(dissenting) — I dissent on two grounds. First, this court should unequivocally reject the distinction between media/nonmedia defendants in determining the applicable standard of proof in libel cases. The majority states that the standard of proof depends upon the status of the defendant: "clear and convincing evidence" against a media defendant and "preponderance of the evidence" against a nonmedia defendant. Majority, at 220. To perpetuate this distinction, even while stating that it would not *227make any difference in deciding this case, majority, at 221, only lends confusion to an area of law that desperately needs greater clarity.
Second, I believe that the LaMons have presented sufficient evidence of fault to overcome defendant's motion for summary judgment. I concur with the conclusions reached on these arguments by Justice Dore in his dissenting opinion and offer further arguments in support of them here.
I
In affirming the trial court's decision to grant defendants' motion for summary judgment, the Court of Appeals held that " [a] defamation plaintiff resisting a media defendant's motion for summary judgment must establish a prima facie case by evidence of convincing clarity." (Some italics mine.) LaMon v. Butler, 44 Wn. App. 654, 657, 722 P.2d 1373 (1986). While noting correctly that this standard of proof was not required by the United States Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals reasoned from recent opinions of this court that media defendants have greater protection than ordinary citizens similarly engaged in the exercise of First Amendment rights. LaMon, at 657 (citing Dunlap v. Wayne, 105 Wn.2d 529, 716 P.2d 842 (1986)). Such a conclusion is not warranted and should be corrected.
There are three problems with the media/nonmedia distinction in our current approach to standard of proof issues in libel law. Each of them strongly suggests that the distinction should be dropped.
A
Sullivan Standards Misconstrued
First, to the extent that the heightened standard of proof came to be applied as a result of state court interpretations of United States Supreme Court decisions, those decisions have been misconstrued. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686, 84 S. Ct. 710, 95 A.L.R.2d 1412 (1964), the Court held that in defamation cases where the plaintiff is a public official, a prima facie *228case must be established with evidence of "convincing clarity" , including a showing of actual malice. Sullivan, at 285-86. This twin standard of actual malice and convincing clarity was later extended to cases where the plaintiff is a "public figure". Curtis Pub'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1094, 87 S. Ct. 1975 (1967). We adopted these standards of fault and proof for public figure plaintiffs in Grayson v. Curtis Pub'g Co., 72 Wn.2d 999, 436 P.2d 756 (1967). While only the plurality of the Court would have extended this twin standard to comments about private individuals which pertained to matters of "general public interest", Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 29 L. Ed. 2d 296, 91 S. Ct. 1811 (1971), this state nonetheless adopted the Sullivan standard for such comments because we felt constitutionally bound to follow the Rosenbloom plurality. Miller v. Argus Pub’g Co., 79 Wn.2d 816, 490 P.2d 101 (1971).
However, in reconsidering the issue 3 years later, the United States Supreme Court held that the Sullivan standards were not constitutionally mandated when the plaintiff was a private individual; hence, the states were free to provide greater protection to defamed private individuals than to public figures. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 41 L. Ed. 2d 789, 94 S. Ct. 2997 (1974). Once again following the cue from United States Supreme Court, Washington modified the standard for private person plaintiffs in defamation actions against the media. In Taskett v. KING Broadcasting Co., 86 Wn.2d 439, 546 P.2d 81 (1976), this court overruled Miller. We stated that the Sullivan standard of liability "imposes a totally unacceptable burden" when applied to private plaintiffs and that, henceforth, such plaintiffs need only show ordinary negligence. Taskett, at 444.
Taskett expressly addressed only one aspect of the Sullivan twin standard, that of fault. The substantive eviden-tiary standard to be applied was left unstated. However, the logic which compelled us to adopt a lesser standard of liability for actions by private plaintiffs strongly suggests *229that the standard of proof should likewise be lower. To have the nature of the plaintiff determine the standard of liability but have the status of the defendant determine the standard of proof is confusing and inconsistent. Yet this is where our case law currently stands.
