specially concurring:
While I agree with my brother Judge Brett’s analysis of appellant’s first assignment of error, I write separately to emphasize that this Court will not tolerate the misuse of mathematical probability evidence. The introduction of such testimony, through the giving of so-called expert opinions in terms of specific mathematical probabilities, presents a substantial danger of misleading, confusing, and invading the province of, the trier of fact. See United States ex rel. DiGiacomo v. Franzen, 680 F.2d 515, 517-18 (7th Cir.1982). “To say that the defendant’s hair is merely similar to hair found in the victim’s automobile is significantly different than saying that there’s a one in 4,500 chance of it belonging to someone else.” Id. at 519. Putting adequate foundation and relevancy concerns of such evidence aside, the trial judge has an affirmative duty to exclude evidence where its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues or misleading the jury. See 12 O.S.1981, § 2403. The tremendous danger of such evidence becomes readily apparent when even diligent cross-examination has been found insufficient to “dispel the psychological impact of the suggestion of mathematical precision.” People v. Collins, 68 Cal.2d 319, 332, 66 Cal.Rptr. 497, 505, 438 P.2d 33, 41 (1968). Accordingly, it was error for the trial judge to allow OSBI Chemist Kenneth Ede to express his opinion concerning hair evidence in terms of mathematical probabilities. While I agree with the majority that, *1081on this record, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, I would add that reversal may be appropriate in another case.