Padilla v. Frito-Lay, Inc.

OPINION

WALTERS, Chief Judge

In this workmen’s compensation case, the issue is the propriety of a lump-sum award to plaintiff.

Gilbert Padilla was injured in the course of his employment with defendant Frito-Lay, Inc. As a result of the injury, he suffered complete blindness in the right eye and almost complete blindness in the left eye, along with other related injuries. The court found that Padilla was entitled to permanent and total disability, finding further that it would be in Padilla’s best interest to allow a lump sum settlement so that he could purchase an available coin-operated laundromat. The propriety of granting a lump-sum payment to permit purchase of a business is a matter not previously decided in New Mexico.

Statutory authority for an award of a lump sum compensation award is found at § 52-1-30 B, N.M.S.A.1978. However, periodic payments ordinarily serve the policy of the Workmen’s Compensation Act; the award of a lump sum is the exception. Arther v. Western Company of North America, 88 N.M. 157, 538 P.2d 799 (Ct.App.1975). A petitioner for a lump sum award has the burden of showing that it is in his best interest and that the failure to award a lump sum would create a manifest hardship where relief is essential to protect the claimant and his family from want or privation; to facilitate the production of income for the claimant; or to help the claimant in a rehabilitation program. Codling v. Aztec Well Serv. Co., 89 N.M. 213, 549 P.2d 628 (Ct.App.1976). Each request for a lump-sum payment stands or falls on its own merits, and each case must be considered according to the evidence produced to determine whether sufficient “special circumstances” exist to bring the request within the exception of § 52-1-30B, supra. Id.

Defendants take the position that there was no testimony to the effect that a lump sum was in Padilla’s best interest; that he was competent to operate a laundromat successfully; or that there were exceptional circumstances which would justify the award. They point out that Padilla was not formally evaluated by the rehabilitation center, and they question the evidence presented regarding Padilla’s possibility of success in the laundromat business, given his disability. Defendants contend that the factual evidence in this case is more akin to the decisions in New Mexico in which the award of a lump sum payment was denied. E.g. Arther, supra; Codling, supra; Lamont v. New Mexico Military Inst., 92 N.M. 804, 595 P.2d 774 (Ct.App.1979); and Lane v. Levi Strauss Co., 92 N.M. 504, 590 P.2d 652 (Ct.App.1979).

Claimant in this case is 37 years old, married, and is the sole support of his family. His total and permanent disability payments, if made periodically, would expire before his 48th birthday. He wants to work, but cannot do any of the tasks he was able to perform in the past because of his blindness. He investigated the prospect of owning and operating a laundromat, which was for sale for $55,000. Padilla made himself aware of the usual tasks necessary to run a laundromat; he has sufficient sight to see the machines, make change, and sweep floors; and he has had some experience in the retail field. He was confident he could operate the business with the help of his wife, and with occasional 'assistance from his children. Mr. and Mrs. Padilla reviewed the financial records of the laundromat with the seller and with the seller’s bookkeeper. There was evidence received regarding the good financial condition of the business and its projected net profits.

The director for the Services for the Blind, who had established hundreds of retraining programs for blind persons, testified that blind persons can and do run laundromats. Following several conversations with Padilla, he formed the opinion that Padilla’s visual loss would not be a significant factor in the success or failure of the laundromat business, but that with Padilla’s prior experience, operation of a laundromat which would be “somewhat commensurate” with his prior occupation would help to restore him to his greatest physical, mental, social and vocational potential in “a worthwhile occupation.”

During oral argument, defendants suggested that because plaintiff had not had a disinterested third party evaluate the business to show its potential success we should reverse for lack of the “abundance” of evidence they claim is essential to support the award.

We recognize that a plethora of cases exist wherein lump-sum settlements have been disallowed. Many of those decisions are gathered in Codling, supra, together with an equally long list of cases where lump sums were approved. It is said at 3 Larson Workmen’s Compensation Law 15-576, -577, § 82.72:

[I]f the claimant needs his compensation benefits to pay his everyday living expenses, it obviously would thwart the purposes of the act to cut them off in order to allow claimant to gamble a lump-sum settlement on a business.

