On Motion for Rehearing.
Per curiam.A motion for rehearing in the above three cases was filed in this court on July 9, 1974, on behalf of John F. Inman. This motion for rehearing contains seven separate grounds.
*579We have considered each of these grounds individually, reviewed the record again, and we conclude that none of the grounds for rehearing is meritorious.
We deem it necessary to comment on only one of the grounds, number five. The fifth ground of the motion for rehearing contends that this court’s judgments in these cases are erroneous because: "The court has overlooked the fact that the 'initial reorganization’ ordinance enacted by the new council March 4,1974, and approved by the mayor March 7, 1974, does not have the force of law, and is insufficient to 'reorganize’ the city government and create a Bureau of Police Services, diluting the duties of Chief Inman under the Act of 1963, pp. 1183, 1184, because such 'reorganization’ can be accomplished under the new charter only by a home rule ordinance as provided in § 7-104 of the new charter (Ga. Laws 1973, p. 2249), even if such § 7-104 be valid.”
As we read this ground five, it contends that the reorganization ordinance enacted by the council was not a "home rule ordinance” pursuant to § 7-104 of the new charter.
In all of this litigation, this contention is raised for the first time in ground five of the motion for rehearing. Chief Inman’s original complaint, and all subsequent amendments and subsequent suit and amendments in DeKalb Superior Court, did not attack the procedural validity of the reorganization ordinance. All of Chief Inman’s legal attacks were leveled only at section 6 of the reorganization ordinance. Paragraph 15 of the original complaint averred that "section 6 of the ordinance ... is ultra vires, null, and void.” The prayers of the original complaint were that the City be enjoined from acting pursuant to section 6 of the reorganization ordinance and that section 6 of the reorganization ordinance attached to the complaint as an exhibit be declared null and void.
The stipulation of facts entered into by the parties in the trial court in No. 29054, filed in the clerk’s office May 2, 1974, contained the following: "An actual controversy exists between the plaintiff and defendant with respect to the issue which has arisen as set out in the complaint and plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment of this court as to the validity of section 6 of the ordinance *580attached to the complaint as exhibit A.”
The City’s brief, filed in the trial court and made a part of the record on appeal (R-52), contained the following: "Pursuant to the requirements of § 7-104 of the new charter, on the fourth day of February, 1974, the Mayor of the City of Atlanta presented to the council a proposed ordinance which specified the number of departments of the City and the duties and the functions of each. This proposed ordinance was duly passed on the fourth day of March, 1974, by the City Council of Atlanta and approved by the mayor on the seventh day of March, 1974.”
Nowhere in the pleadings or argument, prior to the motion for rehearing, was the contention made that the ordinance was not enacted pursuant to § 7-104 of the new charter.
We consider this to be important because § 7-104 of the new charter permits the charter itself to be amended by a "home rule ordinance.” The enactment of such an ordinance by the council amounts to an amendment of the City’s new charter.
The Home Rule Act of 1965 provides that a municipality can amend its charter in any manner whatsoever except for the limitations prescribed in section 4 of that Act. There is no limitation contained in section 4 that prevents a municipality from amending its charter so as to abolish any or all departments contained in its municipal government. Therefore, a "home rule” charter amendment can be enacted by ordinance, and the new charter amendment so enacted supersedes and repeals any conflicting provisions contained in the charter prior to amendment.
As the original opinion of this court shows, these cases were decided on the premise that the ordinance in question was enacted pursuant to § 7-104 of the new charter. There was no contention to the contrary. Only section 6 of the ordinance was attacked.
Therefore, ground five of the motion for rehearing is denied; but we specifically hold that the procedural validity or invalidity of the entire ordinance has not been decided in these cases. This issue simply was not raised or considered in the trial court.
*581Motion for rehearing denied. All the Justices concur, except Nichols, P. J., and Undercofler, J., who dissent.