Justice, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
In this case, the prior felony murder verdicts in Bartow County do not prevent the present prosecution in DeKalb County, since the trial court in Bartow County did not, and indeed could not validly, enter judgments of conviction on those verdicts. However, I agree with the majority that double jeopardy bars the current prosecution of Perkinson in DeKalb County for kidnapping with bodily injury, because he was previously convicted in Bartow County for false imprisonment. Conversely, there was no prior conviction for armed robbery or for any lesser or greater offense thereof and, thus, double jeopardy does not bar the present prosecution for armed robbery. Therefore, I concur in Division 2 of the majority opinion and in the judgment with respect to kidnapping with bodily injury, but I dissent to Division 1 and to the judgment with respect to armed robbery.
A former prosecution of a defendant on multiple alternative felony murder charges in one county will bar a subsequent prosecution for the underlying offenses in another county in the circumstances specified in OCGA § 16-1-8 (b). Compare State v. LeMay, 186 Ga. App. 146, 147 (3) (367 SE2d 61) (1988). That statute, along with OCGA §§ 16-1-6 and 16-1-7, provides more protection to the accused than does Blockburger v. United States, 284 U. S. 299 (52 SC 180, 76 LE 306) (1932) and its progeny. Rower v. State, 267 Ga. 46, 47 (472 SE2d 297) (1996). However, OCGA § 16-1-8 (b) cannot apply if the former prosecution did not result in a conviction, an acquittal, or an improper termination. There is no contention that the former prosecution was improperly terminated after issue was joined. Furthermore, the appellant does not contend that the felony murder prosecution resulted in an acquittal. Any such contention clearly would be incorrect. Bellamy v. State, 272 Ga. 157, 158, fn. 1 (527 SE2d 867) (2000). See also People v. Williams, 664 NE2d 164, 166 (II) (Ill. App. 1996).
Perkinson does assert, and the majority assumes, that the former prosecution on the felony murder charges resulted in his “conviction.” “Perkinson may not be prosecuted for the lesser-included offense after being convicted of the greater offense in a different county. [Cits.]” (Emphasis supplied.) (Majority opinion, p. 495.) Where, as here, a jury returns a verdict of guilt of the alternative counts of malice murder and felony murder of a single victim, and the trial court properly enters judgment on the malice murder verdict alone, the language in this Court’s decisions regarding the status of the felony murder verdict has not been wholly consistent. Some cases indicate that the felony murder “count” or “charge” stands *498vacated by operation of OCGA § 16-1-7 (a). Goforth v. State, 271 Ga. 700 (523 SE2d 868) (1999); Bowden v. State, 270 Ga. 19, fn. 1 (504 SE2d 699) (1998); Rushin v. State, 269 Ga. 599, fn. 1 (502 SE2d 454) (1998); Tiller v. State, 267 Ga. 888, 890 (2) (485 SE2d 720) (1997); Barrett v. State, 263 Ga. 533, 536 (5) (436 SE2d 480) (1993), overruled on other grounds, Wall v. State, 269 Ga. 506, 508, 509 (2) (500 SE2d 904) (1998). In other cases, we have held that the felony murder “verdict” was vacated by operation of law. Stowe v. State, 272 Ga. 866 (536 SE2d 506) (2000); Monroe v. State, 272 Ga. 201, fn. 1 (528 SE2d 504) (2000); Holmes v. State, 271 Ga. 138 (516 SE2d 61) (1999); Johnson v. State, 266 Ga. 775, fn. 1 (470 SE2d 637) (1996). Regardless of whether it is entirely accurate to describe the verdict or charge as “vacated,” these cases clearly support the proposition that there has been no valid felony murder conviction. “ ‘ “Conviction” is not the verdict; it is the judgment on the verdict or guilty plea. OCGA § 16-1-3 (4); (cit.).’ [Cit.]” Blackstock v. State, 270 Ga. 117, 119 (4), fn. 5 (506 SE2d 130) (1998). See also Sartin v. State, 223 Ga. App. 759, 761-762 (4) (479 SE2d 354) (1996); Sanders v. State, 212 Ga. App. 832 (2) (442 SE2d 923) (1994); Leslie v. State, 211 Ga. App. 871, 872 (440 SE2d 757) (1994). “Therefore, since OCGA § 16-1-7 (a) provides that one cannot be ‘convicted’ of more than one crime arising from the same conduct, this Code section has no application to the verdict.” Sanders v. State, supra at 832-833 (2). See also Sartin v. State, supra at 762 (4). Likewise, a verdict is not a “conviction” under OCGA § 16-1-8 (a) (1). Thus, a felony murder verdict has no vitality if the trial court correctly enters a judgment of conviction only on the malice murder verdict. The felony murder verdicts in Perkinson’s former prosecution never became convictions for that offense. He was convicted only of the malice murder of the victim.
