The North Carolina Department of Correction (“NCDOC”) and the North Carolina Post-Release Supervision and Parole Commission (“Parole Commission”) (collectively “defendants”) appeal from an order and judgment denying defendants’ motion for summary judgment and entering a declaratory judgment in favor of Jeffrey Bernard Lineberger (“plaintiff’). We affirm.
On 5 January 1994, in Mecklenburg County Superior Court, pursuant to a plea agreement, plaintiff was convicted of one count of common law robbery, one count of second-degree kidnapping, and one count of conspiracy to commit common law robbery. Plaintiff attained the status of an habitual felon on the common law robbery and second-degree kidnapping charges. The plea agreement provided that the charges be consolidated and the sentence not exceed forty years. Mecklenburg County Superior Court Judge Robert O. Lewis sentenced plaintiff to forty years in the NCDOC pursuant to the Fair Sentencing Act.
On 13 April 1994, plaintiff’s parole case analyst informed plaintiff his earliest parole eligibility date would be 11 December 2000 and, because of the second-degree kidnapping offense, his case would be reviewed for parole 270 days prior to his maximum release date, 12 December 2013. On 22 August 2000, the NCDOC informed plaintiff his parole eligibility date was 10 December 2000. Plaintiff alleges this date was based on N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-7.6 and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1371, providing that habitual felons are eligible for parole *5after serving seven years of their sentence. At that time, plaintiff was held in minimum custody, granted work release and preparing for a December 2000 review for release on parole.
On 28 November 2000, the Parole Commission informed plaintiff that his second-degree kidnapping offense had not been entered into the computer system and his parole eligibility date changed due to the addition of the kidnapping offense. The Parole Commission calculated plaintiffs eligibility date to be ninety days prior to his final release date, or 2 September 2011. The effect of this change resulted in plaintiffs demotion to medium custody and removal from work release.
On 19 February 2004, plaintiff filed a motion for appropriate relief to withdraw his guilty plea on the basis that the recalculation of his parole date disregarded the consolidated sentence and therefore was a breach of the plea agreement. On 27 April 2004, the court denied the motion for appropriate relief.
On 23 November 2005, plaintiff filed a complaint in Wake County Superior Court seeking, inter alia, “a declaratory judgment interpreting and construing N.C.G.S. § 14-1.1 (1993), N.C.G.S. § 14-7.1 et seq. (1993), N.C.G.S. § 15A-1340.4(b) & (f), N.C.G.S. § 15A-1371 (1993) and N.C.G.S. § 15A-1380.2 (1993); as those statutes relate to the calculation of Plaintiffs parole eligibility date.” Defendants answered the complaint asserting that the recalculation corrected a computer error in parole eligibility dates.
On 8 March 2006, defendants moved for summary judgment. After a hearing on 11 April 2006, Superior Court Judge Donald W. Stephens denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment and entered a declaratory judgment for the plaintiff. The trial court ordered defendants to recalculate plaintiff’s parole eligibility date by either (1) considering plaintiff’s forty-year sentence as an habitual felon sentence without regard to the ninety-day end of term parole provisions of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1380.2, or (2) if the Parole Commission applied N.C.G.S. § 15A-1380.2, then the ninety-day end-of-term parole provisions must be applied on the basis that plaintiff received a fifteen-year sentence for kidnapping not a forty-year sentence for kidnapping.
Defendants appeal the trial court’s order denying summary judgment for defendants and granting a declaratory judgment in favor of plaintiff. Defendants did not assign error to the ruling on their sum*6itiary judgment motion. Therefore, our review is limited to whether the trial court erred in its declaratory judgment in favor of the plaintiff. N.C.R. App. P. 10(a) (2007).
The dissent supplements the facts listed above by including prior grievances, actions, and petitions filed by the plaintiff before the commencement of the appeal. As to the supplemented proceedings, which were filed pro se, only the prior actions are mentioned in the record on appeal.1 None of the petitions and grievances, cited by the dissent could be located in the record.
