with whom HODGES and LAVENDER, Justices, join, dissenting.
The court holds that a 42 O.S.1991 § 431 lien [called a § 43 hospital Men] wfll not attach to the proceeds of a patient’s UM2 coverage. Prudential General Insurance Company [insurer or Prudential] brought an interpleader to test' the title to UM proceeds due DolMe Kratz [patient] for injuries sustained in an automobile accident. Jane Phil-Mps Episcopal Memorial Medical Center [hospital] filed a § 43 hospital Men against any recovery the patient might coMect. In disallowing the hospital’s Men against the money on deposit, the court reasons that because the patient’s UM recovery is not “damages” from the tortfeasor (or the latter’s insurer) but rather is a benefit of her insurance policy, these funds cannot be impressed with a § 43 Men.
I recede from today’s pronouncement. Because the UM indemnity represents recompense for the patient’s bodily injuries inflicted by the uninsured motorist, it (1) stands as a substituted res for any “recovery” the patient would have received from the uninsured or underinsured tortfeasor and (2) is hence subject to the § 43 hospital Men.
I
THE ANATOMY OF LITIGATION
The patient, when injured, was a passenger in a car driven by her husband, James Kratz [tortfeasor or driver]. In attempting to turn left the driver was aMegedly negMgent when he crossed in front of oncoming traffic, causing the patient’s injury. The Kratz family has an insurance poMcy with Prudential, which provides both MabiMty (third-party) and UM (first-party) coverage.3 This poMcy contains a household exclusion provision— one which precludes the insured from recovering against another member of the household under the poMcy’s coverage for pubMc MabiMty. It is this feature that legaMy relegated the driver to the status of an uninsured motorist vis-á-vis DolMe Kratz [patient].
After providing accident-related medical treatment to the patient, the hospital filed (in the county clerk’s office) a Men for $17,-901.384 against any recovery the patient *758might collect from another for her injuries and gave the statutorily-required notices.5
The patient and her daughter filed suit against the driver and their insurer. The insurer tendered $30,000.00 into the trust account of the patient’s counsel, the maximum amount available under the uninsured motorist coverage. The April 26, 1991 nisi prius order allowed the hospital’s lien. On appeal the trial court’s decree was affirmed. This court granted certiorari and now reverses the first-instance decision for the hospital.
II
THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTORY LIENS
Statutory liens, like the § 43 hospital lien, are in derogation of the common law.6 Since these remedial devices owe their existence to legislative enactments, the terms prescribed by the statutory texts are the measure both of the right and the remedy.7 Liens must be strictly confined within the ambit of legislation giving them birth.8 After it is clearly established that the lien right does attach, the statute’s enforcement provisions are to be accorded liberal construction.9
III
THE PLAIN AND ORDINARY MEANING OF THE LANGUAGE IN 42 O.S.1991 § 43 MANDATES THAT THE HOSPITAL’S LIEN BE HELD TO ATTACH TO THE INJURED PARTIES’ UM PROCEEDS
The ascertainment of legislative intent is the cardinal rule of statutory construction.10 A statute’s language, when given its plain and ordinary meaning, is the yardstick for divining the drafters’ intent.11 A straightforward reading of the language used in § 43 makes it abundantly clear that the legislative object is to encourage hospitals to deliver health services to persons who have been injured by another but are without sufficient funds or insurance to pay for the needed care.12
Legislative intent is plain when the language of the entire key § 43 phrase — “a claim against another for damages on account of such injuries ” — is considered. “Another ”, as this word is used in the section, deserves a much broader sweep than the court would allow. It should be read to include the UM carrier. But for the injuries occasioned by the uninsured motorist, there would be neither (1) UM carrier liability nor (2) UM recovery by the hospital’s patient. The patient is entitled to the proceeds because of the UM insurer’s coextensive contractual and statutory liability with that of the offending tortfeasor whose obligation is the covered “legal entitlement”.13 When giv*759en its plain and ordinary meaning, the UM indemnity clearly falls within the class of funds the legislature intended for impression with the hospital’s lien.14
IV
PROCEEDS FROM UM COVERAGE CONSTITUTE A SUBSTITUTED RES FOR PERSONAL INJURY RECOVERY FROM AN UNINSURED, UN-DERINSURED, OR HIT-AND-RUN MOTORIST; A § 43 HOSPITAL LIEN WILL ATTACH TO THAT SUBSTITUTED FUND WITH THE SAME EFFECT AS IT WOULD TO A RECOVERY DIRECTLY FROM THE OFFENDING TORTFEASOR
Lien-related interests tender issues for the court’s equitable cognizance.15 Chancery jurisprudence traditionally elevates substance over form.16 UM proceeds, which represent in essence “personal injury recovery” collected by a vehicular tort victim under a different verbal wrap, must be treated as a legal analogue of the critical' qualifying phrase quoted from § 43.