The evidence in this case shows that claimant’s living expenses were slightly less than his present income from social security disability payments but, as the trial court found, Padilla never could purchase the laundromat without a lump-sum settlement because of his lack of money or resources to do so. Thus, although periodic payments would supplement an income that appears to be already adequate to support plaintiff and his family and would ease the family’s financial restraints to some degree, we must recognize that the “supplement” would be insufficient to permit plaintiff’s accumulation of resources for any potentially self-sustaining endeavor. In addition, the fact exists that periodic payments will not exceed 600 weeks’ duration beyond the date of initial entitlement, § 52-1-47, N.M.S.A.1978, at the end of which time the workman will again revert to total reliance upon social security disability benefits. The lump-sum payment here will provide a rehabilitative benefit unavailable from periodic payments; it will enable a seriously injured workman to develop the physical, mental and emotional stability that the satisfactions of self-employment and wage-earning responsibilities engender.

The possible tragedies of inactivity while drawing periodic benefits were illustrated in Crews v. Sanderlin & Assoc., 290 So.2d 487 (Fla.1974). There a severely disabled workman became drug- and alcohol-dependent following an industrial accident. His request for a lump-sum settlement was granted so he could get a contracting business started. In affirming the award, the court relied heavily on the factfinder’s detailed reasoning, included in which was the comment that “if this award is not made, we are going to witness the rehabilitative and emotional destruction of this claimant.” At the same time, he recognized “that the economic plans formulated by the claimant may not be as thorough or detailed or precise” as would be desirable; nevertheless, his overriding consideration, addressed to the claimant’s best interests, was his conclusion “that the claimant would be in a much better position to confront those issues [of rehabilitation and family stability] in the position of financial security or independence that the lump sum award would bring.” 290 So.2d at 490.

The question of evidence from an independent appraiser or business analyst to support plaintiff’s expectations of a profitable venture was raised, and dismissed, in Herndon v. City of Miami, 224 So.2d 681 (Fla.1969):

There is no mandatory requirement in the workmen’s compensation law that the claimant produce expert testimony at a hearing to obtain an advance payment of compensation. The Judge is given vast discretion to determine the interests of the claimant and employer and his findings should not be disturbed unless he has abused this discretion or unless there is no competent substantial evidence to support his order.

Id. at 682-83. We would reach the same decision on that issue upon the same grounds. Texas Employers’ Ins. Ass’n v. Rollins, 257 S.W.2d 851 (Tex.Civ.App.1953), is another case in which a lump-sum award to allow establishment of a business was upheld, even though there is no indication from the facts of the case that the claimant had more than a hazy notion of what kind of business he contemplated, or,presented any testimony of anticipated success in his proposed “business.”

It is not enough for defendants to urge here on appeal that plaintiff’s evidence of a prudent investment and income-producing potential was insufficient. Three months before this case was litigated, a pretrial order listed the question of a lump-sum recovery as an issue of fact to be tried. Plaintiff had been investigating the possibility of purchasing a laundromat three to four months before trial. It does not appear that defendants attempted any discovery on the lump-sum issue before trial to find out what use it was intended for and, certainly, as the Herndon court noted, supra, at 224 So.2d 682, they produced no evidence or witnesses at trial to contradict claimant’s basis for believing he has a sound investment.

A reviewing court will not weigh the evidence nor determine the credibility of witnesses; only the trier of facts judges the trial testimony. Marez v. Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corp., 93 N.M. 9, 595 P.2d 1204 (Ct.App.1978). We consider the evidence and inferences that reasonably may be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to support the trial court’s findings. Moorhead v. Gray Ranch Co., 90 N.M. 220, 561 P.2d 493 (Ct.App.1977). Consequently, we uphold the trial court’s decision. There is ample evidence of claimant’s uniquely disabling condition, his initiative and drive to become self-sufficient, a reasonable expectation of success, and a claimant sufficiently young enough to put his remaining physical abilities to fruitful use for many years to come.

The judgment is affirmed.

LOPEZ, J., concurs. HENDLEY, J., dissents.