(Concurring in the Result):
I concur in the result on the ground that “the photograph by itself does not support *988an inference that the Workmans ‘knowingly’ permitted Kelly to take a picture of E.’s exposed buttocks,” as explained in the lead opinion.
I would not reach beyond that in this case. I particularly have grave doubt about Justice Stewart’s statement that “[t]here is no evidence that the picture could have been used by anyone for [sexual arousal], no matter how sexually eccentric he or she might be.” (Emphasis added.) I believe that the legislature has already made the determination that pictures of minors with their buttocks exposed are capable of sexually arousing persons who may take or view them. In section 76-5a-3, the legislature made it a criminal offense to produce material depicting a nude or partially nude minor for the purpose of sexual arousal. Partial nudity is defined in part as any state of undress in which the human buttocks are less than completely and opaquely covered. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5a-2. It matters not that Justice Stewart finds that the picture has no “alluring or sensual quality to it.” That is not a statutory requirement. Nudity alone is sufficient. Although Kelly did not testify that he took or possessed the picture for the purpose of arousing himself, I think a jury could reasonably draw that inference under the facts of this case, given Kelly’s unusual physical attraction to E. Juries regularly determine a defendant’s state of mind by inference from the evidence. Justice Stewart does not suggest any other purpose Kelly might have had. It follows that I also disagree with his implication that expert testimony might be necessary to establish that this photograph could be sexually arousing. A prosecutor does not have that burden.
HALL, C.J., and ZIMMERMAN, J., concur in HOWE, Associate C.J.’s, concurring in the result opinion.