dissenting.
I dissent because I believe the majority has failed to give effect to the changes in the jurisdiction of district courts brought about by the court reform amendments to the Oklahoma Constitution in 1967. Okla. Const. Art. 7 § 7(a) provides in material part:,
The District Court shall have unlimited original jurisdiction of all justiciable matters, except as otherwise provided in this Article
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Although the district court was acting within its probate docket, I think it inescapable that it had jurisdiction in the probate proceeding to consider Wilson’s tort claims against Kane. I would therefore hold that Wilson’s tort action was barred by res judi-cata.
The majority holds that Wilson’s tort claim “is [not] fit for ... resolution in probate,” but carefully avoids holding that the first district court lacked jurisdiction in the probate action to dispose of all matters in dispute between Wilson and Kane. I disagree with the majority’s refusal to deal with the jurisdictional issue. Disputes over the jurisdiction of district courts acting in their probate capacity have created much confusion in the Oklahoma law since 1969. By refusing to deal with this issue, the majority leaves an already murky area more unsettled.
Historical Background
In 1967 the people reformed the Oklahoma court system by amending the Judicial Article of the Oklahoma Constitution to grant “unlimited original jurisdiction” to the district courts and eliminate the other courts that had existed since statehood. Id., Article 7, § 7(a). The legislature amended the statutes to reflect these changes in legislation that became effective in January 1969.1
Before court reform, the jurisdiction of county courts was strictly limited. Any decision of a county court in a probate matter was appealable to the district court for trial de novo.2 The county court lacked jurisdiction to decide title to property in non probate actions.3
Court reform was thought to have eliminated confusion over competing jurisdiction of the sort that arose in State v. Lohah, 434 P.2d 928 (Okla.1967). There, we issued a writ of prohibition to resolve a dispute between a district court, sitting in a divorce action, and a county court, sitting in a dependant and neglected child matter. Professor George B. Fraser predicted the effect of court reform in an article he wrote about the changes in the Oklahoma Law Review:
Since there will be only one trial court of general jurisdiction the problem of which court has jurisdiction of an action will no longer exist and conflicts between courts within a county will no longer be possible_ [Emphasis added.]
Fraser, Oklahoma’s New Judicial System, 21 Okla.L.Rev. 373, 374 (1968).
We echoed Professor Fraser’s sentiments in the first case in which we addressed the effect of § 7(a), In re Estate of Faulkner, 504 P.2d 875, 877 (Okla.1972). In Faulkner, this Court held:
The District Court is no longer limited by the rule that in probate matters its juris*725diction is appellate only and embraces only the jurisdictional scope of a county court sitting in probate matters.
We have recognized the effect of § 7(a) in two recent opinions. In Frazier v. Bryan Memorial Hosp. Authority, 775 P.2d 281, 285 (Okla.1989), we said, “The district court stands in our constitutional order as a judicial tribunal of unlimited jurisdiction.” [Emphasis as in the original.] In Eskridge v. Ladd, 811 P.2d 587, 588 (Okla.1991), we said that, under Article 7, § 7(a) of the constitution, the district court is “omnicompetent.” [Emphasis added.]
In Duke v. Nelson, 536 P.2d 412, 414 (Okla.App.1975), the Court of Appeals took a position contrary to Faulkner, without citing it. There, the court said:
The new Judicial Article [20 O.S. 1981 § 91.1] did not abolish nor alter the distinction between various types of court actions whether established by common law or statutes. Probate proceedings are strictly statutory. The purview of probate proceedings in Oklahoma will be the same in the -District Court as they were in the County Court unless changed by statute.
The Duke court’s language was not only a misstatement of the law, it was unnecessary to the Court of Appeals’ holding. In Duke, defendant had demurred to plaintiff’s petition on the ground that another action was pending. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court had improperly sustained defendant’s demurrer because plaintiff’s petition did not allege this fact. The Court of Appeals in Duke not only ignored Faulkner but relied on In re Griffin’s Estate, 199 Okla. 676, 189 P.2d 933 (1947), which was decided before court reform.4
The next year, we decided one case that was in line with Faulkner, and another that followed Duke. In re Woodward, 549 P.2d 1207 (Okla.1976), apparently followed Faulkner, and In re Estate of Kizziar, 554 P.2d 791 (Okla.1976) cited with approval the unfortunate misstatement of the law from Duke.
In re Woodward, 549 P.2d 1207 (Okla.1976), was an action to determine the death of a joint tenant and to terminate the joint tenancy. Defendants, other relatives of the decedent, filed a counterclaim in which they contended the plaintiffs had secured the joint tenancy deed through fraud and undue influence. The trial court tried the matter and found for plaintiffs and against defendants on defendants’ counterclaim. Apparently other parties were involved in the action who were not heirs or devisees of the decedent. By affirming the trial court, we impliedly recognized the power of the district court to try title to real property while sitting in its probate capacity, although some of the parties were not heirs.
