dissenting.
I respectfully depart from Divisions 1 and 5 of the majority opinion, and Division 6 insofar as it relates to the subjects treated in Divisions 1 and 5.
1. The basis of the prayer for punitive damages was that defendant was operating his vehicle while intoxicated, rendering him less than safe to drive his vehicle, and that his intoxication was willful and wanton. The breath analysis of .28 percent alcohol in his blood was in excess of the .12 which constitutes a violation of OCGA § 40-6-391 (4). The officer who arrived at the scene and administered the breath test also testified defendant smelled of alcohol, was unsteady on his feet and was incoherent so that in his opinion defendant was a less safe driver.
The trial court charged on aggravating circumstances and on how driving under the influence might be a factor as follows: “Should you find from the evidence that the defendant was operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol, and that his so driving contributed to the plaintiffs injuries, then I charge you that any evidence of his driving under the influence of alcohol may be considered by the jury along with all of the other evidence in this case.”
Since at least Hardwick v. Price, 114 Ga. App. 817, 821 (3) (152 SE2d 905) (1966), this Court and our Supreme Court have consistently held: “[I]t is no longer essential that the court give an instruction in the exact language of a request . . . The requirement of the law is satisfied where the court instructs the jury substantially upon the principles embodied in the request.” Continental Cas. Co. v. Union Camp Corp., 230 Ga. 8, 18 (3) (195 SE2d 417) (1973). The key *435word is “substantial.”
The Supreme Court’s language in Moore v. Thompson, 255 Ga. 236 (336 SE2d 749) (1985) is clear and unequivocal: unjustified driving under the influence is, as a matter of law, an aggravating circumstance. The jury could not find otherwise. The Supreme Court recognized that the legislature has prohibited driving in such condition, so that doing so is contrary to law and therefore against public policy. Evidence of such driving thus establishes “wilful misconduct, wantonness, and that entire want of care which raises the presumption of conscious indifference to the consequences” necessary as a base for the award of punitive damages.
This is not to say that such a finding compels the award of punitive damages. That is the second question. OCGA § 51-12-5 leaves it to the jury to take this aggravating circumstance and award or decline to award punitive damages and, if so, the amount.
The trial court’s instructions failed to give due significance to such a finding as an aggravating circumstance. Instead, it relegated a finding of intoxicated driving to the mere status of other evidence which might or might not be regarded by the jury as an aggravating circumstance. The Supreme Court ruling is that driving under the influence alone is sufficient ground to impose punitive damages, and the jury was not so instructed. Hence, it was error to refuse the written request to charge which was apt, correct, pertinent and precisely adjusted to the case. See Slaughter v. Linder, 122 Ga. App. 144, 147 (176 SE2d 450) (1970).
2. As to Division 5, plaintiff contends correctly that Globe Motors v. Noonan, 106 Ga. App. 486 (127 SE2d 320) (1962), cited as authority for the charge, involves lost profits rather than earnings. Further, the second sentence of the charge and the first clause of the third sentence are not contained in Globe Motors and no authority was given for these statements asserted as law.
The prerequisite for determining lost profits and lost earnings are similar in that both are predicated on two crucial factors: proof of the amount and a showing that the loss resulted from the injuries sustained. See Keplinger v. Cook, 115 Ga. App. 540, 541 (1) (154 SE2d 765) (1967); Mathis v. Copeland, 139 Ga. App. 68, 69 (228 SE2d 23) (1976). But there is a substantial difference with respect to evidence of the amount. To recover for lost profits the damages must be proved definitely, Globe Motors v. Noonan, supra at 489, while lost earnings may be recovered if the proof is reasonably certain and not mere speculation or guesswork. Douglas v. Rinker, 134 Ga. App. 949, 950 (216 SE2d 629) (1975). The charge given was too restrictive and thus error. Whether it was harmful or not is another matter, which need not be addressed considering the posture of the case.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge McMurray, Presid*436ing Judge Banke, and Judge Pope join in this dissent.
Decided December 4, 1987 Rehearing denied December 18, 1987 Steven D. Harris, Nancy P. Phillips, for appellant. Glenn Frick, Sue K. A. Nichols, for appellee.