dissenting.
As I construe the facts of the case sub judice, Mr. Muia’s responsibilities, as general manager of plaintiff’s Ramada Inn facility, included the acquisition and termination of personnel, purchasing food, beverages and other supplies and supervising the daily operations of the business. Mr. Muia was also responsible for depositing operating revenues of the business into Ramada Inn’s accounts at the Trust Company Bank of Augusta, N.A. (the bank). In this capacity, Mr. Muia was authorized by plaintiff to endorse all checks and he was instructed by plaintiff to endorse the checks with a “rubber stamp” or “by running the checks through the [hotel’s] cash register.” (Both the “rubber stamp” and the cash register contained a restrictive endorsement.) While Mr. Muia was not authorized to execute checks on Ramada Inn’s regular checking account, he did have express authority to execute checks on a special checking account used by Ramada Inn to pay musicians, purchase liquor and acquire other supplies and services that could not be charged by the hotel.
Upon Mr. Muia’s employment, the plaintiff brought him to the bank and introduced him to the bank’s branch manager as “ ‘the new general manager of the Ramada Inn here in Augusta.’ ” Soon thereafter, Mr. Muia opened a personal checking account at the bank.
In conducting Ramada Inn’s financial transactions, Mr. Muia visited the bank “[j]ust about every day.” He became familiar with the bank’s employees and often invited the bank’s tellers to “come to the Ramada Inn for happy hour ...”
On February 15, 1985, Mr. Muia presented for deposit into his personal account three checks made payable to Ramada Inn and drawn on the accounts of Champion International Corporation, Cain & Bultman, Inc., and Southern Wood Piedmont Company. The bank deposited the checks into Mr. Muia’s personal account. These checks were endorsed in blank on behalf of Ramada Inn and also contained the endorsement of Thomas Muia and his personal account number.
From June 20,1985, through November 1985 Mr. Muia deposited into his personal account several checks made payable to Ramada Inn and drawn on the account of American Express Travel Related Services Company, Inc. (American Express Travel). One of these transactions was a “split deposit” where Mr. Muia received $1,750 in cash and the balance of the deposit was deposited into his personal account. With regard to the remaining American Express Travel deposits, the proceeds from the checks were deposited directly into Mr. *374Muia’s personal account. The bank cashed a check for Mr. Muia drawn by American Express Travel to Ramada Inn, dated September 6, 1985, in the amount of $3,485.52. This transaction was approved by the bank’s branch manager, Ms. Laurel Bradshaw. (The total amount of Ramada Inn checks cashed by Mr. Muia or deposited into his personal account is $71,397.29.)
All of the American Express Travel checks were endorsed on behalf of Ramada Inn and some of the checks bore the additional endorsement of Mr. Muia or contained Mr. Muia’s personal account number. The American Express Travel check that was dated September 6, 1985, and was cashed for Mr. Muia by the bank contained the following endorsement: “Ramada Inn Thomas Muia G.M.”
Ms. Kay Ross, a teller employed by the bank, inquired of her “supervisor” regarding a Ramada Inn check deposited by Mr. Muia into his personal checking account. She was informed “[t]hat it was fine because of the fact that Thomas Muia did business for the Ramada Inn, and this was for the Ramada Inn.” Ms. Ross accepted the deposit and several similar deposits thereafter. Other tellers who accepted deposits from Mr. Muia did not inquire of his authority to make such deposits as they relied on his position as general manager to perfect banking transactions on behalf of Ramada Inn.
The bank contends the trial court erred in failing to grant its motion for directed verdict with regard to the proceeds of the checks deposited directly to Mr. Muia’s personal account. In support of this contention the bank relies on OCGA § 7-1-352 (a), which provides as follows: “Whenever any agent, administrator, executor, guardian, trustee, either express or implied, or other fiduciary, whether bona fide or mala fide, shall deposit any money in any bank to his credit as an individual, or as such agent, trustee, or other fiduciary, whether the name of the person or corporation for whom he is acting or purporting to act be given or not, such bank shall be authorized to pay the amount of such deposit, or any part thereof, upon the order of such agent, administrator, executor, guardian, trustee, or other fiduciary, signed with the name in which such deposit was entered, without being accountable in any way to the principal, cestui que trust, or other person or corporation who may be entitled to or interested in the amount so deposited.” (Emphasis supplied.)
In Trust Co. of Ga. v. Nationwide Moving &c. Co., 235 Ga. 229 (219 SE2d 162), “the Supreme Court stated: ‘It is clear that the statute is designed to protect a bank from liability where an agent or fiduciary misappropriates funds of the owner in breach of his agency or trust without the bank’s knowledge. The bank is not required to scrutinize every check written by a fiduciary or agent to see if the check is written in compliance with the agent’s authority.’ p. 230.” Flo-Control v. Northeast Bank, 150 Ga. App. 880, 882 (258 SE2d *375695). It appears this rule applies equally where an agent or fiduciary endorses a check and deposits the proceeds thereof to an account other than that of his principal. See National Factor &c. Corp. v. State Bank of Cochran, 224 Ga. 535, 536 (1) (163 SE2d 817). However, application of this rule is not unbridled.
