State v. Bennett

Justice PLEICONES:

In 1988, twelve years before he murdered Benton Smith, appellant brutally assaulted two young men in a parking lot. He pled guilty to two counts of assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature (ABHAN), and received a Youthful Offender Act sentence. During this capital resentencing proceeding, the State introduced, without objection, graphic testimony from two eyewitnesses to the assault of the second ABHAN victim,4 including one witness who observed appellant stomping on the unconscious victim’s head. The second witness testified he saw appellant drag the prostrate victim by the hair, then kneel to punch him five or six times, then rise and kick and stomp the unconscious victim.

The State then called one of the victims’ mothers to testify, and appellant objected on the grounds of - relevance at a sidebar.5 The objection was overruled, and the mother testified to receiving the call telling her to come to the hospital and the injuries to her son that she observed when she arrived. Over another relevancy objection, the State was permitted to introduce a photo of the victim taken while he was in intensive care. The mother was permitted to testify extensively to the details of her son’s time in the hospital, his subsequent stay in a head trauma rehabilitation facility, and the lingering effects of the beating.

This mother’s testimony was followed by that of her son. Appellant’s objection at a sidebar, again on the ground of relevancy, was overruled and the victim was permitted to relate a dream he had had while hospitalized about being chased by “Black Indians.” The State then called, over another unsuccessful relevancy objection, the mother of the *235second victim. This woman testified, as had the first mother, to her observations of her son’s injuries, recovery, rehabilitation, and residual problems.

I agree with the majority that evidence of a defendant’s prior criminal record is admissible in a capital sentencing proceeding because it is relevant evidence of the defendant’s character. The Constitution requires that the decision whether to impose a death sentence be “an individualized determination [made] on the basis of the character of the individual and the circumstances of the crime.” Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 879, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983) (italics in original). Further, I agree that, in furtherance of the jury’s understanding of the defendant’s character, the State should not be limited to merely presenting the fact of the prior conviction as it would be were the purpose to impeach the defendant’s veracity. See State v. Gregg, 230 S.C. 222, 95 S.E.2d 255 (1956). I do not agree, however, that the extensive testimony admitted here, from eyewitnesses, victims, and relatives of the victims of offenses wholly unrelated to the capital offense, are relevant to the issue of the appellant’s character. Nor can I agree that the dream of a victim of a prior crime is, under any stretch of the imagination, relevant to “the character of the individual or the circumstances of the [capital] crime.” Zant, supra.

The Constitution permits the sentencing authority to consider “the specific harm caused by the crime in question” through the State’s introduction of “evidence about the victim and about the impact of the murder on the victim’s family” because such evidence is relevant to the “defendant’s moral culpability and blameworthiness” as it relates to the capital murder. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991). In other words, this type of evidence is admissible because it is relevant to the circumstances of the crime, not because it is relevant to the defendant’s character. Id.

I agree with the majority that the State’s evidence in this case cannot be characterized as victim-impact evidence under Payne since it does not relate to the murder victim or his family. In fairness to appellant’s attorneys, however, they concede that this evidence would have been admissible under Payne if related to the capital crime rather than to these unrelated prior offenses. Specifically, appellant’s trial objec*236tion was to the evidence “as being inappropriate, victim impact type information and having nothing to do with the particular trial that [appellant] is on trial for now.” Moreover, appellant’s attorney in this appeal concedes this type of evidence may be admissible as it relates to the victim of the capital crime, but argues “[t]here is no language in Payne authorizing victim impact evidence on unrelated crimes....” I agree with appellant that the trial court erred in admitting this irrelevant evidence.

The Constitution limits even valid victim-impact evidence where it is unduly inflammatory or renders the sentencing proceeding fundamentally unfair. Payne, supra (Justice O’Connor, concurring). Here, the capital sentencing jury was overwhelmed with evidence of appellant’s “moral culpability and blameworthiness,” not for the murder of Benton Smith, but for the brutal beatings of two young men.6 In my opinion, the State’s presentation of this evidence denied appellant a fair sentencing and encouraged the jury to impose a death sentence on an improper basis. Zant, supra (character of the defendant and circumstances of the capital crime are relevant to determining sentence).

I therefore dissent from the majority’s decision to affirm appellant’s sentence.

. Both victims were lying motionless in the parking lot, "obviously injured.” The scene was quite bloody.

. The judge later put the grounds of the objection on the record.

. This evidence was exploited by the solicitor in his closing argument.