concurring specially.
While I concur fully with Division 1 of the majority, and the judgment rendered, I cannot fully concur that all that is said in Division 2 is necessary to the decision, and would rely solely on the following premise.
Attorney Billy L. Spruell appeals an order holding him in direct criminal contempt of court. Spruell was representing a client upon the tried of certain misdemeanor traffic offenses.
During jury selection there were several sharp exchanges between Spruell and the trial judge, which culminated in the judge holding Spruell in contempt, sentencing him to 20 days in jail and declaring a mistrial. The next day, a written order was entered finding the following behavior of Spruell contemptuous: “became belligerent”; “raised his voice at the Court”; “leaning on the Court’s bench”; “glaring at the Court in a menacing manner”; “refused to have a seat at counsel table”; “began to openly laugh in presence of the Court in a derisive and mocking manner”; “waved his hands in the air”; “continued to laugh”; “turned his back on the Court”; “refused to respond to the Court’s question”; “treated the Court with disrespect, ridicule and mockery.”
“During trial, a trial judge has the power, when necessary to maintain order in the courtroom, to declare conduct committed in his presence and observed by him to be contemptuous, and, after affording the contemnor an opportunity to speak in his or her own behalf, to announce punishment summarily and without further notice or hearing.” (Emphasis supplied.) Dowdy v. Palmour, 251 Ga. 135, 141 (304 SE2d 52) (1983).
A review of the record in this case reveals that Spruell was not given an opportunity to speak in his own behalf as mandated by Dowdy. In addition to the due process implications of this requirement, it serves another essential purpose. “[T]he standard of proof in criminal-contempt cases is the beyond-reasonable-doubt standard.” In re Crane, 253 Ga. 667, 670 (324 SE2d 443) (1985). “[0]n appeal of a criminal contempt conviction the appropriate standard of appellate review is ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Cits.]” In re Irvin, 254 Ga. 251, 256 (328 SE2d 215) (1985). Thus, a practical problem is created where, as here, conduct is involved which *230is not reflected on the trial transcript.1 Given the state of the record in this case, no meaningful review may be had.
Decided June 27, 1991. Brian M. Dubuc, Steven H. Sadow, for appellant. Billy L. Spruell, pro se. Albert Sidney Johnson, Lisa A. Foster, for appellee.Accordingly, the judgment of contempt should be reversed and the case remanded to the trial court for a retrial in accordance with this opinion.2
“As a practical matter, notice in a summary proceeding amounts to a verbal recounting of the conduct the court experienced as offensive and interfering, followed by a challenge to show cause why the conduct should not be held contemptuous.” Johnson and Reaves, “Contempt of Court in Georgia,” 23 Georgia State Bar Journal 66 (1986).
The procedural posture of the case on retrial will be different from the original proceeding. See Dowdy, supra.