concurring and dissenting.
I concur with the majority that Justice Neely violated Canon 2A of the Judicial Code of Ethics and would join Justice Jol-liffe in publicly censuring Justice Neely for that violation. However, I must take exception to some of the conclusions in the majority’s written opinion.
In addition, I dissent with the majority’s determination that Justice Neely did not violate Canon 1 of the Judicial Code of Ethics, and conclude that he did violate Canon 1.
The most significant disagreement I have with the majority opinion is the language which attempts to establish a standard for tasks a judge or justice may properly call upon public employees to perform:
“... A judge or justice may, without creating the appearance of impropriety, occasionally ask members of his personal staff to voluntarily perform personal tasks that interfere only minimally with performance of their other duties ...”
*728Discussions of this case by this panel make it perfectly clear what sorts of innocuous personal tasks were envisioned by the majority in its adoption of this language. Probably every judge and justice has on occasion asked one of the public employees under his direction to pick up his lunch or a cup of coffee, or to do some other simple task that hopefully all we human beings might on occasion do for one another as an everyday human courtesy. Likewise, most judges and justices hopefully have extended to public employees under their direction similar human courtesies.
While the language of the majority may have intended to exempt those types of situations, it goes much further, establishing a legal standard for determination of all cases of this type. The generality of the majority’s language opens a veritable Pandora’s Box of problems by leaving so much to subjective interpretation. It is not difficult to envision examples of clearly unethical conduct which might fall within the parameters of the majority’s exemption. It is not the function of this Court to articulate a general rule or legal standard as to what is or is not proper. That is the purpose of our Judicial Code of Ethics. The purpose of this Court is limited to review of the record of specific instances of alleged misconduct, application of the Judicial Code of Ethics to the facts and circumstances surrounding such allegations, determination of whether the acts complained of constitute an ethical violation, and application of appropriate sanction.
Furthermore, the very nature of the employer/employee relationship is such that requests by the employer of the employee to perform tasks implicitly lack the volun-tariness referred to by the majority.
A second but related portion of the majority’s opinion with which I must disagree relates to the issue of whether alleged conduct of previous justices with respect to requiring the performance of personal tasks by public employees in any way excuses or exonerates the conduct of Justice Neely.
In support of his contentions, Justice Neely submitted an affidavit of former Supreme Court Clerk George W. Singleton, the crux of which was that two previous unnamed justices had assigned personal duties to their secretaries and staff, including completing income tax returns and typing term papers for a justice’s children. By use of the following language, the majority implicitly determined that these actions were not improper:
"... A secretary can complete tax forms or type papers while in the office, during regular working hours, and without interference with duties such as answering the telephone or typing of a more official nature. A secretary who babysits, in her own home or in the justice’s home, is not concurrently available to assist the justice in the performance of his duties ...”
I find this conclusion objectionable for several reasons:
1. The majority’s language once again seems to suggest a general rule and a dangerous one; that is, that so long as a secretary performs personal tasks during regular working hours and is concurrently available for her official duties, that such personal tasks can be required.
2. It is outside the scope of this Court’s authority in this proceeding to make any implicit determination of the propriety or impropriety of any conduct not the subject of this proceeding. In addition, the sworn statement of only one individual (albeit a highly respected person) with neither names, details as to the facts and circumstances of such claimed conduct, nor any opportunity for response to those charges can hardly form a sufficient basis for a determination .as to the propriety or impropriety of such conduct in any proceeding.
3. Even if unethical conduct by any previous or present justice can be proven, the fact that such unethical conduct has occurred on the part of others cannot be used to justify the conduct in this case. The majority opinion fails to make that clear.
I must also part ways with the majority in its determination that Justice Neely did *729not violate Canon 1 of the Judicial Code of Ethics.
Canon 1 provides:
A Judge Should Uphold the Integrity and Independence of the Judiciary
An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our society. A judge should participate in establishing, maintaining, and enforcing, and should himself observe, high standards of conduct so that the integrity and independence of the judiciary may be preserved. The provisions of this Code should be construed and applied to further that objective.
The majority believes the conduct under examination here did not call into question the integrity and independence of the judiciary. I disagree.
The conduct of Justice Neely in requiring personal services of his secretary in the form of babysitting so clearly violates the Code’s requirement of “high standards of conduct” that extensive discussion seems to me not to be required.
Integrity in all actions done in a judicial decision-making capacity is of course vital. But integrity and high standards of conduct also relate to the much broader issue of faithfully adhering to the public trust which resides with every judge and justice in all other public conduct.
The purpose of judicial disciplinary proceedings is the preservation and enhancement of public confidence in the honor, integrity, dignity and efficiency of the members of the judiciary and the system of justice. In the matter of Magistrate Kenneth L. Gorby, 176 W.Va. 16, 339 S.E.2d 702 (1985).
It is for this reason that I must depart • from the majority’s conclusion that admonition is the proper sanction and instead hold that Justice Neely should be publicly censured for his conduct.
The .difference in the two sanctions is semantic but significant. Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary defines “admonition” as “1: gentle or friendly reproof 2: counsel or warning against fault or oversight”; and “censure” as “1: a judgment involving condemnation 2: the act of blaming or condemning sternly 3: an official reprimand.”
Respect for the court system in West Virginia is in need of revitalization. A public perception that the official response to this conduct on the part of one of our brethren is nothing more than a gentle reproof will not bolster public confidence in the courts.
The facts and circumstances of this case require official condemnation.