The companion actions involved herein are
designated as complaints “For Accounting in Equity,” and were instituted, respectively, by appellant Scott, a city fireman, and appellant Yernand, a city policeman. According to the findings of the trial court as set forth in appellant’s brief, the respondent city, during the years 1932-1933, 1933-1934,1934-1935, and 1935-1936, “represented to its police and firemen that it did not have sufficient revenue to enable it to retain the entire force and pay them their full salaries as fixed by Initiative Ordinance, and that they must accept a cut, in salary amounting to ten percent in 1932-1933, and to nine per cent thereafter, or submit to such reduction in personnel as would result in an equal reduction in the outlay for salaries.” The proposed cut in salary was accepted by the personnel “in full and complete discharge and acquittance of all claims and demands for the services rendered . . . solely by reason of said representations,” according to the findings. The trial court also found that the representations so made, were true. *329The appellants’ briefs are largely devoted to the proposition that the city of Los Angeles was guilty of fraud; that at the close of each fiscal year involved herein, “respondent city had, in its various operating funds, surplus money . . . transferred to its reserve fund.” Appellants also insist that during the period in question, “respondent city was accumulating a huge back-log of revenue in the form of delinquent taxes amounting to more than seven million dollars,” which, according to appellants’ theory, constitute “trust funds” for the payment of policemen’s and firemen’s rightful wages withheld by way of the aforementioned deductions. Belying on these averments, it is alleged that “Telling its police and firemen year after year, that its revenues were insufficient to enable the city to retain the entire personnel and pay them the full amount of their salaries as fixed by law, while piling up a huge lack log of revenue during each of said years constituted fraud in a most aggravated form.” (Appellants’ italics.)
The respondents’ brief submits “that appellants are not entitled to an accounting or any other relief for the reason that the City is not and never has been indebted to appellants for the salaries voluntarily waived by them and no funds in the hands of the City are impressed with any trust for the payment of salaries so waived, because”: (1) the voluntary waiver of salary was not induced by any fraud; “ (2) by virtue of Section 186% of the City Charter, appellants accepted their payroll checks in full satisfaction of claims for services”; (3) appellants are in fact seeking recovery of money, which actions are barred by laches, the statute of limitations, and appellants’ failure to file claims in compliance with the City Charter; (4) that delinquent taxes subsequently collected, do not constitute a trust fund for appellants’ benefit.
Whatever may be the rule in other jurisdictions, the courts of California have apparently upheld the validity of waivers by public officers and employees of the full amount of salary as fixed by statute or ordinance. In Gamble v. City of Sacramento (1941), 43 Cal.App.2d 200 [110 P.2d 530] a police officer sought a writ of mandate to compel payment of salary for days worked without pay pursuant to an agreement to donate a designated number of days of service, made in order to avoid a reduction in force personnel. The appellate court, reviewing previous cases on the subject, held that such an agreement was not void as against public policy; also, *330that a claim for unpaid salary is not a book or credit account within the meaning of the statute of limitations, but a cash transaction governed by a charter provision requiring presentation within six months.
Appellants’ brief seeks to distinguish the present case, based upon a trust theory, from actions of debt or assumpsit to directly recover unpaid salary. Indeed, appellants submit that the theory here adopted is “A new approach to an old problem ... an entirely new method by which a long standing wrong, flagrantly fraudulent in its nature, may be righted in entire accord with established principles of law and equity.” But, obviously, calling something by a different name does not change its inherent nature, nor can mere terminology create so-called legal rights where no such rights exist. Such appears to be the situation in the instant litigation.
In respect to the issue of fraud, upon which appellants’ case must, in the final analysis, stand or fall, the record discloses substantial evidence in support of the trial court’s finding that no fraudulent representations were made. In such a situation the well-established rule prevents an appellate court from attempting a further review of the evidence, and the finding must be sustained regardless of the fact that the record also contains conflicting evidence which if believed, would support appellants’ contentions.
In the instant case, respondents’ brief, commenting on the testimony of the chief engineer of the fire department points out that the tentative budget prepared by the chief and approved by the board of fire commissioners, was duly considered by the budget committee in the mayor’s office, and both the mayor and the director of the bureau of budget and efficiency stated that there would have to be a reduction in the amount of salaries. Thereafter the men in the fire department were so notified. A similar procedure was adopted in. reference to the police department. As stated by respondent, “the preparation and adoption of the annual budget is no ‘star chamber’ affair but is attended by ample publicity and participation by the executive, legislative and administrative departments of the city government.” Nor do appellants’ briefs suggest any logical reason why the city of Los Angeles or its officials should entertain any wrongful intent to deprive the firemen and policemen of compensation.
There is evidence indicating that the tax delinquency situation existing in those years of economic upset, required and rightfully received the most careful consideration. Neither *331such consideration, nor the fact that a large amount of delinquent taxes was later collected by the city, can lend support to appellants’ claim of fraud. The same may be said of the city’s transference of certain money to its reserve fund at the close of the fiscal years, which reserve fund, it may be noted, materially decreased during the years in question. Careful consideration of the appellants’ claim of fraud indicates that this contention is based largely, if not entirely, upon matters which have occurred since the making of the alleged false representations to policemen and firemen. In this connection it may be mentioned, in passing, that even if the city authorities had been guilty of using poor judgment in requesting the ten per cent reduction in salaries, such fact would by no means indicate fraud, but rather a possible excess of caution hardly censurable in view of the financial situation existing during the depression years. The appellants’ position also seems to ignore the fact that the city had many departments and needs to provide for, other than those of the police and fire departments.
The trial court also found that appellants’ causes of action were barred by the statutes of limitations, laches, and failure to file claims in compliance with the city charter. The salary waivers involved herein, encompassed the period between 1932 and 1936; appellants’ complaints were filed in 1944; it is not alleged that the charter provisions in reference to filing claims were complied with. As hereinbefore indicated appellants insist that the present actions are not for money, but “are actions in equity to establish fiscal year funds,” alleging that “respondent city is a trustee of the huge balances of revenue resulting from the collection of” delinquent taxes. However, it is true, as said in respondents’ brief, that “No matter what appellants denominate their respective actions, or the theory on which they rely, the fact is obvious that what is sought is recovery of a sum of money representing the difference between their salaries at rates fixed by ordinance and what they actually received.” Although perhaps ingenious in concept, the trust theory here advanced is, so far as the present controversy is concerned, without basis either in law or in fact. If appellants possessed any cause of action, the same is, as found by the trial court, long since barred by limitation and laches. Any other conclusion than that here reached, would, in the language of the findings, result in “serious detriment ... to the City of Los Angeles *332due to the confusion that would be caused in the annual financing of the city government.” And, in view of the state of the record, disclosing as it does, amply sufficient evidence in support of the findings and judgment, no interference with that judgment is warranted.
The judgment is affirmed.
York, P. J., concurred.