dissenting.
The question in this case is which of two statutes of limitations — AS 09.10.060(a), the three-year peace officer statute, or AS 09.10.070, the two-year tort statute — applies to the tort aspect of this suit against certain police officers. If one of the statutes did not exist, the other one would govern. Taken alone the language of each statute is applicable; doubt is introduced only by the existence of the other statute.1
In this, as in all cases involving the meaning of statutes, “our primary guide is the language used, construed in light of the purpose of the enactment. ” Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm’n v. Apokedak, 680 P.2d 486, 489-90 (Alaska 1984) (emphasis added). We have emphasized the importance of the purpose of a statute in determining its meaning numerous times. E.g., Anchorage Municipal Employees Ass’n v. Municipality of Anchorage, 618 P.2d 575, 580 (Alaska 1980) (“[W]e will not construe a statutory provision in a manner which is inconsistent with the express objective of that very legislation.”); J & L Diversified Enterprises, Inc. v. Municipality of Anchorage, 736 P.2d 349, 351 (Alaska 1987); Wien Air Alaska v. Arant, 592 P.2d 352 (Alaska 1979); Hotel, Motel, Restaurant Constr. Camp Employees & Bartenders Union Local 879 v. Thomas, 551 P.2d 942 (Alaska 1976).
*25In light of our continuous insistence on the importance of legislative purpose in determining the meaning of statutes, the failure of today’s opinion to mention the purpose of the special statute pertaining to actions against peace officers is a major failing. It cannot be excused merely by saying, as the opinion does at page 7, that the language of the peace officer statute is unambiguous. Lack of ambiguity is no excuse for not consulting the purpose of a statute. City of Homer v. Gangl, 650 P.2d 396, 400 n. 4 (Alaska 1982); State v. Alex, 646 P.2d 203, 208-09 n. 4 (Alaska 1982); State, Dep’t of Natural Resources v. City of Haines, 627 P.2d 1047, 1049 n. 6 (Alaska 1981); North Slope Borough v. Sohio Petroleum Corp., 585 P.2d 534, 540 n. 7 (Alaska 1978). These authorities recognize that ambiguity is a relative concept, and that statutes may be seen to be ambiguous when legislative history is consulted. State, Dep’t of Natural Resources v. City of Haines, supra. Moreover, the source of uncertainty in this case is not that the language of .060 is unclear, rather it is that both .060 and .070(b) plausibly apply different periods of limitations to the same claim. Further, the majority’s failure to refer to the purpose of section .060 cannot be excused by reference to the statement taken from Safeco Ins. Co. v. Honeywell, 639 P.2d 996, 1001 (Alaska 1981) that where two constructions as to the applicable period of limitations are possible, that which gives the longer period is to be preferred. That principle of construction necessarily stands on a lower footing than the principle that statutes are construed to accomplish their purposes.2
Under today’s opinion an action against a police officer for abuse of process, false arrest, or any other tort involving personal injury may be brought within three years after the tort. By contrast an action for the same tort brought against a private person or the police officer’s employer must be brought within two years. This disparity must strike the interested observer as unusual. Why, he might ask, would the legislature want to discriminate against policemen by making their exposure to liability one year longer than that applicable to others? The answer is that the legislature did not desire this result. It is in direct conflict with the purpose of section .060, which was to shorten the period during which police could be sued.
The three-year statute relating to peace officers and the two-year statute relating to actions for false imprisonment and other personal injury torts were enacted for Alaska by Congress in 1900. Neither has been changed in any respect material to the present question by either the Alaska Territorial Legislature or the Alaska State Legislature. Congress took the statutes from Oregon which in turn took them from New York.3
New York’s peace officer statute was enacted in 1829. See Dixon v. Seymour, 62 A.D.2d 444, 405 N.Y.S.2d 320, 321 (1978). Its purpose was to benefit peace officers and their sureties by providing a period of limitations shorter than those which would generally apply:
[Enforcement of the state’s orders requires that its officers be protected from excessive harassment so that they will not be paralyzed by fear in discharge of their functions; the enactment of such legislation as the short statute — the equivalent of which is found in many jurisdictions — was doubtless inspired by a policy of that sort.
Ingo v. Koch, 127 F.2d 667, 671 (2nd Cir. 1942). The court in Dixon, notes that the 1829 statute shortening the period for suits against sheriffs to three years was, according to the report of the revisors to the legislature in 1829, “proposed in order to relieve the sureties of sheriffs.” Dixon, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 321. Similar statutes exist in many jurisdictions. Their purpose is also to benefit law enforcement officers by shortening the period in which they can be *26sued. Bailey v. Clausen, 192 Colo. 297, 557 P.2d 1207, 1210 (1976); Sibley v. Estabrook, 4 Gray 295 (Mass.1855).