The higher standard of convincing clarity has occasionally been applied by state courts to suits by private persons even though the case authority applying this standard involved public officials or public figures. The first case applying this standard to a private individual was Sims v. KIRO, Inc., 20 Wn. App. 229, 580 P.2d 642, review denied, 91 Wn.2d 1007 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 945 (1979). There the court stated that a plaintiff must present evidence "of a sufficient quantum to establish a prima facie case with convincing clarity." Sims, at 237. While following Taskett insofar as the standard of fault to be applied, the court applied the Sullivan standard of proof, even though Sims was a private citizen and traditionally entitled to greater protection of his reputation than a public figure. To support its application of the convincing clarity standard rather than that of simple preponderance, the court cited two Washington cases — Chase v. Daily Record, Inc., 83 Wn.2d 37, 515 P.2d 154 (1973) and Exner v. AMA, 12 Wn. App. 215, 529 P.2d 863, 75 A.L.R.3d 603 (1974). However, both of these cases involved plaintiffs who were public figures for whom the application of the Sullivan standards of fault and proof was constitutionally compelled.
The application of this heightened evidentiary standard was later challenged by the private plaintiff in Mark v. Seattle Times, 96 Wn.2d 473, 635 P.2d 1081 (1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1124 (1982), but the argument was rejected by this court. We stated then that for "policy reasons, rooted in the First Amendment ... an early testing of plaintiff's evidence by a convincing clarity burden continue to be persuasive." Mark, at 487. Chase was again cited as the source for this rule.
The last case in this evolution was Dunlap v. Wayne, 105 Wn.2d 529, 716 P.2d 842 (1986). There we noted for the *230first time that the cases applying the "convincing clarity" standard had involved media defendants (although it is equally accurate to say that those cases, with the exception of Sims and Mark, involved plaintiffs who were either public officials or public figures) and that "First Amendment concerns at that time supported the special protection that we extended ..." Dunlap, at 534. The court suggested that the same First Amendment concerns were not implicated when a nonmedia defendant was being sued for a statement about private affairs; thus, whenever a nonmedia defendant was involved "the usual rules governing summary judgment should control", presumably including a simple preponderance of the evidence standard. Dunlap, at 535. This media/nonmedia defendant distinction in defamation actions was reiterated without comment in Guntheroth v. Rodaway, 107 Wn.2d 170, 176, 727 P.2d 982 (1986) and is repeated in the majority opinion in the current case.
Thus, the convincing clarity standard of proof came to be applied in libel suits against media defendants as a result of mistaken interpretations of United States Supreme Court decisions.
B
Current Distinction Is Contrary to the First Amendment
Second, the media/nonmedia defendant distinction in defamation actions by private individuals is contrary to the First Amendment. Since this court's media defendant distinction currently rests upon "policy reasons, rooted in the First Amendment", Mark, at 487, it is important to consider that a clear majority of the Justices on the United States Supreme Court and several federal courts addressing the issue have stated that the First Amendment does not support granting the media special protection beyond that available to individual citizens. In Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 86 L. Ed. 2d 593, 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985), five Justices signed separate opinions explicitly concluding that the First Amendment *231requires the equal treatment of media and nonmedia defendants and a sixth, Chief Justice Burger, agreed with this conclusion. Justice White was emphatic in opposing any media/nonmedia distinction in defamation law.
None of our cases affords such a distinction; to the contrary, the Court has rejected it at every turn. It should be rejected again, particularly in this context, since it makes no sense to give the most protection to those publishers who reach the most readers . . . with the most misinformation and do the most damage to private reputation.
(Footnote omitted.) Dun & Bradstreet, at 773 (White, J., concurring).
In a dissenting opinion joined by three other members of the Court, Justice Brennan stated categorically that a media/nonmedia distinction in defamation law is
irreconcilable with the fundamental First Amendment principle that "[t]he inherent worth of . . . speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its source ..."
Dun & Bradstreet, at 781, quoting First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777, 55 L. Ed. 2d 707, 98 S. Ct. 1407 (1978). Justice Brennan further emphasized the problems in defining "media" and suggested that any definition would soon become obsolete. Thus, he concludes that in the context of defamation law,
the rights of the institutional media are no greater and no less than those enjoyed by other individuals or organizations engaged in the same activities.
Dun & Bradstreet, at 784.
A clear majority of the United States Supreme Court unequivocally rejects any media/nonmedia distinction in libel law. This conclusion has since been strongly supported by two federal appellate courts. Garcia v. Board of Educ., 777 F.2d 1403, 1409-11 (10th Cir. 1985); In re IBP Confidential Business Documents Litig., 797 F.2d 632, 642 (8th Cir. 1986). The message is now loud and clear: distinguishing between media and nonmedia defendants in libel cases *232is contrary to the First Amendment. We should not continue to hold otherwise.
