dissenting.
I dissent from the majority’s analysis addressing whether remand to the Commissioner is appropriate under sentence six of § 405(g). In concluding that Allen has failed to present “new evidence which is material” to support a remand pursuant to sentence six of § 405(g), the majority *655resorts to conclusory statements and unsupported assumptions. The majority asserts that “the subsequent decision in Allen’s favor, standing alone,” is the only possible “new evidence” that could support a remand under § 405(g). Op. at 10. However, the second application is not in the record before the panel on appeal, and there is no evidence indicating what Allen did or did not submit to the SSA in support of his second application.
Without examining the evidence submitted in support of Allen’s subsequent application for benefits, this Court cannot determine whether there is “new evidence which is material” underlying the subsequent determination of disability that would support a sentence six remand. Because examination of the evidence supporting the SSA’s subsequent award of benefits is necessary to properly evaluate whether there is “new evidence which is material,” I would remand for a determination of whether the available evidence indicates that the sole possible basis for remand under sentence six is the subsequent favorable determination.1 In view of the incomplete and contradictory state of the record, the preferable disposition of this appeal would be to remand with instructions for clarification regarding the state of the evidence we are to consider in connection with this appeal. Contrary to the majority’s opinion, the problem here is not simply that the record fails to reveal new material evidence, or that Allen has failed to meet his burden; rather, the confusing and ambiguous state of the record should be addressed prior to a ruling by this Court. Because of this recommended disposition, I find it unnecessary to reach the issue of whether a subsequent favorable determination itself, apart from the evidence supporting that determination, can constitute “new evidence which is material” for purposes of § 405(g).
Inasmuch as the majority opinion is based on insufficient support in the record for its conclusory statements, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusions regarding Allen’s request to remand to the Commissioner under sentence six of § 405(g).
. Further demonstrating the conclusory nature of the majority’s opinion is its suggestion that the subsequent finding that Allen was disabled "was likely based on a different age category.” Op. at 654. The majority joins the magistrate judge in speculating that "[t]he new determination might be based on a change in the claimant’s [age]” that required the Commissioner "as a matter of law and pursuant to the ‘grids’ to find the plaintiff disabled for the period after February 3, 2007.” Id. However, the letter awarding Allen benefits provides no indication as to how the SSA arrived at its determination that Allen was disabled. Thus, the majority can only speculate as to the reasons underlying the SSA’s subsequent conclusion that Allen was disabled.