Indemnity under UM coverage is the monetary equivalent of the recompense the injured party would have received from a fully insured tortfeasor.17 The uninsured motorist’s tort liability to the insured is a sine qua non of the UM carrier’s contractual responsibility.18 In contemplation of law, the proceeds of UM coverage stand as a statutorily created fund — a res19 — which is legally due from an uninsured or underinsured motorist for personal injury recovery. The § 43 hospital lien must hence be allowed to attach to that substituted fund with the same effect as it would to a personal injury recovery secured directly in a suit against the offending tortfeasor.
V
SUMMARY
The only issue before the court today is whether — within the meaning and purview of 42 O.S.1991 § 43 (the hospital lien law)— proceeds of UM coverage constitute the monetary equivalent of a personal injury recovery. An integral element of an UM coverage claim is the injured party’s proof that an uninsured (underinsured or hit-and-run) motorist would be legally liable for the tort damages pressed against the insurer. In contemplation of law, the UM coverage proceeds stand as a substituted fund for a per*760sonal injury recovery that would be difficult, if not well-nigh impossible, to collect from an uninsured tortfeasor. The money one is to receive in indemnity under one’s UM coverage is hence an analogue of “personal injury recovery” lienable under the terms of § 43.
The court’s pronouncement erects a needless, though insuperable, barrier to hospital admission of persons who have no means to secure their liability for care other than through UM coverage. Today’s result manifests judicial indifference to the broad legislative objective readily discernible from the plain text of. the lien statute: to open hospital doors to those vehicular tort victims who have no health insurance and no security for payment other than the proceeds that may be due under an automobile policy’s UM protection.
I would affirm the nisi prius decree for the hospital and declare the Court of Appeals’ disposition to be legally correct.
. The pertinent terms of 42 O.S.1991 § 43 are:
"Every hospital ... which shall furnish emergency medical or other service to any patient injured by reason of an accident not covered by the Workers’ Compensation Act, shall, if such injured party shall assert or maintain a claim against another for damages on account of such injuries, have a lien upon that part going or belonging to such patient of any recovery or sum had or collected ... by such patient ... whether by judgment or by settlement or compromise_” [Emphasis mine.]
. UM or uninsured motorist coverage is a first-party indemnity paid by the insurer for bodily injury sustained by the insured, for which the latter is legally entitled to recover from the uninsured, underinsured or hit-and-run motorist (i.e., the tortfeasor). Uptegraft v. Home Ins. Co., Okl., 662 P.2d 681, 685 (1983). See also the provisions of 36 O.S.1991 § 3636(A) and (B), which require that UM coverage be offered on demand as part of the cluster of rights intended to protect the motoring public from consequences of bodily injury inflicted by resourceless drivers.
. For a discussion of the distinction between first-party and third-party coverage, see Uptegraft, supra note 2 at 684-85.
. The record discloses that after a Prudential audit of its statement, the hospital reduced its claim to $17,775.00.
. The hospital must not only file a lien statement in the county clerk’s office but also must mail a copy of the notice to its patient and the. affected insurance companies. 42 O.S.1991 § 44.