Many of this Court’s opinions state that the felony murder conviction is vacated by operation of law where there is also a conviction on an alternative malice murder count. That language originated, however, in a number of cases, including the oft-cited Malcolm v. State, 263 Ga. 369, 372 (4) (434 SE2d 479) (1993), where the trial court actually purported to enter a judgment of conviction on the surplus felony murder verdict. In that event, this Court is compelled to correct the error and recognize the operation of OCGA § 16-1-7 (a) by ordering that the felony murder conviction be vacated. Tiller v. State, supra at 890 (2); Barker v. State, 263 Ga. 746, 747 (2) (438 SE2d 625) (1994); Barrett v. State, supra at 536 (5). In this case, however, there were no erroneous felony murder “convictions” entered. Moreover, any such convictions would not bar the current prosecution for the underlying felonies, because they would stand vacated by operation of OCGA § 16-1-7 (a), and this Court, if not the trial court, would be obligated to recognize that they were void by ordering that they be *499vacated. A prior conviction does not bar a later prosecution for the same crime or a lesser-included offense if subsequent proceedings, whether they be in the trial court or the appellate court, result “in the . . . vacating of the conviction, unless the accused was thereby adjudged not guilty or unless there was a finding that the evidence did not authorize the verdict.” OCGA § 16-1-8 (d) (2). See also McCrary v. State, 254 Ga. 382 (1) (329 SE2d 473) (1985); Garrard v. State, 242 Ga. App. 189, 190 (528 SE2d 273) (2000) (grant of a motion for new trial). A court does not adjudge an accused not guilty or find the evidence insufficient when it recognizes that a “conviction” erroneously entered on a felony murder verdict is vacated by operation of law. Furthermore, any sentences imposed for such “felony murder convictions are void under Malcolm. . . .” Thornton v. State, 264 Ga. 563, 570 (6) (449 SE2d 98) (1994). “[A] void judgment of conviction does not bar a successive prosecution for the same offense under . . . federal principles of double jeopardy. [Cits.]” Hoang v. State, 872 SW2d 694, 698 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993), overruled on other grounds, Proctor v. State, 967 SW2d 840, 842, 844 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). See also People v. Rolland, 581 NE2d 907, 910 (Ill. App. 1991). The same is true under Georgia law, since a void judgment of conviction never is valid and, thus, cannot function as a “conviction” which bars subsequent prosecution under OCGA § 16-1-8 (b).
The majority opinion appears to assert that, even if there are no longer any prior felony murder convictions, the DeKalb County prosecution violates the same double jeopardy bar which prevents the State from instituting successive prosecutions for felony murder and the underlying felony in a single county. (Majority opinion, p. 495.) The majority relies upon federal constitutional cases which offer no support. The only bar to multiple prosecutions which can apply in the absence of a prior conviction, acquittal, or improper termination is wholly statutory, and is codified as OCGA § 16-1-7 (b). That statute
expands the proscription of double jeopardy beyond that provided for in the United States and Georgia Constitutions, [cit.], because it “protects a defendant from multiple prosecutions arising from the same conduct in situations where constitutional double jeopardy would not be a defense.” [Cit.]
Griffin v. State, 266 Ga. 115, 117 (2) (464 SE2d 371) (1995). OCGA § 16-1-7 (b) requires the State to prosecute all crimes arising from the same conduct “in a ‘single prosecution’ provided they are in the same jurisdiction and are known to the prosecutor, unless the [trial] court in the interest of justice orders separate trials.” (Emphasis supplied.) Griffin v. State, supra at 117 (2). As the Court recognizes in footnote 1 of the majority opinion, the prosecution for felony murder *500in Bartow County was proper even though the underlying felonies were committed in DeKalb County. However, the mere occurrence of that prosecution does not preclude the armed robbery prosecution in DeKalb County, because there was absolutely no jurisdiction in Bar-tow County over the crime of armed robbery. Griffin v. State, supra at 118 (2). See also Stephens v. Hopper, 241 Ga. 596, 599 (1) (247 SE2d 92) (1978); Potts v. State, 241 Ga. 67, 78 (11) (243 SE2d 510) (1978). By relying on the bar to successive prosecutions, the majority has not only implicitly overruled numerous cases, including Stephens v. Hopper, supra, Potts v. State, supra, and our recent precedent in Griffin v. State, supra, it has expanded OCGA § 16-1-7 (b) beyond the position advocated by the dissenting opinions in Griffin v. State, supra at 121 (Thompson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), 122 (Fletcher, P. J., dissenting in part) (where, unlike here, the second county to initiate prosecution had jurisdiction over all charges).
Decided February 5, 2001 Reconsideration denied March 2, 2001. William E. Nethery, Maryann F. Blend, Corrine M. MullMilsteen, for appellant. J. Tom Morgan, District Attorney, Barbara B. Conroy, Assistant District Attorney, John H. Petry, for appellee.Because the trial court in Bartow County correctly refrained from entering a judgment of conviction on the felony murder verdicts, and because any such judgment would stand vacated by operation of law, those verdicts cannot bar the current prosecution for the underlying felonies in DeKalb County, under either state or federal principles of double jeopardy. Although the prior conviction for false imprisonment prevents the present prosecution for kidnapping with bodily injury, there has been absolutely no conviction which can possibly bar the prosecution in DeKalb County for armed robbery. By nevertheless prohibiting the State from prosecuting Perkinson for armed robbery, the majority has, in both its analysis and judgment, expanded double jeopardy protections beyond all constitutional and statutory bounds.
I am authorized to state that Justice Hunstein joins in this dissent.