Rule 9 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure limits our review to the record, transcript and any items-filed with the record. “In appeals from the trial division of the General Court of Justice, review is solely upon the record, on appeal, the verbatim transcript of proceedings,. . . and any items filed with the record on appeal pursuant to Rule 9(c) and 9(d).” N.C.R. App. P. 9(a) (2007) (emphasis added). In addition to the record on appeal, appellate courts may take judicial notice of their own filings in an interrelated proceeding. However, judicial notice of an interrelated proceeding is limited to proceedings with the same parties, the same issues, and the parties refer to the interrelated case in the case under consideration. West v. Reddick, Inc., 302 N.C. 201, 202, 274 S.E.2d 221, 223 (1981). Appellate courts may take judicial notice ex mero motu on “any occasion where the existence of a particular fact is important . . . ."Id., 302 N.C. at 203, 274 S.E.2d at 223. Facts which are either so notoriously true as not to be the subject of reasonable dispute or “capable of demonstration by readily accessible sources' of indisputable accuracy” are subject to judicial notice. Id. (citing Kennedy v. Parrott, 243 N.C. 355, 358, 90 S.E.2d 754, 756 (1956)).
Here, there was no request by defendants to take judicial notice of the petitions, grievances, and prior actions. Most of the federal opinions cited by the dissent are brief and unpublished, and do not provide enough information to determine that the issues are the same. See Lineberger v. York, No. 03-6456 (4th Cir. Nov. 25, 2003); Lineberger v. York, No. 03-6771 (4th Cir. Sept. 24, 2003); see also State *7v. Lineberger, -N.C.-, 597 S.E.2d 771 (2004) (dismissing plaintiff’s petition without analysis).
In Lineberger v. York, filed in the United States District Court, Middle District of North Carolina in 2003, plaintiff asserted a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and sought a declaratory judgment. However, the Middle District of North Carolina granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment against plaintiff, in part because declaratory relief on the issue of parole calculation is not available under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Lineberger v. York, No. 1:02CV00210 (M.D.N.C. filed April 25, 2003). Since the federal court dismissed plaintiffs claim in part because declaratory relief was not available under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and did not determine whether his parole was erroneously calculated, judicial notice of plaintiff’s prior action in federal court is not “important” to his current action seeking declaratory relief. West, 302 N.C. at 203, 274 S.E.2d at 223.
Since copies of plaintiff’s petitions, grievances, and prior actions (with the exception of Lineberger v. York, No. 1:02CV00210) were not included with the record on appeal and since the appellants did not make a request for judicial notice of the petitions, grievances and prior actions, we respectfully decline to base our review on matters outside the record as that would require deviation from the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
I. Standard of Review
The standard of review in declaratory judgment actions where the trial court decides questions of fact is whether the trial court’s findings are supported by any competent evidence. Cartner v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 123 N.C. App. 251, 253, 472 S.E.2d 389, 390 (1996); Walker v. Penn Nat’l Sec. Ins. Co., 168 N.C. App. 555, 559, 608 S.E.2d 107, 110 (2005). Where the findings are supported by competent evidence, the trial court’s findings of fact are conclusive on appeal. Walker, 168 N.C. App. at 559, 608 S.E.2d at 110. This is true even when there is evidence which “sustain[s] findings to the contrary.” Cartner, 123 N.C. App. at 253, 472 S.E.2d at 390.
Whether or not the trial court’s interpretation of the parole eligibility statutes as applied to this case was correct is a question of law, subject to de novo review. Teasley v. Beck, 155 N.C. App. 282, 288, 574 S.E.2d 137, 141 (2002) (citing County of Durham v. N.C. Dep’t of Env’t & Natural Resources, 131 N.C. App. 395, 396, 507 S.E.2d 310, 311 (1998)).
