word until they came to that portion of Section 3, Article XXI, which provides:
“. . . The name of the person against whom the petition is filed shall not appear on the ballot as a candidate for the office.”
They deliberately excluded that phrase in their recall provisions. Later in the Charter when they were dealing with the question of what should happen to one who was recalled from office, they provided only that he may not be “appointed” to any office within one year of his removal.
It is clear to me that the framers of the Boulder Charter specifically meant to permit the incumbent to run for election to succeed himself. Where there is a difference between the provisions of Article XXI and the provisions of a home rule city charter, those provisions govern which reserve the greater or more extensive electoral power for the people. I see no conflict with the Colorado Constitution in this particular, since I do not view this as a restriction of any right granted by the Colorado Constitution.
*91To me, this approach on the part of the drafters of the Boulder Charter is consonant with a freer expression of the popular will, provides less restriction on voter power than is provided in the Colorado Constitution and, therefore, is permissible in a home rule city charter.
I think the opinion of Chief Justice Weintraub in Grubb v. Wyckoff, 52 N.J. 599, 247 A.2d 481 (1968) and the reasoning therein contained is cogent and I would adopt it here.
MR. JUSTICE DAY authorizes me to say that he joins in these views.