Kanawha & Hocking Coal & Coke Co. v. Carbon County

ELLETT, Justice:

Plaintiff initiated these proceedings in the District Court of Carbon County for the purpose of quieting its title to a tract of land in Township 13 South, Range 10 East, Salt Lake Meridian. The original suit was filed by North American Coal Corporation, and while these proceedings were pending the land was sold and conveyed to the plaintiff. By their answers both defendants admit that the plaintiff is the owner of the surface but deny that the plaintiff owns the coal underlying the premises. Carbon County claims title to the coal by virtue of two sales for unpaid taxes for the year 1932, and an auditor’s tax deed recorded Ma^' 26, 1937. The second tax sale was for unpaid 1944 taxes and an auditor’s endorsement was recorded June 13, 1949. The district court granted a summary judgment in favor of the County as to ownership of the coal.

The County relies upon the statute of limitations as a defense to this suit. The sections relied upon are as follows:

78-12-5.2. U.C.A.1953 (1973 Pocket Supp.). No action or defense for the *1140recovery or possession of real property or to quiet title or determine the ownership thereof shall be commenced or interposed against the holder of a tax title after the expiration of four years from the date of the sale, conveyance or transfer of such tax title to any county, or directly to any other purchase thereof at any public or private tax sale and after the expiration of one year from the date of this act. Provided, however, that this section shall not bar any action or defense by the owner of the legal title to such property where he or his predecessor has actually occupied or been in actual possession of such property within four years from the commencement or interposition of such action or defense.
78-12-5.3, U.C.A.1953 (1973 Pocket Supp.). The term “tax title” as used in section 78-12-5.2 and section 59-10-65, and the related amended sections 78-12-5, 78-12-7, and 78-12-12, means any title to real property, whether valid or not, which has been derived through or is dependent upon any sale, conveyance or transfer of such property in the course of a statutory proceeding for the liquidation of any tax levied against such property whereby the property is relieved from a tax lien.
Definition of “Action.”
The word “action” as used in these sections includes counterclaims and cross-complaints and all civil actions wherein affirmative relief is sought.

The record does not reveal that the plaintiff or either of the defendants was in actual possession of the beds of coal beneath the premises. For the purposes of the defendants’ motion for a summary judgment in the district court, the invalidity of the county auditor’s conveyances to the County was assumed as a matter of fact and law.

The general property taxes for the surface rights of the property have been assessed separately from the mineral rights. Carbon County assesses taxes to the surface rights and the Utah State Tax Commission assesses taxes on the coal beds. The plaintiff and its predecessors paid the taxes assessed against the surface, but since the County owns the mineral rights no taxes have been assessed thereon.1

It is the plaintiff’s contention that its possession and its predecessors’ possession of the surface constitute possession of the subsurface minerals. The tax sale of the mineral . rights and the auditor’s deed thereto were effective to sever the surface estate from that of the underlying minerals.

Plaintiff cites a number of cases to support its position that its continued possession of the surface was adverse possession of the minerals. We are of the opinion that the better rule is that where title to the surface and that of the underlying minerals have been effectively severed, possession of the surface, when unaccompanied by any acts of dominion over the minerals, does not constitute adverse possession of the minerals.2

Since the county received its tax deed to the mineral rights more than four years prior to suit, and since the plaintiff has not been in actual possession of the mineral rights conveyed to the county by that tax deed, the statute of limitation has run and the plaintiff cannot recover. The judgment of the trial court is therefore affirmed.

No costs are awarded.

HENRIOD, C. J. and CROCKETT, J. concur.

. Art. VIII, Sec. 2, Constitution of Utah.

. Shrewsbury v. Pocahontas Coal & Coke Co., 4 Cir., 219 F. 142; Consolidation Coal Co. v. Yonts, 6 Cir., 25 F.2d 404; Catlin Coal Co. v. Lloyd, 180 Ill. 398, 54 N.E. 214; Uphoff v. Tufts College, 351 Ill. 146, 184 N.E. 213, 93 A.L.R. 1224; Prewitt v. Bull, 234 Ky. 18, 27 S.W.2d 399; Brennan v. Pine Hill Colliers Co., 312 Pa. 52, 167 A. 776; Luse v. Parmer (Tex.Civ.App.), 221 S.W. 1031.