*8II. Defendants’ First Argument
Defendants argue the declaratory judgment in favor of plaintiff was in error because: (a) a declaratory judgment may not be used to collaterally attack a prior judgment; (b) plaintiff’s claim is barred by § 15A-1027; and (c) the trial court’s interpretation of § 15A-1340.4 was in error.
A. Collateral Attack
Defendants argue that plaintiff’s suit is a collateral attack on his habitual felon status as well as the robbery, kidnapping, and conspiracy convictions. We disagree.
“Questioning the validity of the original conviction is an impermissible collateral attack.” State v. Flemming, 171 N.C. App. 413, 417, 615 S.E.2d 310, 313 (2005) (citing State v. Creason, 123 N.C. App. 495, 500, 473 S.E.2d 771, 773 (1996)). “A collateral attack is one in which a plaintiff is not entitled to the relief demanded in the complaint unless the judgment in another action is adjudicated invalid. A collateral attack on a judicial proceeding is an attempt to avoid, defeat, or evade it, or deny its force and effect, in some incidental proceeding not provided by law for the express purpose of attacking it.” Pinewood Homes, Inc. v. Harris, 184 N.C. App. 597, 601, 646 S.E.2d 826, 830 (July 17, 2007) (No. COA06-690) (citations and internal quotations omitted).
Defendants cite State v. Flemming, inter alia, in support of their argument. Flemming involved a criminal defendant who appealed his habitual felon conviction on numerous legal arguments, including insufficient evidence to prove the trial court’s jurisdiction to enter a felony conviction. Flemming, 171 N.C. App. at 417, 615 S.E.2d at 313. This Court overruled that assignment of error because defendant’s argument questioned the validity of the original conviction. Id.
Here, plaintiff filed a declaratory judgment action to determine how the sentencing and parole eligibility statutes should be applied to his convictions for robbery, conspiracy to commit robbery, kidnapping, and attaining the status of an habitual felon. Plaintiff does not challenge the validity of his convictions.
The dissent concludes that the relief granted by the trial court altered plaintiff’s forty-year sentence. The plaintiff’s forty-year sentence imposed in 1994 remains in effect. Plaintiff’s complaint for declaratory relief challenges the Parole Commission’s calculation of his eligibility date and not his forty-year sentence.
*9Declaratory relief seeking clarification or construction of legal principles without denying the validity of the judgment is not a collateral attack. Brickhouse v. Brickhouse, 104 N.C. App. 69, 72, 407 S.E.2d 607, 609 (1991) (declaratory relief not a collateral attack where the plaintiff was not attacking the validity of the will but was asking the court to construe the will to determine who could take under it); compare State v. Woolridge, 357 N.C. 544, 549, 592 S.E.2d 191, 194 (2003) (one superior court judge prohibited from changing the judgment of another judge made in the same action).
At plaintiffs hearing on the declaratory judgment action, Judge Stephens recognized the Superior Court in Mecklenburg County had denied plaintiff’s motion for appropriate relief. Plaintiff’s pro se motion for appropriate relief requested vacating his conviction and withdrawing his guilty plea. Judge Stephens stated that he “can’t do anything about that.” Judge Stephens entered a declaratory judgment for the plaintiff but this relief did not vacate plaintiff’s conviction or withdraw his plea; that would have been an impermissible collateral attack. We conclude that defendants’ argument that plaintiff is using the declaratory judgment act to collaterally attack his convictions is without merit. Any error on this ground is overruled.
B. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1027
Next defendants argue that plaintiff’s complaint is barred by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1027. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1027 provides that noncompliance with procedures required in guilty pleas “may not be a basis- for review of a conviction after the appeal period for the conviction has expired.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1027 (2007). The only case cited by defendants in support of this argument is State v. Rush, 158 N.C. App. 738, 582 S.E.2d 37 (2003). We find this case distinguishable.