C
Washington Constitution
Third, even assuming that the states can give greater protection to media than to nonmedia defendants without violating either the First or Fourteenth Amendments, it has not been determined whether the Washington Constitution does in fact provide for such a distinction. In Dunlap, this court noted that "the Washington Constitution may provide heightened protection to media defendants." Dunlap, at 534 n.l (citing Const, art. 1, § 5 and State v. Coe, 101 Wn.2d 364, 679 P.2d 353 (1984)). In the present case, this issue was not raised before the Court of Appeals. But that court nonetheless concluded from its evaluation of Washington case law and the footnote in Dunlap that the Washington Constitution "does provide heightened protection to media defendants". (Italics mine.) LaMon, at 657 n.2.
Such a definitive statement by the Court of Appeals is unwarranted. First, the language of article 1, section 5 is hardly unambiguous on this point. There is no differentiation between freedom of speech and press and, hence, no clear grounds for distinguishing levels of protection for comments from media and nonmedia sources. Second, the footnote cited in Dunlap goes only so far as to suggest that article 1, section 5 may provide heightened protection to the media in defamation cases. However, it was only a suggestion, was not essential to the holding in the case, and, most importantly, has never been raised in arguments before this court. Third, the special protection provided by the "convincing clarity" evidentiary standard has not been sought by the media defendants in this case as a state constitutional right; it is the petitioners who raise the issue on appeal claiming that the state constitution affords no such enhanced protection. To allow the language of the Court of Appeals to stand granting state constitutional protection to the media which is not granted to individual citizens of the *233state is highly unsatisfactory. The media defendant has not urged its adoption and this court has not been presented with any arguments using the nonexclusive criteria of State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54, 720 P.2d 808 (1986), or other reasons mandating heightened state constitutional protection.
The media/nonmedia defendant distinction in our defamation law should be dropped. The appropriate evidentiary standard should be governed solely by the nature of the plaintiff, in the same manner that we determine which standard of liability to apply. A public figure plaintiff would therefore need to prove actual malice by clear and convincing evidence and a private person would only need to show negligence by simple preponderance of the evidence. The status of the defendant is irrelevant.
It is altogether proper to make the nature of the plaintiff the determining factor. The two basic rationales for the strict Sullivan standards are the need to promote vigorous and robust debate on matters and personalities affecting public policy and the ability of public figures to use the media to rebut false statements made about them. Neither of these rationales is implicated when a libel suit is brought by a private person.
Abolishing the media/nonmedia distinction would be consistent with recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court and federal courts of appeal which have clarified the standards since our earlier cases. It would also be consistent with this court's reasoning in Taskett where it adopted "ordinary negligence" as the standard of fault for defamation cases involving a private person suing a media defendant.
The distinction between media and nonmedia defendants is faulty and should no longer be employed. I believe that "the best way forward is to take two steps back" and correct our mistake. The proper standard of proof in any libel action should depend solely on the nature of the plaintiff. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986). Otherwise we perpetuate a body *234of law under which two defendants engaged in the same conduct may suffer vastly different penalties simply because one is a member of the media and the other is not.
II
The Court of Appeals determined, and the majority does not disagree, that the LaMons are private persons for purposes of this litigation. Thus, they would be entitled to recover if they can show by a preponderance of the evidence that the statements made about them were false, had a defamatory meaning, were made negligently by the defendant, and were not otherwise privileged communication. See Guntheroth, at 175; Dunlap, at 542. As the non-moving party in a summary judgment proceeding, the LaMons are further entitled to have the evidence and all reasonable inferences construed in the light most favorable to them and against the defendants. Herron v. Tribune Pub'g Co., 108 Wn.2d 162, 736 P.2d 249 (1987). Applying the appropriate evidentiary standard, I believe that the LaMons have presented a prima facie case and are entitled to proceed to trial.
The Court of Appeals concluded that the LaMons had provided sufficient evidence to show all the elements of defamation except defendants' fault. That court ruled that the LaMons had not made a prima facie showing of negligence and upheld summary judgment for the defendants. On this basis alone the majority affirms the decision.
