dissenting.
The majority ignores the overarching purpose of Chapter 48 and exalts form over substance in its application of the statutes therein. I am convinced that the majority of the Court of Appeals correctly applied the relevant law consistent with legislative intent and adhered to the proper scope of appellate review of the trial court’s findings.
The controlling, salient consideration in adoption cases is the interest of the child. As expressed by the General Assembly,
[t]he primary purpose of this Chapter is to protect children from unnecessary separation from parents who might give them good homes and loving care, . . . and to protect them from *705interference, long after they have become properly adjusted in their adoptive homes[,] by biological parents who may have some legal claim because of a defect in the adoption procedure. . . . The secondary purpose of this Chapter is ... to prevent later disturbance of [the adoptive parents’] relationship to the child by biological parents whose legal rights have not been fully protected.
N.C.G.S. § 48-1(1), (2) (1984). The Legislature also expressly provided that “[w]hen the interests of a child and those of an adult are in conflict, such conflict should be resolved in favor of the child; and to that end this Chapter should be liberally construed.” N.C.G.S. § 48-1(3) (1984).
In cases involving adoption issues, wide discretion is afforded the trial court, see In re Spinks, 32 N.C. App. 422, 428, 232 S.E.2d 479, 483 (1977), because the trial court, having the opportunity to observe the parties and evaluate the evidence, can decide what outcome is in the child’s best interest. White v. White, 90 N.C. App. 553, 557, 369 S.E.2d 92, 97 (1988). When parties appeal from such a determination, the trial court’s findings of fact are binding on the appellate court if there is evidence to support the findings. In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 110, 316 S.E.2d 246, 252-53 (1984).
In determining whether to set aside the interlocutory decree, the trial court made findings of fact. The findings pertaining to the individuals, rather than to the procedural provisions of Chapter 48, should be given the most weight in determining whether living with Rowe and Rogers or with the PEPs is in the child’s best interest.
The trial court found that Rogers and Rowe were not married at the time of the action and that the two
have had a difficult relationship. Rogers decided to move from their joint residence and took their child, Benjamin, with her. Rowe tried to find her and tried to serve a summons on her in a court action. Rogers left . . . her whereabouts secret from him while she was in North Carolina. After she returned to Michigan, they engaged in a court action over Benjamin until they reached the aforementioned consent order.
The trial court also noted that the couple began cohabitating again in December 1988, when this action was filed. Further, the court found as fact that although Rowe instituted an action to legitimize Benjamin, the order did not mention the child who is the subject *706of this action. The court also noted that Rowe’s assertions of paternity and Rogers’ assertions (made after entry of the interlocutory decree) were the only evidence that he is the biological father, and that prior to entry of the decree Rogers claimed that Rowe was not the father.
In contrast, the trial court found as fact that Mr. PEP earns $46,000 in his employment with the United States Environmental Protection Agency; Mrs. PEP stays at home with the child; that “the child is being well cared for by the” PEPs; that the PEPs “are fit and proper persons to have the care, custody, and control of the minor child”; and that “it is in the best interest of the minor child to remain in the care, custody and control of” the PEPs.
Based on these findings of fact, the trial court concluded that to uphold the interlocutory decree and to remain with the PEPs was in the minor child’s best interest. My review of the record reveals that these findings are supported by competent evidence. Whether Rowe is the father is not certain, as the biological mother took different positions on this point at different times. Further, Rowe and Rogers cannot be said to have a stable home in which to raise the minor child; the couple argued for many months over legitimization of Benjamin before signing a consent decree, and Rogers moved from the couple’s residence for seven months in the year preceding this action.
Notably, at the time the trial court made its findings of fact, the PEPs had had custody of the minor child for almost nine months. In that time, the PEPs fed, clothed, and cared for the child. The PEPs are the only parents this minor child knows. It defies reason to conclude that it is in the child’s best interest now, when he is three years old, to remove him from his home, where he is well cared for, and place him with two individuals who have an obviously difficult relationship.
The majority opinion focuses not on the best interest of the child but on the purported violations of three statutes and concludes that “the statutory violations, together with numerous other irregularities, under the circumstances of this case require that the interlocutory decree be set aside.” The majority cites N.C.G.S. § 48-3(a) (1990), which states that a child need not be born in this state to be adopted here, and asserts that the attorney, Hargrave, violated this statute. The majority blatantly misapplies the statute, however; the statute merely provides that a child may be adopted *707here, regardless of state of birth. It follows, then, that a violation of this statute would occur only if an agency or a trial court prevented an adoption because the child was not born in this state. Hargrave misstated the law, but the uncontradicted evidence is that he thought Rogers in fact had to give birth in North Carolina. Clearly, misstating the law does not constitute a violation of N.C.G.S. § 48-3(a).