In State v. Rush, the defendant pled guilty to two counts of assault with a deadly weapon on a law enforcement officer and one count of common law robbery. 158 N.C. App. at 739, 582 S.E.2d at 38. The defendant was sentenced to a minimum of twenty-four months and maximum of thirty-eight months on each count. That sentence was suspended and she was placed on probation. Id. Her plea agreement provided for two twenty-four month suspended sentences. Id. The defendant violated her probation twice. Id., 158 N.C. App. at 740, 582 S.E.2d at 38. The court activated her- sentence and she was ordered to serve twenty-four to thirty-eight months for each offense. *10Id. Defendant did not object that the sentence was inconsistent with the plea agreement. Furthermore, rather than appealing the inconsistency, the defendant appealed the activation of her sentence. 158 N.C. App. at 739, 582 S.E.2d at 38. This Court held that defendant could not challenge the activation of the sentence on the basis that it is inconsistent with the plea agreement, because, inter alia, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1027 does not allow noncompliance with procedures governing guilty pleas as a basis for review of a conviction after the appeal period has expired. 158 N.C. App. at 741, 582 S.E.2d at 39.
Unlike the defendant in Rush, here, plaintiff is seeking declaratory relief in the form of a ruling on whether the trial court correctly applied the parole eligibility statutes to plaintiffs sentence, and not challenging the sentence itself. Interpretation of parole eligibility statutes is considered proper subject matter for a declaratory judgment. See Price v. Beck, 153 N.C. App. 763, 765, 571 S.E.2d 247, 249 (2002) (inmate seeks declaratory relief from incorrect calculation of his parole date); Robbins v. Freeman, 127 N.C. App. 162, 163-64, 487 S.E.2d 771, 772 (1997) (inmate sought declaratory judgment determining his parole eligibility); Teasley, 155 N.C. App. at 284, 574 S.E.2d at 139 (inmate seeking declaratory judgment on application of credit to calculate parole eligibility).
Although the trial court found the forty-year sentence exceeded the total of presumptive terms for each felony offense and concluded that the maximum sentence the court could impose for the kidnapping charge was fifteen years, the order was limited to the calculation of parole eligibility based on a forty-year sentence and did not change plaintiffs original sentence. Plaintiffs complaint is not barred by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1027, because plaintiff is challenging the application of the parole eligibility statutes to his forty-year sentence, and not directly challenging the forty-year sentence itself This assignment of error is overruled.
C. Presumptive Prison Term
Defendants contend the trial court erred in concluding that plaintiffs sentence violates N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.4 (1993) (Cum. Supp. 1994) (repealed effective Oct. 1, 1994). N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.4(f) provides the presumptive prison term for felonies under Chapter 14 and “any other specific penalty statutes.” Under this section, the presumptive prison term for a Class C felony is imprisonment for fifteen years. Id.
*11In its order, the trial court concluded that:
4. Because the sentence the Court imposed for Plaintiffs kidnapping conviction only comprised a portion of the forty (40) year consolidated sentence, the most that can be said is that fifteen (15) years of the forty (40) year sentence should be treated as a sentence for kidnapping. This is so because, under N.C.G.S. §15A-1340.4, a sentence imposed for a felony offense, such as the kidnapping offense here, may not exceed the presumptive term unless the Court specifically finds in the record aggravating factors to justify a sentence greater than the presumptive. The presumptive term on the kidnapping charge was fifteen (15) years. FN2 In this case, the Court did not make any findings in aggravation or mitigation, but rather imposed the forty (40) year consolidated sentence without making such findings. (See, N.C.G.S §15A-1340(4).)
FN2 The presumptive term under the Fair Sentencing Act for second degree kidnapping is nine (9) years. However, since the kidnapping charge was enhanced to a Class C felony due to Plaintiff’s habitual felon status, the presumptive term was fifteen (15) years.
