(dissenting.)
I respectfully dissent.
La Jara argues for the first time on appeal that the assessor’s method of valuation was arbitrary and capricious and not in accordance with the law, because the method was a “hybrid” method not authorized by § 7-36-15(B), N.M.S.A. 1978, and because the assessor should have used the comparable sales method. Section 7-36-15(B) states:
Unless a method or methods of valuation are authorized in Sections 7-36-20 through 7-36-33 NMSA 1978, the value of property for property taxation purposes shall be its market value as determined by sales of comparable property or, if that method cannot be used due to the lack of comparable sales data for the property being valued, then its value shall be determined using an income method or cost methods of valuation. In using any of the methods of valuation authorized by this subsection the valuation authority shall apply generally accepted appraisal techniques.
At the hearing, Mr. Castillo, an appraiser for the county, stated that the assessor used the cost method of valuation, plus he had “some comparables to back that up.” The cost method of valuation is an approved method under the statute, and the assessor did not create a “hybrid” method by presenting some comparable sales data to bolster his valuation.
Mr. Castillo did not state why the assessor had used the cost method as opposed to the comparable method. Section 7-36-15(B) requires the assessor to use the comparable sales method of valuation if he has sufficient comparable sales data. It also provides alternate methods if there is not sufficient comparable sales data. It does not render the use of an alternate method invalid, simply because the assessor did not expressly state that he lacked sufficient comparable sales data and therefore had to use an alternate method.
In First National Bank v. Bernalillo Cty. Valuation, 90 N.M. 110, 560 P.2d 174 (Ct.App.1977), this court stated:
At a hearing before the board on the selection of a method of valuation, taxpayer shall present competent evidence to create an issue of fact and request the board to determine the proper method of valuation.
At the hearing, La Jara did not question the assessor’s method of valuation, nor did it present any evidence to create an issue of fact on the method of valuation. The board’s decision that the cost method of valuation was appropriate in this case was not arbitrary or capricious, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.
There is a statutory presumption that the “[v]alues of property for property taxation purposes determined by the department or county assessor” are correct. Section 7-38-6, N.M.S.A. 1978. The taxpayer has the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut the presumption of correctness. Peters on Properties v. Valencia Cty. Val. Protests Bd., 89 N.M. 239, 549 P.2d 1074 (Ct.App.1976). La Jara argues that in this case the presumption of correctness was successfully rebutted, because the assessor used an improper method of valuation. The method of valuation was appropriate under the circumstances.
Therefore, La Jara had the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut the presumption of correctness. The only evidence that La Jara presented to the board was the purchase price of the property. The purchase price of the subject property is not an appropriate measure for valuing that property for tax purposes. New Mexico Baptist v. Bernalillo County, 93 N.M. 363, 600 P.2d 309 (Ct.App.1979); Peterson Properties v. Valencia Cty. Val. Protests Bd. La Jara did not successfully rebut the presumption of correctness of the assessor’s valuation.
La Jara challenges the validity of the comparable sales data, which was used to back up the assessor’s valuation of the property by the cost method. La Jara claims the sales presented by Mr. Castillo were not “comparable” to the property in question for a variety of reasons.
The scope of appellate review does not include a de novo look at the evidence presented to the protests board. Section 7-38-28(D) N.M.S.A. 1978. This court reviews evidence only to determine if there was substantial evidence to support the board’s decision. In Matter of Protest of Miller, 88 N.M. 492, 542 P.2d 1182 (Ct.App.1975), this court stated:
If there is substantial evidence in the record to support a decision of a county valuation protest board, we are bound thereby. United Veterans Org. v. New Mexico Prop. App. Dept., 84 N.M. 114, 500 P.2d 199 (Ct.App.1972). In deciding if there is substantial evidence to support the decision,
“... we must view the evidence in the most favorable light to support the finding and we will reverse only if convinced that the evidence thus viewed, together with all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, cannot sustain the finding. Further, only favorable evidence and the inferences to be drawn therefrom, will be considered, and any evidence unfavorable to the findings will not be considered.”
Id., 84 N.M. at 118, 500 P.2d at 203.
Mr. Castillo testified that the front half of the land was valued at $1.75 per sq. ft., and the back piece was valued at $1.00 per sq. ft. He presented several other land sales along or near Central Avenue ranging from $1.00 per sq. ft. to $1.84 per sq. ft. Mr. Castillo testified that the improvements on the property was appraised at $5,663 per unit using the cost method. He presented sales of other motel and apartment units, the lowest of which was $6,000 per unit, and the highest of which was the sale of the 180 units in the Rodeway Inn in 1980 for approximately $19,000 per unit. The assessor’s valuation of the property in question was lower using the cost method than the figures presented as comparable sales data. I conclude that there was substantial evidence to support the board’s decision that the assessor’s valuation was correct.
For the reasons discussed above, the decision of the board should be affirmed.