dissenting.
Defendant enumerates error on the court’s failure to allow him to amend his pleadings by adding a counterclaim.
There are two statutes which allow the amendment of such pleadings, to wit: Code Ann. § 81A-113 (f) (§ 13 CPA; Ga. L. 1966, pp. 609, 625) and Code Ann. § 81A-115 (a) (§ 15 CPA; Ga. L. 1966, pp. 609, 627; 1968, pp. 1104, 1106; 1972, pp. 689, 694).
The first statute permits amending by adding an omitted counterclaim where it is shown that the failure to include same earlier was through oversight, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, or when justice requires. Clearly no proper showing was made under this statute, as the affidavit is made, not by the party but by his counsel, and suggests that the information as to the right to counterclaim did not reach "our office” until after the original pleading had been filed. This was as nearly no showing as could be imagined.
But the next statute, to wit, Code Ann. § 81A-115 (a) is very broad and all-inclusive, as follows: "A party may amend his pleading as a matter of course and without leave of court at any time before the entry of a pre-trial order. ” (Emphasis supplied.) There was no pre-trial order in this case; consequently, defendant had the right to amend and add the omitted counterclaim "as a matter of course and without leave of court.” The trial judge’s denial of this right was clearly erroneous.
Simply because defendant was not entitled to amend under Code Ann. § 81A-113 (f) did not lessen or take away from his right to amend under Code Ann. § 81A-115 (a).
As to the damage done defendant through failure to allow this amendment, it has been held that where a right is granted unto a party, and that right is denied him *223by the court, the denial is presumptively harmful to the party and constitutes reversible error. See Lively v. Thompson, 88 Ga. App. 31, 35 (75 SE2d 846); Poultryland, Inc. v. Anderson, 200 Ga. 549, 562 (37 SE2d 785).
I therefore dissent.