Defendants argue that this conclusion of law is in error because the sentencing court could have sentenced in excess of the presumptive term without considering aggravating or mitigating factors if “[it] imposes a prison term pursuant to any plea arrangement as to sentence under Article 58 of this Chapter . . . .” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.4(a). This conclusion is based on the interpretation that the forty-year sentence was not imposed “pursuant to any plea arrangement as to sentence.” Even if this conclusion were in error, since we determine that the trial court’s calculation of plaintiff’s parole eligibility does not disturb his forty-year sentence, whether the trial court erred in concluding the forty-year sentence violates N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.4 is immaterial.
III. Defendants’ Second Argument
Defendants next argue that under the Fair Sentencing Act and habitual felon sentencing statutes, (1) plaintiff’s parole eligibility date was correctly calculated by the Parole Commission, and (2) any ambiguity in § 15A-1380.2(h) should be resolved in favor of the agency’s interpretation of the statute so long as that interpretation is reasonable. We disagree.
*12“Legislative intent controls the meaning of statutes.” Teasley, 155 N.C. App. at 288, 574 S.E.2d at 141 (citing Francine Delany New School for Children, Inc. v. Asheville City Bd. of Educ., 150 N.C. App. 338, 345, 563 S.E.2d 92, 97 (2002)). In determining legislative intent, a court “must analyze the statute as a whole, considering the chosen words themselves, the spirit of the act, and the objectives the statute seeks to accomplish.” Id. (quoting Brown v. Flowe, 349 N.C. 520, 522, 507 S.E.2d 894, 895 (1998)).
Defendants contend that plaintiffs kidnapping conviction “permeates the entirety of his consolidatéd sentence” and therefore his parole eligibility should be calculated as ninety days before the expiration of his term, without eligibility for community service parole. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1380.2(a) & (h) (1993) (Cum. Supp. 1994) (repealed effective Oct. 1, 1994). Defendants assert that the trial court should have deferred to the Parole Commission’s interpretation of the parole eligibility statutes citing County of Durham, 131 N.C. App. at 396, 507 S.E.2d at 311 and Teasley, 155 N.C. App. at 289, 574 S.E.2d at 141.
In County of Durham, this Court affirmed a declaratory ruling issued by the NCDENR pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 150B-45 (1991), recognizing “a tenet of statutory construction that a reviewing court should defer to the agency’s interpretation of a statute it administers ‘so [] long as the agency’s interpretation is reasonable and based on a permissible construction of the statute.’ ” 131 N.C. App. at 397, 507 S.E.2d at 311 (quoting Carpenter v. N.C. Dept. of Human Resources, 107 N.C. App. 278, 279, 419 S.E.2d 582, 584 (1992)).
In Teasley v. Beck, this Court deferred to the Parole Commission’s interpretation of the parole statutes, evidenced by affidavits submitted by the Parole Commission, namely whether gain or meritorious time applied to alter parole eligibility for life sentences. Teasley, 155 N.C. App. at 289, 574 S.E.2d at 142. In that case, this Court found the Parole Commission’s interpretation to be reasonable. Id.
Here, defendants submitted an affidavit by Melita Groomes, Executive Director of the Post-Release Supervision and Parole Commission, which explained that plaintiff is eligible only for end-of-term parole based on the Parole Commission’s interpretation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1380.2(h). N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1380.2(h) states “[n]o prisoner convicted under Article 7A of Chapter 14 of a sex offense, under G.S. 14-39, 14-41, or 14-43.3, or under G.S. 90-95(h) of a drug *13trafficking offense shall be eligible for community service parole.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1380.2(h). If a prisoner is not eligible for community service parole, he is eligible for ninety-day parole. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1380.2(a).