. Republic Bank & Trust v. Bohmar Minerals, Okl., 661 P.2d 521, 523 (1983); Riffe Petroleum Co. v. Great Nat. Corp., Inc., Okl., 614 P.2d 576, 578-79 (1980).
. In re Tefertiller, Okl., 772 P.2d 396, 398 (1989), citing Riffe, supra note 6.
. Riffe, supra note 6 at 579; Taylor v. B.B. & G. Oil Co., 207 Okl. 288, 249 P.2d 430, 433 (1952); Martin Coal & Coke Co. v. Brewer, 185 Old. 169, 90 P.2d 653, 655 (1939).
. Tefertiller, supra note 7 at 398; Davidson Oil Country Supply v. Pioneer Oil, Okl., 689 P.2d 1279, 1280-81 (1984); Bohmar, supra note 6 at 523; Riffe, supra note 6 at 579.
. Riffe, supra note 6 at 579; Stemmons, Inc. v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., Okl., 301 P.2d 212, 216 (1956).
. Tinker Inv. & Mortg. v. Midwest City, Okl., 873 P.2d 1029, 1038 (1994); City of Bethany v. Hill, Okl., 509 P.2d 1364, 1365 (1973); Applications of Oklahoma Turnpike Authority, Okl., 277 P.2d 176, 182 (1954).
. For this court’s treatment of a comparable legislative intent, see Balfour v. Nelson, Okl., 890 P.2d 916, 918-19 (1994), where the court discussed the provisions of 42 O.S.1991 § 46-im-pressing physician liens on recoveries for injuries caused by another.
. Uptegraft, supra note 2 at 685.
. See Woods v. Baptist Medical Center of Okl., 890 P.2d 1367, 1369 (Okl.App.1995), where the court applied comparable reasoning to that suggested here, holding that a § 43 lien does attach to UM proceeds.
. First Nat. Bank of Pauls Valley v. Crudup, Okl., 656 P.2d 914, 917 (1982); McGill v. Cooper Supply Co., 196 Okl. 362, 165 P.2d 829, 831 (1946).
. Sinclair Oil & Gas Co. v. Bishop, Okl., 441 P.2d 436, 439 (1967); Kasner v. Reynolds, 268 P.2d 864, 867 (1954).
. Uptegraft, supra note 2 at 685.
. Markham v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 464 F.2d 703, 705 (10th Cir.1972); Karlson v. City of Oklahoma City, Okl., 711 P.2d 72, 75 (1985) (Opala, J., dissenting).
. The concept of a substituted res is alien neither to Oklahoma’s statutory lien regime nor to its case law exposition. See 42 O.S.1991 § 147.1, which provides in pertinent part:
"Any property owner ... against whom a lien claim is filed ... may at any time discharge the lien by depositing ... [a]n amount equal to ... 125% of the lien claim amount-
* * sK sfc ⅜ *
The cash deposit or bond, as the case may be, shall stand in lieu of the released lien, and the lien claimant must proceed against the substituted security....”
Jurisprudence applying this statute [and its predecessors 42 O.S.1981 § 147 and Kan.Gen.St. ¶4745 (1889)] treats the cash deposit or bond which discharges the lien as a substituted res for the real property to which the lien had previously attached. See Williams v. C.M. Mays Lumber Co., 149 Okl. 201, 299 P. 885, 887 (1931); Carr v. Wewoka Oil & Gas Co., 103 Okl. 139, 229 P. 434, 435 (1924); Risse v. Hopkins Planing-Mill Co., 55 Kan. 518, 40 P. 904, 905 (Kan.1895).
The legal relationship between the § 147.1 cash amount or bond and the real property for which it stands (as a substituted res for the mechanic and materialmen's lien’s satisfaction) is analogous to the relationship between indemnity proceeds — i.e., the 36 O.S.1991 § 3636 UM coverage — and the recovery which the injured party would receive from a culpable motorist/tortfea-sor who is an uninsured, underinsured or a hit- and-run driver/actor.