(dissenting) — The majority holds that the prosecution, in its case in chief, can introduce expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome when such evidence would be helpful to the jury's understanding of the victim's perceptions and behavior. The majority, however, fails to evaluate the prejudicial impact of the testimony on the defendant. In my opinion, testimony on the battered woman syndrome is inadmissible as a matter of law where it is used as an affirmative weapon against a defendant. I dissent.
Battered Woman Syndrome
We have not previously been faced with a case where the prosecution offered battered woman testimony as direct evidence against a defendant. In State v. Allery, 101 Wn.2d 591, 597, 682 P.2d 312 (1984) we held that the defendant *285can offer expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome to assist in evaluating the reasonableness of force used in self-defense. Allery, at 597; State v. Walker, 40 Wn. App. 658, 664-65, 700 P.2d 1168, review denied, 104 Wn.2d 1012 (1985). Nothing in Allery suggests use of battered woman testimony as affirmative evidence to prove elements of the crime charged.
In considering a self-defense claim, the trier of fact must evaluate the claim from the defendant's point of view as conditions appeared at the time of the act. State v. McCullum, 98 Wn.2d 484, 488-89, 656 P.2d 1064 (1983); State v. Wanrow, 88 Wn.2d 221, 234-36, 559 P.2d 548 (1977). Expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome as it relates to a battered woman's state of mind is essential to the proper evaluation of a self-defense claim. Allery, at 597. Battered woman testimony plays no such role in a rape prosecution. The victim's state of mind is not at issue nor is proof that the defendant is a batterer or that the defendant and the victim are involved in a battering relationship.
Applying ER 702, the majority concludes that an understanding of the battered woman syndrome is beyond the competence of the average jury and therefore expert testimony explaining the syndrome is admissible in the prosecution's case. I will concede that the average jury may harbor misconceptions about battering relationships. This lack of understanding, however, is not a sufficient ground to admit expert testimony that otherwise has only limited probative value but substantial prejudicial impact on the defendant.
Expert testimony satisfying the requirements of ER 702 must also be evaluated in terms of its prejudicial impact on defendant. ER 403; State v. Petrich, 101 Wn.2d 566, 575, 683 P.2d 173 (1984). ER 403 recognizes that "relevance does not ensure admissibility. There remains the question of whether its value is worth what it costs." E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence § 185, at 544 (3d ed. 1984). Under the circumstances of this case, I conclude that the prejudice *286of the battered woman testimony to the defendant substantially outweighs any benefits.
The trial court admitted the testimony for the purpose of dispelling the impression that a delay in reporting the rapes to the police is inconsistent with the victim's assertion that she was raped. In deciding to exclude evidence on grounds of unfair prejudice, the court must consider the availability of other means to prove the fact at issue. Comment, ER 403. Here, several friends of the victim testified that the victim told them that the defendant raped her shortly after the incidents occurred. Further, the victim testified that she did not go to the police because she was afraid of the defendant's violent temper. Insofar as the expert's testimony bears on the victim's delay in reporting the attacks to the police, there was other evidence available for rebuttal purposes.
The diagnosis that the victim suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and battered woman syndrome presupposes and speculates on the existence of a batterer. There being no other person involved in a relationship with the victim during the relevant time period, the testimony amounts to an opinion that the defendant is in fact a batterer. The testimony, in effect, put the defendant on trial for being a batterer.
The prosecution interjected emotionally charged and speculative evidence on the battered woman syndrome into an already emotionally charged rape trial. The testimony could have only aroused the passion and prejudice of the jury against the defendant. See State v. Rupe, 101 Wn.2d 664, 686, 683 P.2d 571 (1984).
The expert's testimony also vouches too much for the victim's credibility and corroborates her testimony on the critical issue of whether the defendant raped her. The rule is that evidence designed to bolster a witness' credibility is admissible only where the witness' credibility has been attacked by the opposing party. State v. Froehlich, 96 Wn.2d 301, 305, 635 P.2d 127 (1981).
*287Klingbeil testified that the victim suffered from PTSD. The record reveals that the traumatic event that triggered the disorder was the victim's claim that the defendant raped her. She also testified that the battered woman syndrome
is a collection of behaviors or characteristics, when taken together, lead to the diagnosis of a battered woman syndrome. It has to do with the kind of relationship as evidenced by force or coercive kinds of power that one person has over another person, without their permission; that is, against their will.
(Italics mine.) Report of Proceedings, at 716-17. Finally, she stated that the cycle of violence that characterizes a battering relationship can be marked by sexual violence, including rape.
The diagnosis of PTSD presupposed the existence of a rape. The diagnosis of battered woman syndrome assumes that the defendant exercised force or coercive powers over the victim such that he overcame the will of the victim. This testimony directly enhances the victims' credibility on her claim that she did not consent to sexual intercourse with the defendant. As the defendant had not attacked the victim's credibility, it was error to admit the expert's testimony.
In Petrich we held that the prosecution can introduce expert testimony to explain a child's delay in reporting sexual abuse to rebut an inference that the victim was not abused. Petrich, at 575-76. Petrich reflects the special consideration this court accords child victims of sexual abuse and does not control here. The danger that a jury may misconstrue the actions and behavior of a child are far greater than the dangers presented when an adult testifies.
Conclusion
In my opinion, I find as a matter of law that expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome is inadmissible in the prosecution's case. The testimony greatly prejudiced the defendant in that it labeled him as a batterer and put him in the position of having to defend himself against *288such an allegation. The evidence also impermissibly corroborated the victim's credibility on the ultimate issue of whether she was raped by the defendant. The expert's testimony constitutes prejudicial error.
I would reverse the defendant's convictions and remand for a new trial.
Reconsideration denied September 12, 1988.