Appellant pled not guilty to possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. In a “stipulated agreement” she admitted to all the essential elements of the crime charged and conditionally waived her right to a jury trial. Based on this stipulation the court found appellant guilty. On appeal she raises issues with respect to the trial court’s denial of a motion to supress her statements to the police.
This court will not address the supression issues, but rather remand the case to the trial court for the taking of a proper plea.
An information was filed on September 5, 1985, charging appellant with possession of a controlled substance (marijuana) with intent to deliver, in violation of § 35-7-1031(a)(ii), W.S.1977, 1985 Cum.Supp. On October 4, 1985, appellant filed a motion to suppress all statements made by her and all property seized as a result of her having made statements to the police. The police had questioned appellant and conducted a search and seizure pursuant to a search warrant on July 18, 1985.
After a hearing on October 25, 1985, the trial court denied appellant’s motion to suppress, and at her arraignment appellant pled not guilty. On November 15, 1985, a “stipulated agreement” was filed in the district court. In the “stipulated agreement” appellant admitted to all the essential elements of the crime charged and *1046“conditionally” waived her right to a jury trial. In this stipulation appellant also preserved her right to appeal to the supreme court. Apparently she intended to appeal the trial court’s denial of her motion to suppress her statements to the police.
On December 2, 1985, the district court entered an order stating that the stipulation would not be accepted. The court apparently considered the case of Tompkins v. State, Wyo., 705 P.2d 836 (1985), cert. denied — U.S. —, 106 S.Ct. 1277, 89 L.Ed.2d 585 (1986). Appellant filed a motion on December 4, 1985, urging the district court to reconsider its order disallowing the stipulation. On January 21, 1986, the district court entered its order accepting the stipulation, and found appellant guilty, in violation of § 35-7-1031(a)(ii), W.S.1977, 1985 Cum.Supp.
The stipulation left nothing for the court to decide, appellant having agreed that she did exactly what the statute proscribed. Admission to all the essential elements of the crime with no suggestion of a defense is tantamount to a plea of guilty. People v. Sullivan, 72 Ill.App.3d 533, 29 Ill.Dec. 82, 391 N.E.2d 241 (1979); and People v. Russ, 31 Ill.App.3d 385, 334 N.E.2d 108 (1975).
The plea here is, in effect, a conditional plea of guilty which we held to be improper in Tompkins v. State, supra. In that case we said:
“ * * * [Appellant] is not challenging the constitutionality of the statute to which he pled guilty. He is only seeking a ruling on the admissibility of evidence. Inasmuch as our Rule 15 does not allow for such a conditional plea, we hold that such is not permissible. * * * ” (Emphasis added.) Id., at 840.
Here, as in Tompkins, appellant was seeking a ruling on the admissibility of evidence. In Tompkins we set out the reasons why a conditional plea to test the admissibility of evidence is improper, and we need not repeat the rationale here.
This case is remanded to the district court for the taking of a proper plea.