concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I respectfully dissent with respect to Divisions 1 and 2 of the majority opinion and concur with Judge Carley insofar as Division 3 is concerned.
1. There were two violations of USCR 31.1, and with respect to at least the latter one involving the four-day notice, it should be held that there was an abuse of discretion in shortening the time from ten days and thereby paving the way for introduction of the evidence of an alleged February 1985 incident.
In considering the admission of evidence of similar incidents, the underlying principle which must be served is the fundamental one “in our system of jurisprudence, intended to protect the individual who is charged with crime, and to insure him of a fair and impartial trial before an unbiased jury, that the general character of the defendant and his conduct in other transactions is irrelevant unless the defend*36ant chooses to put his character in issue.” Bacon v. State, 209 Ga. 261, 262 (71 SE2d 615) (1952); OCGA § 24-2-2. Exceptions have been developed, however, so that for example proof of a separate crime, which is similar and logically connected with the crime on trial, and relevant to an issue, is admissible even when defendant does not put his character at issue. Bacon, supra; Lucas v. State, 178 Ga. App. 150 (342 SE2d 377) (1986); Hill v. State, 183 Ga. App. 404 (1) (359 SE2d 190) (1987); DeVane v. State, 183 Ga. App. 60, 63 (2) (b) (357 SE2d 819) (1987) (grant of certiorari vacated October 26, 1987).
Because of the devastating practical effect on defendant’s defense, and in obedience to the fundamental principle recited above, the law by way of USCR 31.1 has accommodated the interests of the state and the defendant by requiring the state, when it intends to introduce such exceptional evidence, to give the defendant ten days notice in advance of trial. This specified period of time allows the defendant an opportunity to object ahead to the introduction of the damaging evidence and, if his objection fails, to prepare his defense with that impediment in tow. It also allows him an opportunity to investigate the truth of the alleged prior crime or incident, as well as its legal efficacy in the event it resulted in conviction. See DeVane, supra at 62 (2) (a).
Since the effective date of the rule on July 1, 1985, there have been at least a dozen appellate cases involving its application. Several of them call into review the exercise of the trial court’s discretion in shortening the ten-day advance notice which is allowed by the rule. See DeVane v. State, supra; Richardson v. State, 182 Ga. App. 661, 662 (2) (356 SE2d 725) (1987); Durham v. State, 181 Ga. App. 155, 156 (2) (351 SE2d 683) (1986); Hall v. State, 181 Ga. App. 92 (1) (351 SE2d 236) (1986); Stewart v. State, 180 Ga. App. 266 (2) (349 SE2d 18) (1986). Thus it appears that it has added to the problems which arise in criminal trials.
In exercising the discretion given to shorten the ten-day requirement, the court must consider whether the purposes of the rule have been served so that non-compliance can be excused. Relevant factors would be the nature of the evidence (whether a straightforward documented conviction or an unconvicted prior incident), the defendant’s need for the ten-day period, the reasons for the state’s failure, and the relative degree of impact which the evidence will have, such as whether it is simply another one of many convictions already noticed.
Notice of intent to introduce a 1979 incident of “enticing a (female) child for indecent purposes,” of which defendant was convicted, was given and filed only seven days before trial was set, but the state did not at that point ask the court to shorten the time or reset the trial.
The nature of the evidence was a conviction which defendant did *37not contest. Counsel indicated he had no time to investigate it because the public defender’s office for which he worked had thirteen cases on the court’s trial calendar, but he asserted no need for the full period. He had reviewed that record in the district attorney’s office ten days before trial, and the conviction was one from the same court. Although the state offered no reasonable excuse for the tardiness despite its being responsible for the untimely work of its clerical employees, and although the prior conviction of a sex offense involving a child would have a significant impact on the jury’s determination in this case, it would be beyond the bounds of appellate review to classify the trial court’s ruling as an abuse of discretion.
The second notice was given and filed only four days before trial, with a weekend intervening, and again no shortening or continuance was sought by the state when it provided this tardy notice. Here the circumstances were not as borderline as they were in respect to the prior conviction.
The evidence was not a conclusive conviction of which defendant would already be aware, but rather an unindicted accusation that a year-and-a-half earlier, defendant had molested a six-year-old boy. Defendant and defense counsel did not even know about the accusation until apprised of it in the district attorney’s office on that Thursday before Monday’s trial. Counsel had very little opportunity, if any, to investigate it. When he objected at trial and asked that the incident be excluded from introduction, the court said it would allow time to interview the two witnesses, that is, the mother and the young boy, when they reported in the morning pursuant to the state’s subpoenas. Counsel implored the court to grant two days for investigation, recognizing that the witnesses likely would decline interview. The court acknowledged this problem but refused the continuance and instead delayed for half an hour the morning starting time.
The reason given by the state for the notice so close to trial was that it was unaware of the alleged incident until Deputy Sheriff Cos-per apprised the district attorney of it that same day. While it is true that the state cannot give notice of what it does not know, this information was within the direct knowledge of the state’s law enforcement arm, the very investigative department used by this district attorney. Not only that, it was the arresting officer, who was on the state’s witness list filed October 24, who reported it to the district attorney. It had been reported to him by the child’s mother in August.
