OPINION
Opinion by
Chief Justice MORRISS.Edward Charles Strather appeals the summary judgment granted in favor of Dolgencorp of Texas, Inc., an entity which owns and operates Dollar General Stores in Texas. Strather, an independent truck driver, sued Dolgencorp alleging its employees were negligent in loading a trailer he hauled from Oklahoma to Texas. He alleged that, while he was unloading the trailer, a heavy box of glass containers of coffee fell onto his head from the upper part of the stacked boxes.
Dolgencorp filed a motion for summary judgment contending (1) there was a defect in the parties because it was not liable in the capacity in which it had been sued, and (2) the statute of limitations barred Strather’s suit. As summary judgment proof, Dolgencorp attached the affidavit of Michelle Hughes, an employee in the Risk Management Division of Dollar General Corporation, who is responsible for handling claims on behalf of Dolgencorp. In her affidavit, Hughes states that “[n]o employee of Dolgencorp was involved in the *422loading or preparation of the trailer.” Dolgencorp also attached excerpts from Strather’s deposition, in which he testified the trailer was closed and sealed when he picked it up. Finally, Dolgencorp attached Strather’s petition, which was filed on April 14, 2000, and which alleged he was injured on April 13,1998.
In response to Dolgencorp’s motion, Strather attached his own affidavit, in which he states he picked up the trailer on April 13,1998, but was injured on April 14, 1998. He also states that when he picked up the trailer “it was represented to [him] that.. .Dolgencorp.. .was responsible for the loading of the trailer,” that the trailer “was at a property controlled and operated by Dolgencorp,” and that “to [his] knowledge” Dolgencorp owned the trader. He further states that the warehouse where the trailer was located had numerous signs in the area that read “Dollar General.” Strather also amended his petition to clarify that his injury occurred April 14, 1998.
The trial court sent a letter to the parties in which it stated it was granting Dolgencorp’s motion because “the Summary Judgment evidence contained the Affidavit that no employee of the Defendant loaded the trailer tractor [sic] in question,” and “[t]here is no competent Summary Judgment evidence to the contrary.” The trial court later signed an order that did not recite its reasons for granting summary judgment.
Strather raises two issues on appeal: “Whether the trial court erred in granting the judgment by holding that Appellant did not produce summary judgment proof that raised a fact issue in avoidance of Appellee’s affirmative defense? [and] ... WTiether the trial court erred in granting final summary judgment as to all causes of action originally alleged against Appellee?”
Dolgencorp moved for summary judgment under Tex.R. Civ. P. 166a(b). To prevail on such a motion, the movant must establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Tex.R. Civ. P. 166a(c). Summary judgment for a defendant is proper when the defendant negates at least one element of each of the plaintiffs theories of recovery, or pleads and conclusively establishes each element of an affirmative defense. Science Spectrum, Inc. v. Martinez, 941 S.W.2d 910, 911 (Tex.1997). When reviewing a summary judgment, we take as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant. Rhone-Poulenc, Inc. v. Steel, 997 S.W.2d 217, 223 (Tex.1999). We indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubt in the nonmovant’s favor. Id. On appeal, the movant still bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.
Strather first contends the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because his affidavit provided summary judgment proof by raising a fact issue concerning Dolgencorp’s affirmative defense. Dolgencorp contends that Strather’s affidavit is incompetent summary judgment proof and that the trial court so found when it stated in its letter to the parties that there was no competent summary judgment proof to contradict Hughes’ assertions in her affidavit.
Strather’s issue on appeal relates only to Dolgencorp’s “defective parties” defense. As mentioned previously, Dolgencorp had also moved for summary judgment on the basis of the statute of limitations.
WTien the trial court does not specify on what basis it granted summary judgment, the appellant must argue that every ground in the summary judgment motion is erroneous. Star-Telegram, Inc. *423v. Doe, 915 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Tex.1995); Simmons v. Healthcare Ctrs. of Tex., Inc., 55 S.W.3d 674, 680 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2001, no pet.). Strather raises a specific, rather than a general, point of error. When an appellant uses specific points of error or issues on appeal to attack a summary judgment and fails to attack one of the possible grounds on which the judgment was granted, the summary judgment must be affirmed.1 Malooly Bros., Inc. v. Napier, 461 S.W.2d 119, 121 (Tex.1970); Simmons, 55 S.W.3d at 681. This is because the summary judgment may have been based on a ground that was available to the trial court and not specifically challenged by the appellant on appeal. Malooly Bros., Inc., 461 S.W.2d at 121; Simmons, 55 S.W.3d at 681.
Arguably, the above rule should not apply under the present circumstances because Strather amended his petition to remove the defect about which Dolgencorp complained in its summary judgment motion before the trial court ruled on the motion. It is not uncommon, however, for a party, in order to avoid summary judgment, to amend his or her pleadings in response to a motion for summary judgment.
Were we to remove Strather’s burden of attacking each of the possible grounds for granting summary judgment by simply referencing his amended pleadings and assuming the trial court could not have granted summary judgment in light of those amended pleadings, we would effectively be placing ourselves in the role of the trial court in ruling on the motion for summary judgment. We would be assuming the trial court did not rule — either correctly or incorrectly — on the motion it had before it. We decline to set such a precedent, especially because the burden of attacking each possible ground alleged in the summary judgment motion is relatively light.
In the present case, however, the trial court arguably did state its reasons for granting summary judgment in the letter it sent to the parties. But these statements were not contained in the order granting summary judgment and are in the nature of findings of fact and conclusions of law, which we are precluded from considering. See Simmons, 55 S.W.3d at 680; Williams v. Moores, 5 S.W.3d 334, 336 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1999, pet. denied). Rather, we must look only to the order granting summary judgment, in which the trial court did not provide the reasons for its ruling. Simmons, 55 S.W.3d at 680; see also Stevens v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 929 S.W.2d 665, 669 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1996, writ denied) (court of appeals could not consider trial court’s letter stating its reasons for granting summary judgment because letter was not part of judgment).
Dolgencorp raised the statute of limitations as a basis for granting summary judgment. Because Strather does not attack Dolgencorp’s statute of limitations defense, either through a general or specific point of error or issue on appeal, we must affirm the summary judgment.
The same reasoning applies to Strather’s second issue on appeal, in which he contends the trial court erred in granting summary judgment with respect to three of his theories of liability, because Dolgen-corp’s summary judgment proof does not address those theories. In his petition, *424Strather alleged that Dolgencorp failed to properly train its employees, servants, and agents in the appropriate procedures to follow in loading trailers; that Dolgen-corp failed to reasonably supervise the loading of the trailer; and that Dolgen-corp failed to reasonably inspect the loading of the trailer. He contends Hughes’ affidavit, which states that no employee of Dolgencorp was involved in the loading or preparation of the trailer, does not provide summary judgment proof to negate these theories.
Even if Strather is correct, he fails to attack Dolgencorp’s statute of limitations defense, which entitles it to summary judgment notwithstanding these theories of liability. Therefore, we must affirm the summary judgment.
We affirm the judgment.
. A general point of error or issue on appeal allows a court of appeals to review all possible grounds on which summary judgment may have been granted. Malooly Bros., Inc. v. Napier, 461 S.W.2d 119, 121 (Tex.1970). A general point or issue states, "The trial court erred in granting the motion for summary judgment,” or uses similar language. Id.