The three-year statute of limitations for suits against sheriffs was shorter than general periods of limitations prevailing in 1829 in New York. Likewise, when the New York statute was adopted by the state of Oregon, the general statute of limitations pertaining to “injury to the person or rights of another, not arising on contract and not hereinafter enumerated ...” was six years.4 However, in 1870 the Oregon legislature took this clause out of the six-year statute and placed it in the two-year statute.5 Thus the general personal injury statute of limitations became shorter than the peace officer statute of limitations. This relationship was incorporated in the statutes governing Alaska when Congress enacted Oregon’s laws for Alaska.6
In New York, because the three-year peace officer statute was shortened to one year in 1871, the peace officer statute is still shorter than the periods of limitations to which police officers would otherwise be subject. Thus, in New York, the statute is referred to as “the short statute,” Ingo, 127 F.2d at 671, and the focus of the litigation concerning the statute is on the question as to under what circumstances a policeman can take advantage of the statute.7 There are no reported decisions in Oregon or Alaska concerning whether the peace officer statute or the general personal injury statute governs personal injury suits against the police. However, this question was adjudicated in Massachusetts where there was a similar statutory situation.
The case is Sibley v. Estabrook, 4 Gray 295 (Mass.1855). Section 2 of the statute of limitations provided for a two-year period for actions for assault and battery and false imprisonment. Section 3 provided for a four-year period for actions against sheriffs for the misconduct or negligence of their deputies. The case was an action against a sheriff for an assault and false imprisonment committed by the sheriffs deputy. The court referred to the contention that the statute relating to actions against sheriffs controlled the statute relating to assaults and false imprisonment:
It is contended by the plaintiff that the special provision of the statute, limiting all actions against the sheriff, for the misconduct of his deputies, to four years, controls the general provision limiting actions for assault and false imprisonment to two years. The argument that by this construction you secure a uniform rule of limitation applicable to all actions against the sheriff for the misconduct of his deputies, is certainly a plausible one.
4 Gray at 296. However, the court held that this contention was contrary to the purposes of both sections:
But we think that must yield to the greater and leading purpose of § 2, that of requiring an early institution of a suit for an assault and battery, or false imprisonment. The object of § 3 was to benefit the sheriff in the matter of his official responsibility for the default of his deputies, by limiting his liability to a shorter period than it would otherwise have been. For many causes of action, six years was the period of limitation.
... This was deemed an unreasonable period for a liability of this nature, and hence § 3 limits the extreme period of such liability of sheriffs to four years. *27This was to have its effect upon all cases of liabilities that would otherwise have been continued to a period more remote. But we cannot suppose it was intended to extend the term of limitation in cases where it was by other provisions already limited to two years.
4 Gray at 296-97. Sibley v. Estabrook was followed in a similar case arising under a similar statutory structure in Trask v. Wadsworth, 78 Me. 336, 5 A. 182 (1886).
The approach of the court in Sibley is faithful to the purpose of the peace officer statute. I would follow it in this case. Thus, when police officers are sued for acts where a longer statute of limitations would otherwise apply,8 the three year statute would apply to shorten this period. However, when police officers are sued for acts whose statutes already provide a shorter period of limitations than three years, the shorter period would apply. Only in this way can the statutory purpose of providing a short period of limitations to benefit the police be realized. Further, this interpretation is faithful to the legislative purpose of providing a relatively short period, two years, for most personal injury torts.
For these reasons I would affirm the judgment.
. I thus accept the the view that the peace officer statute applies to torts involving personal injuries. At least one court construing a similar statute has held that it does not. Zahn v. Taylor, 7 Wis.2d 60, 95 N.W.2d 771 (1959).
. Just as in contract interpretation the intention of the parties has primacy over the rule of construction that ambiguities are interpreted against the draftsman. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 206 comment (a), 202, 203.
. See F. Brown, The Sources of the Alaska and Oregon Codes, 2 UCLA Alaska Law Review 15, 86 (1972-73).
. Oregon Code of Civil Procedure § 6, ¶ 5 (1862).
. Oregon Laws — Olson 1920 § 8(1). The 1870 amendment is explained in Smith v. Day, 39 Or. 531, 64 P. 812, 813 (1901).
. See sections 7 and 8, Alaska Civil Code, ch. 786, 56 Cong. Session 1, 1900.
. See e.g., Ingo v. Koch (the sheriff may have benefit of short statute when acting in good faith although unlawfully, but not while acting with knowledge that his act was unauthorized); Dixon v. Seymour, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 323 (sheriff may have the benefit of the short statute when sued for violating his duties which are imposed on him by reason of his office, but not when violating duties imposed on the public at large; thus, a deputy sheriff who caused death through negligent driving of a patrol car while on duty would not have the benefit of the short statute because he was merely violating "the duty of reasonable care assumed by everyone who operates an automobile on the highway.”).
. Property damage torts, for example. AS 09.-10.050.