Plaintiff argues that because plaintiffs kidnapping conviction is only part of the forty-year consolidated sentence, his habitual felon status should determine parole eligibility, under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1371. Plaintiff contends defendants’ interpretation of the statutes is incorrect. Specifically, it would result in eligibility for discretionary parole in twenty years for a life imprisonment (the maximum term) sentence when a person is convicted of second-degree kidnapping and attaining the status of an habitual felon. However, the plaintiff, who is sentenced to a total of forty years, is not eligible for parole until ninety days before completion of his forty-year sentence. We agree. Defendants’ interpretation, unlike Teasley, is not reasonable.
The next question is whether the trial court properly applied the statutes to plaintiff’s sentence. The trial court determined that the Parole Commission should either apply the ninety-day parole to only fifteen years for a presumptive term for kidnapping as an habitual felon, or treat the forty-year sentence as an habitual felon sentence and not apply the ninety-day parole rule.
The most serious offense here was attaining habitual felon status, which carries a presumptive term of fifteen years. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.4(f) (Class C felonies have a presumptive term of fifteen years imprisonment; Class E felonies have presumptive term of nine years).
Here, Judge Stephens ordered:
For purposes of calculating Plaintiff’s parole eligibility, the Department of Correction and the Parole Commission must either consider Plaintiff’s forty (40) year consolidated sentence as an habitual felon sentence without regard to the 90-day end of term parole provisions of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1380.2 (1995) applicable to kidnapping sentences or if they consider Plaintiff’s sentence as a kidnapping sentence subject to the end of term parole provisions of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1380.2 (1995), they must apply the 90-day end of term parole provisions only on the basis that Plaintiff received a fifteen (15) year sentence for kidnapping, rather than a forty (40) year sentence for kidnapping.
*14This conclusion of law comports with the statutory provisions of N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 15A-1340.4, 15A-1380.2(a) & (h), because the second-degree kidnapping conviction is not subject to community service parole. We affirm.
IV. Defendants’ Third Argument
Defendants argue that the trial court’s findings of fact are insufficient “to support the declaratory judgment entered.” We disagree.
Our question on review is whether the findings of fact are supported by any competent evidence and whether those findings support the conclusions of law. Walker, 168 N.C. App. at 559, 608 S.E.2d at 110. Findings supported by “any competent evidence” are conclusive, even when there is evidence which “sustainfs] findings to the contrary.” Gartner, 123 N.C. App. at 253, 472 S.E.2d at 390.
Defendants challenge findings of fact 4, 5, 7, 9, 10, 11 and the lack of findings on the issue of procedural bar.
Finding of fact number four states:
4. During the plea colloquy, Plaintiff’s counsel informed the Court of the terms and conditions of the plea agreement between the State and the Plaintiff; to wit: that the counts would be consolidated for sentencing and the sentence to be imposed by the Court could not exceed forty (40) years.
This finding is supported in the record by the sentencing hearing transcript attached to plaintiff’s complaint. This is competent evidence and we affirm.
Finding of fact number five states: “5. The plea agreement did not contain any agreement as to the sentence Plaintiff would receive upon his guilty plea, except that it stated the sentence would not exceed forty (40) years.” A copy of the plea arrangement supports this finding where it states the sentence is capped at forty years, “(i.e. sentence not to exceed 40 years).” We affirm.
Finding of fact number seven states:
Because there was no plea agreement as to the sentence Plaintiff would receive, the Court was required under N.C.G.S. § 15A-1340.4 to make findings of aggravating factors before imposing a sentence that exceeded the presumptive term for each of the three (3) counts. (See N.C.G.S. § 15A-1340.4 (1993).) Under *15N.C.G.S. § 15A-1340.3, the Court was prohibited from imposing a consolidated sentence on the three (3) separate felony convictions that exceeded the total of the presumptive terms of each felony so consolidated, without first making findings in aggravation to support such a sentence. The presumptive term on the common law robbery conviction was fifteen (15) years, due to the fact that under the habitual felon statute it was enhanced to a Class C felony. See, N.C.G.S. § 15A-1340.4(f); 14-7.6. The presumptive term on the kidnapping conviction was also fifteen (15) years, because it too was enhanced to a Class C felony under the habitual felon statute. Id. The presumptive term on the conspiracy to commit common law robbery conviction was three (3) years, due to the fact that this charge was not subject to the habitual felon enhancement. The total of the presumptive terms for the three (3) consolidated counts was thirty-three (33) years. The Court’s imposition of the consolidated sentence of forty (40) years exceeded that allowed under N.C.G.S. § 15A-1340.4 because it exceeded the total of the presumptive terms for each felony offense so consolidated.
