(concurring) — My dissent in DeLaney v. Superior Court, 69 Wn.2d 519, 531, 418 P.2d 747 (1966), referred to in Justice Brachtenbach’s dissent, was based *213upon the lack of statutory authority for issuing a grand jury report.
The question of whether a grand jury has the right to issue a report is one of first impression in this state. It has been presumed that the grand jury had this authority. Thus, the grand jury, acting in good faith and in pursuance of their assumed authority, issued their report. I am now convinced that the grand jury is without the statutory authority to do this.
Since that decision the legislature, in 1971, enacted the Criminal Investigatory Act of 1971 (RCW 10.27; Laws of 1971, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 67, § 1), authorizing the release of evidence of a grand jury report to certain public officials. RCW 10.27.090.
Thus, I feel that I am bound by the mandate of the statute. This court should not sit as a super legislature and exceed its powers by repealing the statute.
The order which this court affirms releases the grand jury report to certain public officials, to wit, Governor, Attorney General, and prosecuting attorney for Thurston County, and not to the public. As I understand the statute, the release of the grand jury report to public officials is for official use.
The legislature, in RCW 10.27.160, authorizes the release of
conclusions, recommendations and suggestions in the form of a grand jury report. Such report shall be released to the public only upon a determination by a majority of the judges of the superior court of the county court that (1) the findings in the report deal with matters of broad public policy affecting the public interest and do not identify or criticize any individual; (2) the release of the report would be consistent with the public interest and further the ends of justice; . . .
The record discloses that the release of the grand jury report does not meet this criteria, neither in a finding that the majority of the judges of the Superior Court authorized its release, nor does it show that it complies with that *214portion of the statute that it does “not identify or criticize any individual.”
Thus, I reaffirm the statement in my dissent in DeLaney v. Superior Court, supra at 531:
A report of a grand jury reflecting upon a person may do irreparable harm to that person’s reputation. There is no forum in which such a person can have an opportunity to clear himself or to establish the falsity of the findings.
Hunter, J., concurs with Rosellini, J.