The issue before us is whether there is sufficient evidence from which a trier of fact could reasonably conclude that defendants Butler and The Daily World "knew or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known" that the statements made about the LaMons were false. Taskett, 86 Wn.2d at 445. While the majority, like the Court of Appeals, examines only the statements made regarding the assault conviction, the LaMons' cause of action actually rests upon three allegedly defamatory statements. In addition to the false statements regarding the convictions, Butler and The Daily World are alleged to have made false *235statements to the effect that the LaMons' civil rights litigation against the police chief was dismissed in federal court for being "frivolous" when in fact there was a substantial recovery, and to the effect that the civil rights suit was "connected" with the alleged assault incident when, in fact, there was no connection whatsoever.
These statements were made not once, but over the course of several years. Butler continued to make these statements even after the LaMons had notified her and The Daily World of their falsity. Although the statute of limitations limits the LaMons' suit to those statements published in September 1979 and April 1980, the record contains several other articles published before then containing the same defamatory remarks. The false statements that were made shortly after the reversal of LaMon's assault conviction may well have been the result of honest mistake. The LaMons are nonetheless entitled to argue that it is at least negligent and perhaps reflects actual malice when the defendant reporter and newspaper persist in printing the same mistaken and defamatory comments for 7 years.
The strongest basis for the LaMons' action lies in the false reporting of an assault conviction in municipal court that was later reversed by dismissal in superior court. Butler stated that after she heard of the superior court order dismissing the action against the LaMons, she did not know its effect on the municipal court conviction. However, Butler did not take the time to read the order herself. Butler Deposition, at 13. Had she done so, she would have noted that the superior court judge ordered that the "above action be dismissed with prejudice"; and that the "above action" clearly referred to the City of Westport's assault charges against the LaMons, not merely the appeal of the municipal court conviction. Clerk's Papers, at 66.
Although our law has since changed, the rule had been well established at the time the order was issued that dismissal of a superior court action voids a prior municipal conviction. See State v. Buckman, 51 Wn.2d 827, 322 P.2d *236881 (1958). The majority's characterization of the superior court order as a "dismissal of Lorraine LaMon's appeal" is inexplicable when the language of the order is given its plain and simple meaning. Majority, at 218.
Butler asserts that she contacted the Westport city attorney regarding the implications of the dismissal. According to her unsupported recollection of the conversation, the city attorney told her that the original municipal court conviction still stood despite the superior court's dismissal of the case. Butler Deposition, at 13-14. The majority is correct in stating that the LaMons offer no direct evidence that this conversation did not take place or that the city attorney said something other than what Butler now recalls. However, the LaMons have submitted evidence that it was the city attorney himself who initially proposed the order dismissing the case against them. Clerk's Papers, at 63. It is at least arguable that the same city attorney who proposed dismissing the case against the LaMons in the first place would not later tell a reporter that the assault conviction was not affected. This evidence and the reasonable inference from it presents a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to overcome the defendants' motion for summary judgment. For this reason we cannot accept Butler's version of events at face value.
The two other false statements made by the defendants in the publications at issue here further suggest that the LaMons have an adequate factual basis for their complaint. Butler continued to write that the LaMons' civil rights action against the police chief was dismissed as being "frivolous", despite knowing that in fact the LaMons were successful in their suit in federal district court. In this instance, Butler cannot claim to have been unaware of the true facts of the case. The LaMons had earlier paid for several large advertisements, published in the same newspaper, reprinting verbatim the findings of fact and judgment of the federal district court granting them relief and the memorandum opinion of the Ninth Circuit Court of *237Appeals affirming the judgment. Clerk's Papers, at 41. Butler admitted in her deposition that she knew of the advertisements. Butler Deposition, at 35. In addition, Butler falsely reported that the civil rights action "stemmed from" and was "connected with" the assault conviction. She later admitted in deposition that she knew that the basis for the LaMons' suit against the police chief was a denial of equal protection and had nothing to do with the prior municipal court conviction. Butler Deposition, at 27-28.
It is difficult to reconcile these facts with the majority's conclusion that no trier of fact could reasonably find the defendants at fault. The LaMons clearly have sufficient evidence with which to proceed to trial. The Court of Appeals decision should be reversed and the case remanded for trial.
Pearson, C.J., and Goodloe, J., concur with Utter, J.