Another statute cited is N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 4(jl) (1990), the process provision in North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. As noted above, Rogers at different times gave conflicting information about the biological father’s identity. If Rowe is not the father, he has no right to notice in any form.
Assuming, arguendo, that Rowe is the father, on the facts of this case a technical violation of N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 4(jl) is not of such compelling import as to justify removing the minor child from his home.
The majority writes that “Spruit [Rowe’s attorney] did not accept service on behalf of Rowe.” In this the majority misreads the record. The trial court in its findings of fact stated the following:
On September 27, 1988, Hargrave wrote to Richard Spruit, Rowe’s Michigan attorney, advising him that Hargrave was handling the adoption of the child, and that Hargrave had received information that Rowe has asserted that he was the father and that Pamela Rogers denied it. Hargrave indicated that he wished to serve Rowe with notice of the Petition for Adoption, and enclosed a copy of the notice of service of process by publication, a Denial of Paternity form and a Waiver of Rights to the Child form. (Emphasis added.)
Hargrave asked Spruit if he would accept service, and if not, that he would have to serve Rowe by means of the Sheriff.
On October 4, 1988, Spruit wrote Hargrave confirming receipt of the September 27, 1988 letter, and indicated that he had forwarded the information to Rowe and would respond in the future. Spruit indicated in the letter that “as of the present time, [Rowe] is certain that he is the father of the child, and will not voluntarily consent to the adoption.”
There is no further contact between Hargrave and Rowe until Rowe intervened in this matter. Rowe was aware of the adoption proceeding in North Craolina [sic].
*708These findings, which are supported by competent evidence, indicate that Rowe received notice. The record does not indicate whether Hargrave’s correspondence with Spruit was by certified or registered mail, the manner of dispatch mentioned in Rule 4. There also is no evidence to indicate that Hargrave had access to Rowe’s address. Spruit never informed Hargrave that Spruit would not accept service of process on behalf of Rowe; quite to the contrary, Spruit informed Hargrave that he was sending the documents (including notice of service by publication) to Rowe and that Spruit would contact Hargrave to convey Rowe’s “position in this matter.” In any event, Rowe had actual notice of the proceedings. In using the failure to conform to the notice provisions as one of the three crucial legs upon which its opinion rests, the majority “truly exalt[s] form over substance.” Power Co. v. Winebarger, 300 N.C. 57, 68, 265 S.E.2d 227, 234 (1980). Where the fundamental consideration is the best interest of the child, and where actual notice exists, the prophylactic function of N.C.G.S. § 1A-1 vis-a-vis rights of potentially affected individuals does not justify removing the minor child from his home.
The third statute the majority emphasized prohibits compensation to parties involved in an adoption or, more simply stated, buying babies. The majority asserts that the trial court must look to the motives of the adopting parents and their attorney, rather than the motive of the mother.
N.C.G.S. § 48-37 provides that “[n]o person . . . shall offer or give, charge or accept any fee, compensation, consideration or thing of value for receiving or placing, arranging the placement of, or assisting in placing or arranging the placement of, any child for adoption. . . .” N.C.G.S. § 48-37 (1984) (emphasis added). The provision explicitly applies both to persons who give and who accept anything of value for receiving or placing a child for adoption. Thus, its application is bilateral, and the majority errs in suggesting that the focus should be only on the motives of the PEPs and their attorney. Notably, the statute makes no mention of motive. The prohibition clearly applies to someone in Rogers’ position just as certainly as to someone in the PEPs’ or Hargrave’s position. In this case, it appears that both parties have violated this statutory provision. The General Assembly has provided that anyone violating the statute is guilty of a misdemeanor. Setting aside an adoption decree is not among the sanctions the Legislature ordered.
*709Given the bilateral nature of the violations, the proceeding was tainted on both sides. Thus, as required by Chapter 48, the compelling consideration of the best interests of the child must be determinative. I conclude that, while the conduct of Rogers, Hargrave, and the PEPs is reprehensible, the minor child’s interest will be best served by allowing the child to remain in the PEPs’ home. As of this writing, the child is three years old. To uproot him and separate him from his adoptive parents to place him with his biological mother, who also violated the statute by accepting the support, is nonsensical.
For the foregoing reasons, I vote to uphold the interlocutory decree.