concurring specially and dissenting.
I concur specially in part I of the Court’s opinion. In my view, whether Washington has adopted a rule similar to the one adopted by this Court in Anderson v. Gailey, 97 Idaho 813, 555 P.2d 144 (1976) is not pertinent to our decision. Our own rule of collateral estoppel is sufficient to dispose of the appeal here.
I dissent from part II. The first ground for my dissent is that this part of the opinion is dictum because it is unnecessary to the disposition of this case. The second ground for my dissent is that I would not adopt an exception to the going and coming rule merely because the employee is traveling in a vehicle furnished by the employer. The reference to this exception in Eriksen v. Nez Perce County, 72 Idaho 1, 4, 235 P.2d 736, 737 (1951) is dictum.