This finding is supported by competent evidence because one could interpret the plea agreement which stated plaintiff’s sentence would be capped at forty years does not equate to an agreement to a forty-year sentence. We affirm.
Finding of fact number nine states:
Upon Plaintiff’s admission to the Department of Correction, Defendants, as required by law, calculated Plaintiff’s parole eligibility date. Defendants originally treated Plaintiff’s sentence as a forty (40) year habitual felon sentence and applied the parole eligibility statutes applicable to habitual felon sentences in calculating his parole eligibility date; to wit: N.C.G.S. § 14-7.6 and N.C.G.S. § 15A-1380.1.
Finding of fact number ten states: “[b]ecause a person sentenced as an habitual felon under the Fair Sentencing Act is eligible for parole after serving seven (7) years of his sentence, Defendants initially calculated Plaintiff’s parole eligibility date to be December 10, 2000. (See N.C.G.S. §14-7.6 and N.C.G.S. §15A-1371).”
We find competent evidence to support findings of fact numbers nine and ten. Specifically, the Parole Commission’s 1994 letter to plaintiff informing him of his parole eligibility status and *16the NCDOC’s August 2000 letter to plaintiff. This assignment of error is overruled.
Finding of fact number eleven states: “On August 22, 2000, the Department of Correction, informed Plaintiff by letter that his parole eligibility date on the forty (40) year sentence was December 10, 2000. At the time Plaintiff received this letter, he was in minimum custody, on work release and preparing to be reviewed for release on parole in December 2000.”
We find competent evidence to support finding of fact number eleven in the form of plaintiffs exhibit D, which defendants admitted as true in their answer.
Defendants assign error to conclusion of law number two, that plaintiff is not procedurally barred from filing his complaint for a declaratory judgment and his issues could not be properly raised in a motion for appropriate relief and failure to raise issues does not constitute a procedural bar. Defendants argue this case is barred by Jernigan v. State, 279 N.C. 556, 184 S.E.2d 259 (1971) and that the trial court was required to make specific findings on this issue. We disagree.
Additional findings of fact are not required where the facts supporting the conclusion of law are not disputed. See Cumberland Homes, Inc. v. Carolina Lakes Prop. Owners’ Ass’n, 158 N.C. App. 518, 520-21, 581 S.E.2d 94, 96 (2003). It is undisputed that plaintiff filed an earlier motion for appropriate relief, and that plaintiff seeks declaratory relief. As we discussed in Section II of this opinion, plaintiffs complaint is not procedurally barred. Affirm.
As a final matter we note that defendants assigned forty errors in the record on appeal but argued thirty-one assignments of error in their brief. When assignments of error are not argued, they are abandoned pursuant to N.C.R. App. P 28(b)(6) (2007). Therefore, nine assignments of error are deemed abandoned.
Affirmed.
Judge GEER concurs in the result only in a separate opinion. Judge JACKSON dissents in a separate opinion.. Specifically, the record included an affidavit and a motion for summary judgment by defendants in plaintiff’s suit against Michael York filed in United States District Court, Middle District of North Carolina, file No. 1:02CV00210, asserting a § 1983 claim under Title 42 of the Civil Rights Act. (Counsel for defendants also referenced this action at the hearing on the declaratory judgment action in the context of introducing the affidavit as an exhibit). In addition, defendants’ brief in support of their motion for summary judgment references two federal actions and a state court action filed by plaintiff.