Such knowledge should be imputed to the state, the same as applies to knowledge of defendant’s statements, else OCGA § 17-7-210 is violated. Talley v. State, 251 Ga. 42 (302 SE2d 355) (1983); Ludy v. State, 177 Ga. App. 767 (1) (341 SE2d 224) (1986). USCR 31 does not even contain an exception for newly discovered evidence, as is pro*38vided in OCGA § 17-7-210 (e). For an illustration of the latter, see Satterfield v. State, 256 Ga. 593, 600 (12) (351 SE2d 625) (1987); moreover, it is not clear in that case that the witness who had knowledge of the statement was a law enforcement officer; if he was, he was not an officer of this state. Yet even a statement to one other than an officer is subject to the timely disclosure requirement of OCGA § 17-7-210. Walraven v. State, 250 Ga. 401, 405 (2) (297 SE2d 278) (1982). Compare Ledesma v. State, 251 Ga. 487, 489 (5) (306 SE2d 629) (1983), where deeming the statement to an officer as newly discovered evidence was based in part on its being relevant only in rebuttal and, in addition, neither inculpatory nor exculpatory in and of itself.
A like exclusion is mandated by OCGA § 17-7-211 for written scientific reports. Luck v. State, 163 Ga. App. 657, 658 (2) (295 SE2d 584) (1982); Law v. State, 251 Ga. 525, 528 (2) (307 SE2d 904) (1983).
To allow shortening of time in the circumstances of this case is to allow Rule 31 to become a virtual nullity. The state can wait until the last minute to ascertain defendant’s prior record or earlier incidents and then when it finds some which it wishes to introduce at trial, say “I just found out.” That emasculates the rule, disserves its purpose, hampers and handicaps defendant in the preparation and presentation of his defense, and rewards the state for ignoring the ten-day rule.
The evidence was undeniably prejudicial. The mother testified that her son, at her urging when she first suspected it one-and-a-half years after the incident, described to her certain acts which defendant allegedly engaged in while the child was being cared for by defendant’s family. The child drew pictures to explain it to his mother and father, which drawings were submitted to Deputy Cosper in August and admitted in evidence. The child, a friend of the victim allegedly attacked on August 1, also testified, with his mother present, describing that defendant had done substantially the same thing to him.
Yet defendant had no opportunity to learn in advance the details or circumstances of this alleged prior act nor to investigate the truth of it. For one thing, he was able to speak with the mother for only a minute or two before trial. Counsel was impossibly handicapped in cross-examination of both witnesses, in refuting the charge, in preparing the defense, and in challenging the similarity, logical connection, relevancy, and other aspects of its admissibility.
This tableau compels a conclusion that defendant was deprived of fair and adequate notice and so of a fair trial in terms of what is required by Georgia law. Disallowing the evidence altogether would not have been mandated, as the court could have granted a continuance. As recognized by the Supreme Court in Robinson v. State, 257 Ga. 194, 195 (1) (357 SE2d 74) (1987), the court must give defendant “ample opportunity to construct a defense against the testimony as to *39similar crimes and transactions.”
2. The facts relating to the pretrial delivery of defendant’s statements and their significance to defendant’s trial preparation also compels departure from the opinion.
In response to the request for all statements made by defendant while in custody, the state produced a three-sentence “Synopsis of Defendant’s Statement” followed by “NOTE: Tape available thru D.A.’s Office.” Defense counsel communicated with the district attorney’s office about this and understood it to relate to the statement to Sheriff Lee. He was even given a transcript of the tape, in further response to the discovery demand. There is no indication that he knew of the earlier statement to arresting officer Cosper or that he was put on notice of it by the state.
He went to the district attorney’s office and listened to the tape of Lee’s interview and detected that the portion allegedly admitting that defendant fondled the child’s genitals was objectionable because just prior to that, defendant had indicated a desire for an attorney. Armed with this bar to evidence of child molestation as charged in count two, defendant went to trial and successfully objected to that portion of the statement. That left only the child’s vague and noncommittal testimony on the subject, which never quite reached evidence of a touching of his genitals.
The state, in its planning, decided to use Deputy Cosper’s testimony regarding the statement made earlier to him, when it realized the existence of an impediment to introduction of the post-request portion of defendant’s statement to Sheriff Lee. It did not advise defendant of this in advance, nor did it give any indication whatsoever that the synopsis and the tape listed in the response to discovery demand were meant to cover two separate statements. Whether this was intended to begin with, when the response was drafted, or whether the decision to use two statements came afterward, is not clear but does not control. What does is that defendant was not apprised that there were two separate statements, and that he was notified of only one.
The fact that the short synopsis fit both, which fact persuaded the trial court that no harm was done, is beside the point. What defendant came to trial with was the well-founded opinion that the statement contained in the taped and transcribed interview with Sheriff Lee, which was synopsized by “Defendant admitted fondling grandson,” was inadmissible. He was not informed that there was an earlier statement to this same effect which did not have the attorney-request obstruction.
OCGA § 17-7-210 makes it the obligation of the State to provide the statements. The purpose and the objective is to inform the defendant, as the opinion aptly states, citing White v. State, 253 Ga. *40106, 109 (2) (317 SE2d 196) (1984). The law was not complied with here, to defendant’s prejudice. He should not have to guess at what the state means in its response nor to divine that when it says “statement” it means two statements. And the fact that Cosper’s name was on the list of witnesses was no notice of the statement to him; Cosper was the arresting officer, so his name would likely appear as to that aspect of the case.
Decided November 20, 1987. Jennifer McLeod, for appellant. Frank C. Winn, District Attorney, J. David McDade, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.The imperfections in this trial, which resulted in sentences of life imprisonment and fifteen years concurrent, require a new trial.