“In National NuGrape Co. v. Citizens & Southern Nat. Bk., 94 Ga. App. 5, 14 (93 SE2d 381), (certiorari denied), the Court of Appeals, after quoting Code § 13-2042 [formerly Ga. Code Ann. § 41A-1605 and now OCGA § 7-1-352], stated: ‘To charge a bank with notice that a depositor is acting in violation of his trust so as to render it liable for the amount paid out on his check or order to one other than the bank itself, the circumstances must be such as to raise a presumption of knowledge that the depositor is acting dishonestly, or adequate notice to the bank may come from circumstances which reasonably support the sole inference that a breach of trust is intended. Michie, Banks & Banking, Vol. 5A, p. 161; AmJur 376, § 522; Bischoff v. Yorkville Bank, 218 N.Y. 106 (112 NE 759, LRA 1916F, 1059). Judge Sibley speaking for the court in Atlanta & St. A.B.R. Co. v. Barnes, 95 F2d 273, stated as to such cases: “The penalty thus visited ought to be supported by the mala fides of a fraudulent intent, or by a negligence so great as to show wilful ignorance. Simple neglect to inquire about circumstances which ought to have excited attention is not enough, just as it is not enough to prove a want of good faith in purchasing negotiable paper . . . Commercial transactions are not put within the strict fetters of constructive notice.” ’ ” National Factor &c. Corp. v. State Bank of Cochran, 224 Ga. 535, 539, supra.
Under circumstances similar to those of the case sub judice, the Supreme Court in National Factor accepted the above quoted rule and held, “that the circumstances must be such as to raise a presumption of knowledge that the party is acting dishonestly, or adequate notice to the bank may come from circumstances which reasonably support the sole inference that a breach of trust is intended.” National Factor &c. Corp. v. State Bank of Cochran, 224 Ga. 535, 539, supra. From this rule, it follows that plaintiff in the case sub judice carries a heavy burden of showing that the bank was aware of Mr. Muia’s alleged misappropriation of funds. In this regard, Mr. Muia deposited 19 checks made payable to Ramada Inn directly into his personal account. In a “split deposit” transaction, Muia received a substantial amount of cash from the proceeds of a Ramada Inn check, which was made a part of that transaction; and, the bank cashed for Mr. Muia a check made payable to Ramada Inn for over $3,400. These facts raise the question of the scope of Mr. Muia’s actual, apparent and implied authority as general manager to handle Ramada Inn’s financial transactions.
“We do not hold that a general manager can never have the au*376thority or inherent agency power to arrange for the handling of corporate [or business] funds. See, e.g., Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Merchants Nat. Bank, 223 Ia. 446 (273 NW 141) (1937 .... The scope of a general manager’s power depends on his duties and responsibilities and his actual authority. See Raleigh & G.R. Co. v. Pullman Co., 122 Ga. 700 (50 SE 1008) (1905), and Knowles v. Rome Tribune Co., 127 Ga. 90 (56 SE 109).” Trust Co. of Ga. v. Nationwide Moving &c. Co., 235 Ga. 229, 232, 233, supra.
In the case sub judice, in my view plaintiff’s statement to the bank’s branch manager that Mr. Muia was the “new general manager of the Ramada Inn . . . ,” combined with plaintiffs authorization allowing Mr. Muia to endorse checks and deposit funds into Ramada Inn’s regular checking account and withdraw funds from Ramada Inn’s special checking account, was sufficient to support the bank’s conclusion that Mr. Muia had wide authority to conduct Ramada Inn’s financial transactions. This conclusion is further supported by evidence indicating that Mr. Muia had authority to bind plaintiff for services rendered and products supplied to Ramada Inn by vendors and service personnel. This view is in line with the weight of authority in other jurisdictions “to the effect that a bank is not charged with notice of misappropriation by an agent or fiduciary, because of the mere fact that the latter deposited to his individual account a check or note payable to or indorsed by him in his fiduciary capacity.” 57 ALR 925, 930, § III. See also supplementing annotations in 64 ALR 1404, § III; 106 ALR 836, § III; and 115 ALR 648, § III.
Consequently, in the case sub judice, with the bank’s specific denial that it had knowledge of the misappropriation by Muia of funds belonging to plaintiff, this court should conclude that the facts and circumstances relied upon by plaintiff to show knowledge by the bank of conversion of funds by Mr. Muia do not make an issue of fact for the jury. See Citizens Bank of Forsyth v. Middlebrooks, 209 Ga. 330 (72 SE2d 298); Chelena v. Ga. Fed. &c. Assn., 256 Ga. 336 (349 SE2d 180); Bank South v. Grand Lodge &c. for Ga., 174 Ga. App. 777 (331 SE2d 629); and National Bank of Ga. v. Weiner, 180 Ga. App. 61 (348 SE2d 492). The trial court erred in allowing this matter to go to the jury and in failing to grant the bank’s motion for directed verdict as to its liability for the checks deposited into Mr. Muia’s personal account.
The majority’s reliance upon National Bank of Ga. v. Refrigerated Transport Co., 147 Ga. App. 240 (248 SE2d 496), and Thornton & Co. v. Gwinnett Bank &c. Co., 151 Ga. App. 641 (260 SE2d 765), is misplaced. In those cases, the statutory defense, OCGA § 7-1-352 (a), was not relied upon. See Flo-Control v. Northeast Bank, 150 Ga. App. 880, 882, supra.
I, therefore, respectfully dissent. I am authorized to state that *377Judge Carley and Judge Benham join in this dissent.
Decided December 4, 1987 Rehearing denied December 17, 1987 Neal W. Dickert, for appellant. James W. Purcell, Mark C. Wilby, for appellee.