dissenting:
I dissent to the majority opinion which, yet again, liberalizes the standards of quality that a lawyer must exhibit at all times in his representation of his clients.
The plaintiffs’ attorney filed a malpractice suit against the defendant doctors on August 12, 1985. The defendant answered the complaint in a timely manner. At the same time, one of the defendants, Dr. Bellamy, filed interrogatories and a request for production of documents on August 23, 1985. The plaintiffs failed to respond, and on February 18, 1986, Dr. Bellamy filed a motion to compel. The plaintiffs answered the interrogatories and produced the requested documents on March 6, 1986. No other action occurred in this case until a dismissal notice was sent to the plaintiffs’ attorney indicating that, because of inaction, the case would be dismissed under the two year rule unless “good cause” was shown. The plaintiffs’ attorney did nothing, and the case was dismissed without prejudice on March 28, 1988.
Two days after the dismissal, however, the plaintiffs’ attorney filed a motion for reinstatement for “good cause,” claiming that out-of-state counsel with whom the plaintiffs’ attorney was associated had withdrawn from participation in the case. The defendants, in their answer to the motion, alleged prejudice. The plaintiffs’ motion for reinstatement was denied for the reason that “good cause” was not shown. Our review of the record reveals that the plaintiffs’ claim of good cause was merit-less. Not only did the plaintiffs’ attorney have only an informal relationship with the out-of-state attorneys, the out-of-state attorneys were not listed as counsel of record. In fact, they had withdrawn from the practice of law in West Virginia in the fall of 1987, six months or more before the dismissal notice was sent to the plaintiffs counsel. Yet the majority still finds that the attorney’s inaction was excused as good cause shown by the withdrawal of the out-of-state attorneys.
The majority opinion ignores two crucial facts: Good cause was not shown, and a very serious question exists concerning prejudice to the defendants. One of the defendants now resides in the State of Mississippi and correctly argues that he would be prejudiced if the case was reinstated. Instead of a realistic review of these facts, the majority spews an eight-page homily lecturing circuit judges in West Virginia on how they should run their courts, and not a word on how lawyers should conduct their practices.
I realize that the plaintiffs had a right of action. It may have been an excellent *361right of action, but it was properly dismissed. Now the plaintiffs’ right of action is against their attorney. A client has a right to expect his attorney to represent him according to the standards of conduct prescribed for attorneys. One of those standards requires an attorney to represent his client competently. Canon 6, Code of Professional Responsibility (1987). Disciplinary Rule 6-101(3) orders that an attorney shall not “neglect a legal matter entrusted to him.” Canon 7 requires an attorney to represent a client zealously within the bounds of the law. Neither was done here. This attorney not only neglected this case, but he also failed to act at all, thus letting crucial deadlines slip by. Such failures make the attorney liable to the client for malpractice. The attorney was in the wrong, not the circuit court.
The majority interprets the phrase “good cause” to mean any cause, whether good or bad. It excuses inexcusable actions of attorneys who fail to perform the most basic functions of client representation. Once again, instead of properly policing the members of our profession, this Court encourages incompetence. Why flail the judge of the Circuit Court of Raleigh County for seeking to uphold the legal standards by which all lawyers are bound?