concurring in part and concurring in result.
I concur in the part of the principal opinion that reverses the trial court’s denial of Charlotte Newton’s and David Newton’s cross-petition to set aside the quitclaim deed they gave respondent. I concur in the result reached by the principal opinion in reversing the part of the trial court judgment granting specific performance of a contract.
As the principal opinion acknowledges, the contract respondent seeks to enforce was between respondent and appellants in appellants’ capacities of guardians. Appellants were not parties to the contract in their individual capacities. Appellants’ inclusion in the contract was as guardians of the Estate of Bess Masters. Because Bess Masters did not own the fee interest in the real estate to which the contract was directed, she, and consequently her guardians on her behalf, lacked capacity to convey a fee interest. Mrs. Masters was possessed only with a life estate. Her interest in the real estate terminated at her death, September 28,1984.
As the principal opinion points out, the brief filed by appellants Edwin J. Masters (in which appellants Jackie Masters, Charlotte M. Newton and David Newton joined) is anything but exemplary. The points on appeal, however, although not in compliance with Rule 84.04(d), do not impede disposition of the appeal on its merits in that they sufficiently advise the court and respondent of the basis for the claimed errors. Thus, review is permissible for plain error in accordance with Rule 84.13(c). One claim of error, Point XII, complains that the trial court ordered appellants to “give up” their property although they never had a contract with respondent. I would decide the part of the appeal directed the granting of specific performance of a contract on that issue.
*833The contract respondent sought to enforce was for purchase of real estate owned by Bess Masters. Because Bess Masters had only a life estate in the real estate, all she or guardians on her behalf (with proper court approval) could convey was the life estate.1 Michie v. National Bank of Caruthersville, 558 S.W.2d 270, 275 (Mo.App.1977). The contract to acquire Bess Masters’ real estate was execu-tory at the time Bess Masters died. Because Bess Masters’ life estate terminated upon her death, the contract was no longer capable of being enforced, a requirement for granting specific performance of a contract. See Coale v. Hilles, 976 S.W.2d 61, 65 (Mo.App.1998). I, therefore, concur in the result reached by the principal opinion with respect to respondent’s action for specific performance. The trial court committed plain error in ordering specific performance.
. "Title to the property of an incompetent ward is in the ward.” State ex rel. Emmons v. Hollenbeck, 394 S.W.2d 82, 88 n. 6 (Mo.App.1965).