In re Estate of Kizziar, 554 P.2d 791 (Okla.1976) started out as the probate of the estate of an intestate. During his lifetime, decedent had bought certificates of deposit on which he named others as joint tenants. The surviving joint tenants in the certificates of deposit objected to the personal representative’s inventory, and the trial court held an evidentiary hearing to decide whether the estate or the surviving joint tenants owned the certificates. In the final decree, the trial court held that the estate, not the surviving joint tenants, owned the certificates of deposit. The surviving joint tenants appealed. This Court cited Duke with approval, and held that the trial court had lacked jurisdiction to decide the ownership of the certificates of deposit. As had Duke, Kizziar relied on cases decided before court reform. Kizziar recognized the exception created by In re Griffin’s Estate, 199 Okla. 676,. 189 P.2d 933 (1947). Griffin held that a probate court had jurisdiction to try title if the dispute is between those claiming as heirs or devisees of the decedent. In Kizziar, however, we held that the Griffin exception did not apply because, in Kizziar, the surviving joint tenant was a stranger to the estate.
*726In the seventeen years since it was decided, this Court did not cite Kizziar, until the majority did so today. It has been cited but twice by the Court of Appeals, in Matter of Lindell’s Death, 573 P.2d 716 (Okl.App.1977), and Matter of Estate of Jech, 701 P.2d 428 (Okl.App.1985). Both opinions were justifiably critical of Kizziar. In Lindell, the Court of Appeals properly concluded that it was bound by Kizziar,. and Duke, but suggested their holdings were inconsistent with court reform:
... We can see no law or logical reason why a district court in Oklahoma cannot determine all of the issues in a case without the necessity of at least two separate actions being filed
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As we see it, the only possible rationale for the cases which conclude that the district court must sit in a dual capacity — that is, hear two separate lawsuits— is because originally there were two separate courts which now have become one.... This seems to go against the very letter and spirit of the statutory court reform in Oklahoma. [Emphasis added.]
Lindell, Id. 573 P.2d at 720. In Jech, the Court of Appeals after noting that it was bound by Kizziar and Duke, quoted Lin-dell with approval.
Resolving the Confusion
Today the majority has failed to resolve the confusion, spawned by Kizziar and Duke, that has existed with respect to the jurisdiction of district courts in probate matters. Kizziar relies on a misstatement in Duke and misapplies the law. I would overrule Kizziar. Wilson submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the first district court by claiming the certificates of deposit in that forum. She should have been required to submit all claims arising from the central facts of the transaction there. Subjecting Kane to a second suit arising out of the same transaction, because Wilson's first suit was assigned a probate number, is unfair and not supported by law.
The majority cites Kizziar, but avoids applying it by saying that the jurisdiction of the court in the Morris probate to decide that matter is not before this Court. I believe the jurisdiction of the probate court is properly before the Court. If the district court had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of Wilson’s claim to the certificates, how could it lack jurisdiction over the remaining issues arising from the transaction between Wilson and Kane? On the other hand, if the trial court in the Morris probate lacked jurisdiction to consider who owned the certificates of deposit, then the judgment in Wilson’s favor was a nullity. Thus, Wilson will be required upon remand of this action to again prove that she owned the Certificates. Wilson will have to win on the ownership issue a second time to entitle herself to damages. Leaving the critical question of the first district court’s jurisdiction unanswered virtually guarantees that we will see this case again.
Believing as I do that Kizziar should be overruled, and that we should hold the trial court had jurisdiction over Wilson’s claim in the Morris probate matter, her claim in this action was barred by res judicata. Under Mann v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 669 P.2d 768 (Okla.1983), and Retherford v. Halliburton Company, 572 P.2d 966 (Okla.1977), a cause of action includes all theories arising from a single occurrence or transaction. That is the case here.
The majority repeatedly uses the term “probate judge” as if a probate judge were somehow different from other district judges. One searches the constitution and statutes in vain for the term “probate judge.” The constitution and statutes do not mention “probate judge.” Instead, they create a single district court that is “omnicompetent.” The majority’s holding to the contrary is insupportable.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly decided the matter. The failure of the majority to overrule Kizziar regrettably deprives the people of this state of a significant amount of the reform they thought they were getting when they passed Court Reform in 1967. The majority’s pronouncement is unsupported by ei*727ther “law or logical reason” and goes “against the very letter and spirit of the statutory court reform in Oklahoma.” Lindell, Id. 573 P.2d at 720. Unfortunately, the confusion over the jurisdiction of district courts sitting in probate matters to try title to property that has existed since Kizziar still reigns. I dissent.
.20 O.S. 1991 § 91.1 provides in material part:
The district courts of the State of Oklahoma are the successors to the jurisdiction of all other courts, including ... the County Courts ... Wherever reference is made in the Oklahoma Statutes to any of the above courts or to the judge thereof, it shall be deemed to refer to the district court or a judge thereof ...
. Okla. Const. Art 7 § 16 (1961).
. Okla. Const. Art. 7 § 12 (1961).
. In Griffin, we held that a probate court had jurisdiction to try title if, but only if, all contestants to the property were claiming as heirs or devisees of the decedent.