dissenting:
I dissent. It is my view that the facts of this case are adequate to show a confidential relationship and the exercise of undue influence sufficient to require that these deeds be set aside.
On the way home after Mrs. Bullard was released from the hospital on February 2, 1981, Mrs. Crawley drove Mrs. Bullard to an attorney’s office. A frail Mrs. Bullard, sitting in the car in the parking lot, executed a deed and a will conveying her property to the Crawleys. Shortly thereafter, Mrs. Crawley discovered that all of Mrs. Bullard’s property was not included in the deed. She carried Mrs. Bullard back to the law office the next day, and Mrs. Bullard executed a second deed transferring the remainder of her property to the Crawleys, reserving a life estate to herself.
On February 6, 1981, upon realizing the consequences of her action, Mrs. Bullard became very upset. She telephoned her friend, Mrs. Macy Alford, who found Mrs. Bullard in such a distraught condition — loss of breath and crying— that she drove Mrs. Bullard to a physician. Upon returning from the doctor, Mrs. Bullard confronted Karen Crawley and emphatically indicated that it was not her desire or *283intent to convey the property to the Crawleys. Karen Crawley agreed to reconvey the property to Mrs. Bullard; and the two, accompanied by Mrs. Alford, went to the law office to recover the deeds. They were informed that the deeds had been filed with the Clerk of Court and another deed would have to be drawn to effect the reconveyance. Upon being advised that no attorney was available to prepare a deed, Mrs. Crawley signed a paper agreeing to reconvey the property. Mrs. Crawley and Mrs. Bullard agreed to return to the law office that afternoon so that Mrs. Crawley could execute a deed reconveying the property to Mrs. Bullard. Later that same day Mrs. Crawley surreptitiously returned to North Carolina and subsequently refused to reconvey the property.
CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP
It is not necessary that the parties be related by blood or that a formal agency relationship exist in order to establish a confidential relationship. Such a relationship may exist between non-blood related individuals depending on the circumstances of each case. The relationship and duties involved need not be legal, but may be moral, social, domestic or merely personal. See e.g., Hodge v. Shea, 252 S. C. 601, 168 S. E. (2d) 82 (1969); see also, 26A C. J. S. Deeds, § 193.
A confidential relationship exists between grantor and grantee wherever there is a trust reposed by the former and dominant influence obtained by the latter, irrespective of the formal fiduciary character of their relationship. The existence of a confidential relationship between the parties demands close scrutiny of a deed executed by the subservient grantor and may render it invalid for presumed undue influence when otherwise it would be sustained, although deeds between those in a confidential relationship will be upheld if fair and expressive of the free will of the grantor.
Page v. Lewis, 209 S. C. 212, 39 S. E. (2d) 787, 799 (1946), quoting 26 C. J. S. Deeds § 63.
Where a confidential relationship is established, a presumption is raised against the validity of the conveyance, and the burden is on the grantee to show that the transac*284tion was equitable and not the result of undue influence. Way v. Union Cent. Life Insurance Co., 61 S. C. 501, 39 S. E. 742 (1901); Devlin v. Devlin, 89 S. C. 268, 71 S. E. 966 (1911). The presumption may be strong or weak according to the character and situation of the parties and the nature of the relationship between them. Devlin, supra.
In my opinion, the evidence in this case more than adequately establishes that a confidential relationship existed between Karen Crawley and Georgia Bullard. For instance, Mrs. Crawley was the sole provider of assistance to Mrs. Bullard during her protracted illness. She was responsible for supervising Mrs. Bullard’s daily activities as well as conducting her financial and business transactions. Under the circumstances of this case, Mrs. Bullard’s illness and her subsequent reliance upon Mrs. Crawley to manage her affairs is sufficient evidence to establish trust and confidence and the existence of a confidential relationship.
UNDUE INFLUENCE
Under the law, upon a finding of the existence of a confidential relationship, the burden shifts to the grantee to prove that no undue influence was exerted to secure the deed. Way v. Union Cent. Life Insurance Co., supra. The evidence reveals that (a) the grantor was unquestionably susceptible to undue influence as a result of age and mental and physical infirmities; and (b) there is clear and convincing evidence of the grantee’s opportunity and disposition to influence the grantor.
It is an established principle of equity that the acts and contracts of persons who are of weak understanding, and thereby subject to imposition, will be closely scrutinized by the courts to discover whether or not undue influence was exerted or any confidence betrayed to the prejudice of the weaker party or of the one reposing such trust and confidence. Baynard v. Ulmer, 153 S. C. 100, 150 S. E. 610 (1929).
Undue influence invalidates a deed procured by wrongful influence exerted over the grantor so as to destroy free agency and constrain a person to act against his will. Page v. Lewis, supra. It is not material how such control was exercised, whether by physical force, threats, importunities, or any other form of mental or physical coercion, provided that *285it was exerted to destroy freedom of action, and the act was not the grantor’s true will. Baynard v. Ulmer, supra.
The fact that Mrs. Bullard heeded Mrs. Crawley’s threats of abandonment if Mrs. Crawley did not get “concrete papers” is credible and convincing evidence that she exerted dominion over Mrs. Bullard. During Mrs. Bullard’s physical infirmity and accompanying apprehension, she acquiesced and deeded her property to Mrs. Crawley. The deed was executed immediately after Mrs. Bullard was released from the hospital as she sat outside the lawyer’s office, possibly in a nightgown, in a vehicle operated by Mrs. Crawley.
CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding the firm legal ground upon which I would reverse the circuit court’s ruling, I feel compelled to point out two additional areas of particular concern.
First, the majority draws the inference that an additional consideration for the deeds from Mrs. Bullard to Mrs. Crawley might be Karen Crawley’s agreement to care for Mrs. Bullard. This is incongruous in view of two facts: (1) Consideration is not an issue before the court and has no bearing upon the issues of a confidential relationship or undue influence; and (2) this same majority opinion recites that Karen Crawley received a salary and room and board for herself and her daughter, which was the agreed consideration for her services.
Second, the majority relies upon the testimony of Peter Salussolia as evidence of Mrs. Bullard’s sound state of mind. This witness is quoted as saying “she needed somebody there to take care of her____” Further, they rely upon Dr. McKay’s testimony that in January, she (Mrs. Bullard) “kicked Dr. Jordan out of the room.” Clearly, the testimony of Peter Salussolia and Dr. McKay indicate that Mrs. Bullard was unable to care for herself because of her physical and mental condition and was susceptible to undue influence rather than having a strong, independent will as the majority suggests.
My analysis of the record shows that there was ample evidence to support the findings of the master-in-equity that Mrs. Bullard was unduly influenced by Mrs. Crawley. Further, the record reveals that the Crawleys’ evidence was *286insufficient to rebut the presumption that Mrs. Crawley exerted undue influence upon the grantor. Accordingly, I would reverse the order of the circuit court and set aside the deeds to the respondents Steve Crawley and Karen Crawley.
Harwell, J., concurs.