dissenting.
In 1999, the General Assembly amended OCGA§ 16-6-1 (b) so as to authorize life imprisonment without parole as a sentencing option for the crime of rape. Ga. L. 1999, p. 666, § 1. Today, however, the majority holds that, by virtue of OCGA § 17-10-16 (a), that sentence is governed by OCGA § 17-10-30 et seq., including OCGA § 17-10-32.1, and, absent compliance with those statutes, is not available as punishment for the crime of rape, whether committed before or after the 1999 amendment. I submit that such a result is contrary to the principle that “the General Assembly is presumed to intend something by passage of [that amendment], [and] we must construe its provisions so as not to render it meaningless. [Cit.]” Chatman v. Findley, 274 Ga. 54, 55 (548 SE2d 5) (2001). If the majority were correct, the legislature accomplished nothing by amending OCGA § 16-6-1 (b) in 1999.
More perplexing is the failure even to recognize the inconsistency, pointed out by the Court of Appeals, between the amendment and a construction of OCGA § 17-10-16 (a) which limits the authority granted by that amendment. Velazquez v. State, 283 Ga. App. 863,864 (643 SE2d 291) (2007). As correctly quoted in footnote 1 of the majority opinion, OCGA§ 17-10-16 (a) authorizes a sentence of life imprisonment without parole as provided in OCGA§ 17-10-30 et seq. for any crime for which the death penalty may be imposed, “[notwithstanding any other provision of law.”
*210The natural and ordinary meaning of the word “notwithstanding” is “without obstruction from” or “in spite of.” [Cit.] Application of this definition to [OCGA§ 17-10-16 (a)] would mean that it was not intended as the exclusive method for [imposing a sentence of life imprisonment without parole]. The word “notwithstanding” does not indicate here any repugnancy among the [statutory] provisions. [Cit.]
Williamson v. Schmid, 237 Ga. 630, 632 (229 SE2d 400) (1976). Thus, the natural meaning of OCGA § 17-10-16 (a) is that “a person who is convicted of an offense... for which the death penalty may be imposed under the laws of this state may be sentenced to... imprisonment for life without parole ... as provided in” OCGA § 17-10-30 et seq., or that, in addition, he may be given that sentence pursuant to “any other provision of law” which permits its imposition as punishment for a crime. See Williamson v. Schmid, supra. Since 1999, OCGA § 16-6-1 (b) has constituted such “other provision of law,” because it now specifically permits punishment for the offense of rape “by imprisonment for life without parole ....” Therefore, the procedures in OCGA § 17-10-30 et seq. no longer constitute the exclusive method for imposing a sentence of life imprisonment without parole for rape and, in particular, compliance with OCGA § 17-10-32.1 is not required prior to the imposition of that sentence upon entry of a guilty plea to a charge of rape.
Murder cases are distinguishable. In those cases, it is absolutely necessary to utilize the procedures in OCGA § 17-10-30 et seq. because the murder statute, unlike OCGA § 16-6-1 (b), does not provide expressly for life imprisonment without parole as a possible sentence. OCGA § 16-5-1 (d). Moreover, most of the provisions regarding that sentence contained in OCGA § 17-10-30 et seq. are specifically applicable to murder, and even exclude other offenses for which the death penalty is authorized. OCGA §§ 17-10-30.1, 17-10-31.1; State v. Ingram, 266 Ga. 324, 326, fn. 7 (467 SE2d 523) (1996). Application of the procedures in OCGA § 17-10-30 et seq. is not required in order for a sentence of life imprisonment without parole to withstand a constitutional challenge in a non-murder case. Ortiz v. State, 266 Ga. 752, 753 (2) (470 SE2d 874) (1996) (upholding mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without parole authorized by OCGA § 17-10-7 (b) (2) for defendant who commits second “serious violent felony for which such person is not sentenced to death”). See also Henry v. State, 279 Ga. 615, 618 (6) (619 SE2d 609) (2005).
In short, there is not any reason for this Court to assume that OCGA § 16-6-1 (b) is meaningless and to extend the reach of OCGA § 17-10-16 (a) beyond its plain language, such that the procedures of OCGA§ 17-10-30 et seq. apply to sentences for rape even though they *211do not apply to recidivist sentences pursuant to OCGA § 17-10-7 (b). Accordingly, I dissent to the affirmance of the Court of Appeals’ judgment.
Decided February 25, 2008. Joseph K. Mulholland, District Attorney, Gun Ju Pak, Assistant District Attorney, for appellant. Billy M. Grantham, for appellee.I am authorized to state that Presiding Justice Hunstein and Justice Melton join in this dissent.